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BEFORE THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO

LA CLERK
VERDENE PAGE,
Claimant-Appellant,

SUPREME COURT NO. 40568

V.

MCCAIN FOODS, INC., Employer, and
TRANSCONTINENTAL INSURANCE COMPANY,
Surety,
Defendants-Respondents,
and

AGENCY'S RECORD

IDAHO INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION,
,

.

l ' ' ' .•

Real Party in Interest-Respondent,

i.i

L. CLYEL BERRY, individually,
Intervenor-Appellant.
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L CLVEL BERRY

L.CLYELBERRY,CHARTERED
Attorney at Law
P.O. Box 302
Twin Falls. ID 83303-0302
Phone: (208) 734-9962
Fax: (208) 734-9962
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RECEIVED

l~OUST?lAL

COMMISSION

FAX TRANSMITTAL COVER SHEET
OUR FAX NUMBER: (208) 734-9962
DATE: November 21, 2011
TO:

Clerk. Idaho Industrial Commission

Fax: 334-2321
RE:

Attached:

Page v. McCain Foods and Transcontinental Insurance
1.C. No. 02-007246
Request for Calendaring re Claimant's Counsel's Petition for Approval of

Fees/Request for IDAPA 17.02.08.033.03.b Hearing.

NUMBER OF PAGES: 6 (INCLUDING COVER SHEET) WITH HARD COPY

ro FOLLOW

If you have not properly received this facsimile, please call us immediately at

(208) 734·9962.
The information contained in this facsimUe message is attorney privileged and
confidential information intended only for the use of the individual or entity named
above. If the reader of this message is not the intended recipient, or the employee or
agent responsible to deliver it to the intended recipient, you are notified that any
dissemination, distribution or copying of this communication is strictly prohibited. If
you have received this communication in error, please immediately notify us by
telephone and return the original message to us via the United States Postal Service.
Thank you.

01/05

11/21/2011

11:4'3

L CLYEL BERRY

208734'3'3
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BEFORE THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION
OF THE STATE OF IOAHO

VerDENE PAGE,

)

l.C. No. 02-007246

)
Claimant,

)

)
)
)

vs.
McCAIN FOODS, INC.,
Employer,

)
)
)

)
a~

TRANSCONTINENTAL INSURANCE
COMPANY,
Surety,
Defendants.

REQUEST FOR CALENDARING
RE CLAIMANT'S COUNSEL'S
PETITION FOR APPROVAL

)

OFFEE~REQUESTFOR

)

IDAPA 17.02.08.033.03.b
HEARING

)
)
)
)
)

~~~~~~~~~~~~-)
COMES NOW Claimant and her counsel of record and, pursuant to
Rules B(C) of the Judicial Rules of Practice and Procedure, revised March 1, 2008,
and/or IDAPA 17.02.08.033.03.b, hereby request that hearing be set upon that
December 17, 2009, Petition for Approval of Fees, inclusive of that April 9, 2010,
Motion to Reconsider and/or Motion for Further Findings; and, Alternative Request
for IDAPA 17.02.08.033.03.b Hearing. Pursuant thereto, Claimant and her counsel
advise as follows:

Request for Calendaring Re Claimant's counsel's Petition for Approval of
Fees/Request for IDAPA 17.02.08.033.03.b Hearing • 1

L. CLYEL BERR

ARTERED

ATTORNEY AND COUNSELOR AT LAW
~

P.O. BOX302
Twin Falls, ID 83303-0302

reie/ihane.:2os1n:t:??62

Fax Number: 2081734-9963
Idaho State Bar No. 1897

BEFORE THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO
)

VerDENE PAGE,

l.C. No. 02-007246

)

Claimant,
vs.
McCAIN FOODS, INC.,
Employer,
and
TRANSCONTINENTAL INSURANCE
COMPANY,

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

REQUEST FOR CALENDARING
RE CLAIMANT'S COUNSEL'S
PETITION FOR APPROVAL
OFFEE~REQUESTFOR

IDAPA 17.02.08.033.03.b
HEARING

)
)

)
Surety,
)
Defendants.
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~·)
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COMES NOW Claimant and her counsel of reco~~n~pursuant to

Rules S(C) of the Judicial Rules of Practice and Procedure,

rev~ M~rch

1, 2008,

and/or IDAPA 17.02.08.033.03.b, hereby request that hearin~ be ~t upon that

c:;

o

December 17, 2009, Petition for Approval of Fees, inclusive of that ~pril 9, 2010,
Motion to Reconsider and/or Motion for Further Findings; and, Alternative Request
for IDAPA 17.02.08.033.03.b Hearing. Pursuant thereto, Claimant and her counsel
advise as follows:
Request for Calendaring Re Claimant's Counsel's Petition for Approval of
Fees/Request for IDAPA 17.02.08.033.03.b Hearing - 1

the discretion of the Idaho State Industrial Commission, either
in Twin Falls, Idaho, or Boise, Idaho. In this regard, the Idaho
State Industrial Commission is advised that Claimant is elderly,
suffers from degenerative disk disease and presents as statuspost bilateral TKAs.
telephone

Upon November 8, 2011, during a

conversation

between

Claimant

and

counsel,

Claimant expressed desire to participate in the forthcoming
hearing and, dependent upon weather conditions as well as
Claimant's state of health, would be willing to travel to Twin
Falls, Idaho, for that purpose. However, Claimant is concerned
that if hearing is scheduled in Boise, that due to the additional
travel involved in conjunction with the potential for inclement
weather and hazardous road conditions, Claimant may not be
able to be personally present. If hearing herein is set in Boise,
Idaho, and Claimant is not able to be physically present,
Claimant would then request that she be allowed to p;:irticipate
therein telephonically from her home, in Paul, Idaho.
2. Request is made that notice of the setting of this matter for
hearing to Claimant and her counsel be at least 45 days.
3. The principal issue for determination by the Commission is
whether circumstances in the instant case are such that the

Request for Calendaring Re Claimant's Counsel's Petition for Approval of
Fees/Request for IDAPA 17.02.08.033.03.b Hearing - 2

---------tt----------H-ld~a...,,h-or--<-S~tasHtoaer-HIn'\-l'd'4+u-H:s'*"'-trial

-Commission should or- v1ill approve

attorney's fees at the rate of forty (40%) percent, as agreed by
and between Claimant and counsel and specifically set-forth
within the Contingent Fee Agreement dated April 24, 2002 or,
at a rate greater than thirty (30%) percent.
4. The desired location of any hearing is either in Twin Falls,
Idaho, or Boise, Idaho, at the convenience and discretion of the
Idaho State Industrial Commission.
5. Counsel WOULD

NOT be available for hearing and/or

conference herein, upon the following dates:
From the date of the instant instrument through January 13,
2012;
January 19 -January 27, 2012;
February 10 - March 2, 2012;
April 13-April 17, 2012;
May 14, 2012;
May 24 -June 6, 2012;
July 2 - July 6, 2012;
July 16 - 17, 2012;
6. Estimated length of hearing is one-half (1/2) day.
7. It is believed that the requested hearing should be held before
the Commissioners of the Idaho State Industrial Commission,

Request for Calendaring Re Claimant's Counsel's Petition for Approval of
Fees/Request for IDAPA 17.02.08.033.03.b Hearing - 3

rather than a Referee. Claimant and her counsel note-#lat-fmrn---+--and following the January 31, 2008, Idaho Supreme Court
Opinion herein, the respective parties' motions as well as
subsequent

hearings

herein

have

been

heard

by

the

Commissioners, rather than by a Referee.
8. By reason of his representation of Surety herein in unrelated
matters,

prior to

being

appointed

as

a Commissioner.

Commissioner Baskin reclused himself from the underlying
proceedings. However, as the issue to be determined by the
Commission for which hearing is hereby requested is unrelated
to Defendants Employer and Surety herein, Claimant and her
counsel hereby advise that they have no objection should
Commissioner Baskin wish to participate in the forthcoming
hearing and issues or matters inherent therein.
Dated this

J._./

day of November, 2011.

0J1:d;~7

L. Clyel

I

Attorney for Claimant

Request for Calendaring Re Claimant's Counsel's Petition for Approval of
Fees/Request for IDAPA 17.02.08.033.03.b Hearing - 4

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I hereby certify that I am a resident attorney of the State of Idaho and
day of November, 2011, I served a copy of the foregoing
that on the ~ (
document, by depositing a true copy thereof in the United States mail, postage
prepaid, upon the following:
VerDene Page
c/o Brad Page
507 West 300 South
Heyburn, ID 83336
And by facsimile upon the following:
Mark C. Peterson
MOFFATT, THOMAS, BARRETT,
ROCK & FIELDS, CHARTERED
Fax Number: (208) 385-5384

Request for Calendaring Re Claimant's Counsel's Petition for Approval of
Fees/Request for IDAPA 17.02.08.033.03.b Hearing - 5

VERDENEPAGE,

)
)

Claimant,

)
)

V.

)

IC 2002-007246

)

McCAIN FOODS, INC.,

)
)

Employer,

)

~d

TRANSCONTINENTAL INSURANCE
COMPANY,
Surety,
Defendants.

NOTICE OF HEARING

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

Fl LE

DEC - 2 2011
INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION

NOTICE IS HEREBY GIVEN that a hearing will be held in the above-entitled matter on
April 10, 2012 at 10:30 a.m., MST, for two hours, in the Industrial Commission hearing room,

1411 Falls Avenue East, Suite 915, City of Twin Falls, County of Twin Falls, State ofldaho, on
Claimant's entitlement to attorney fees.
DATED this yJday of

l)wKlfll

' 2011.

INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I hereby certify that on the M_ day of December, 2011 a true and correct copy of the
NOTICE OF HEARING was served by United States Certified Mail upon each of the following:
L CLYEL BERRY
PO BOX 302
TWIN FALLS ID 83303-0302
NOTICE OF HEARING - 1

@'
\

I

I

and by email to:
DEAN WILLIS
mdwillis l@msn.com
phone (208) 855-9151
and a courtesy copy by regular Unites States mail to:
MARC C PETERSON

::~?0 ;3701
82

NOTICE OF HEARING - 2
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v

BEFORE THE INuUSTPJAL COMMISSION OF THE
VERD ENE PAGE,
Claimant,
v.
McCAIN FOODS, INC.,
Employer,
and
TRANSCONTINENTAL INSURANCE
COMPANY,
Surety,
Defendants.

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

~-ATE

OF IDAHO

IC 2002-007246

AMENDED NOTICE OF HEARING

Fi LED

12
COMMISSION

NOTICE IS HEREBY GIVEN that a hearing will be held in the above-entitled matter on

April 10, 2012 at 10:30 a.m., MST, for two hours, in the Industrial Commission hearing room,
1411 Falls Avenue East, Suite 915, City of Twin Falls, County of Twin Falls, State ofldaho, on
Claimant's attorney's entitlement to attorney fees.
DATED this

('2.,#.

Lf

ci '-pvtH.£~11'

0 , 2012.

INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION

NOTICE OF HEARING - 1

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that on the
[')_tl\_ ~
of January, 2012, a true and
correct copy of the NOTICE OF HEARING was served by United States Certified Mail upon
each of the following:

L CLYEL BERRY
PO BOX 302
TWIN FALLS ID 83303-0302
and by email to:
DEAN WILLIS
mdwillis l@msn.com
phone (208) 855-9151
and a courtesy copy by regular Unites States mail to:
MARK C PETERSON
PO BOX 829
BOISE ID 83701

amw

NOTICE OF HEARING - 2

03/30/2012

10:34

L CLYEL BERRY

2087349 ..

L.CLYELBERRY,CHARTERED
Attorney at Law
P.O. Box 302
Twin Falls, ID 83303-0302
Phone: (208) 734-9962
Fax: (208) 734-9963

PAGE
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FAX TRANSMITTAL COVER SHEET

OUR FAX NUMBER: (208) 734-9963

DATE: March 30, 2012

TO:

Clerk, Idaho Industrial Commission
Fax: 334-2321
RE:

Page v. McCain Foods and Transcontinental Insurance
1.C. No. 02-007246

Attached: Third Affidavit of L. Clyel Berry in Support of Petition for Approval of Fees, dated
March 30, 2012, with original to follow via U.S. Mail.
NUMBER OF PAGES: __ (INCLUDING COVER SHEET)
If you have not properly received this facsimile, please call us immediately at
(208) 7:J4-9962.
The information contained in this facsimile message is attorney privileged and
confidential information intended only for the use of the individual or entity named
above. If the reader of this message is not the intended recipient, or the employee or
agent responsible to deliver it to the intended recipient, you are notified that any
dissemination, distribution or copying of this communication is strictly prohibited. If
you have received this communication in error, please immediately notify us by
telephone and return the original message to us via the United States Postal Service.
Thank you.

@

03/30/2012

10:34

L CLYEL BERRY

2087349

PAGE

02/59

~

L.CLYELBERRY,CHARTERED
A'ITORNEY AND COu'NSELOR AT LAW
P.O. BOX 309
1'wln Fllll!i, ID 8!1303.Q.'102

Tclcpllone: 208/734-9962

ZfilZ

FIU Number: 208(134-$.96.'J

I<l11ho Stace J1Rr No. 1897

!~

30 A !Q: 3'1
f~ECEtVEO

STRIM Cf!HHISSION

BEFORE THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF THE STATE OF IDAHO
VerDENE PAGE,
Claimant,
vs.
McCAIN FOODS, INC.,
Employer,
and
TRANSCONTINENTAL INSURANCE
COMPANY,
Surety,

STATE OF IDAHO, INDUSTRIAL SPECIAL
INDEMNITY FUND,

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

J.C. No. 02-007246

THIRD AFFIDAVIT OF
L. CLYEL BERRY IN
SUPPORT OF PETITION
FOR APPROVAL OF FEES

)
)
)
)

)
Defendant.
)
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~>
The purpose of the instant Affidavit is to set-forth facts and/or data
believed pertinent to the Petition for Approval of Fees, currently pending before the

Idaho State Industrial Commission, occurring subsequent in time to that Affidavit of

L. Clyel Berry in Support of Petition for Approval of Fees, dated December 17,

2009.

Third Affidavit Of L. Clyel Berry In Support Of Petition For Approval Of Fees~ 1

/

r

-;
TERED

L. CLYEL BERR

AITORNEY AND COUNSELOR AT LAW
P.O.BOX302
TWin ralls,1JJ 83303-0302
Telephone: 208/734-9962
Fax Number: 208/734-9963
Idaho State Bar No. 1897

BEFORE THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF THE STATE OF IDAHO
VerDENE PAGE,
Claimant,
vs.
McCAIN FOODS, INC.,
Employer,
and
TRANSCONTINENTAL INSURANCE
COMPANY,
Surety,
STATE OF IDAHO, INDUSTRIAL SPECIAL
INDEMNITY FUND,
Defendant.

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

l.C. No. 02-007246

THIRD AFFIDAVIT OF
L. CLYEL BERRY IN
SUPPORT OF PETITION
FOR APPROVAL OF FEES

The purpose of the instant Affidavit is to set-forth facts and/or data
believed pertinent to the Petition for Approval of Fees, currently pending before the
Idaho State Industrial Commission, occurring subsequent in time to that Affidavit of

L. Clyel Berry in Support of Petition for Approval of Fees, dated December 17,
2009.

Third Affidavit Of L. Clyel Berry In Support Of Petition For Approval Of Fees - 1

STATE OF IDAHO

)
) SS.

County of Twin Falls.

)

L. Clyel Berry, having been first duly sworn on oath, deposes and

states as follows:
1.

That your affiant is an attorney licensed to practice law by and
within the state of Idaho, and is counsel of record for Claimant
herein.

Further, affiant herein makes factual representations

based upon personal knowledge as to matters upon which he
would be competent to testify before the Idaho State Industrial
Commission or a Court of appropriate jurisdiction, as to data,
facts and/or events occurring subsequent in time to affiant's
Affidavit in Support of Petition for Approval of Fees, dated
December 17, 2009.
2.

That upon September 23, 2010, Claimant underwent right TKA
by Dr.

Joseph

Petersen.

Defendants denied Title 72

compensability with regard to right knee presentment.
3.

That upon November 17, 2010, Dr. Petersen advised that
Claimant had achieved maximum medical stability status-post
right TKA; advised that the need for right TKA was either a
direct or indirect consequence of Claimant's August 7, 2001,
industrial left knee injury; assigned impairment related to

Third Affidavit Of L. Clyel Berry In Support Of Petition For Approval Of Fees - 2

Claimant's right knee, status-post TKA, of 21-25% of the lower
extremity or, 8-10% of the whole man; and, apportioned that
impairment as being 20% industrial and 80% by reason of preexisting presentment.
4.

Defendants required that Claimant undergo IME by Dr. Brian
Tallerico, D.O., upon March 26, 2010, and August 5, 2011. Dr.
Tallerico's reports generated by reason of those examinations
stated his opinion that neither Claimant's left nor right TKAs
were related to the August 17, 2001, industrial accident.

5.

To respond to the opinions of Dr. Tallerico, counsel retained Dr.
Frederick Surbaugh, a board-certified orthopedic surgeon, who
conducted a records review and performed an orthopedic
examination upon Claimant and thereafter authored his report
of August 17, 2011.

Thereby, Dr. Surbaugh indicated his

concurrences with Dr. Petersen, that Claimant's change of gait
by reason of left industrial knee injury resulted in, " ... an
acceleration of right knee degenerative joint disease with the
need for total knee arthroplasty."
6.

Following additional discovery by and upon behalf of the
respective

parties,

encompassing

not

only

Defendants

employer and surety but also the ISIF, this matter was set for
hearing before the Idaho State Industrial Commission, with
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hearing scheduled for September 20, 2011.

Issues to be

determined within that proceeding included:
a.

Claimant's entitlement to permanent partial impairment
by reason of left knee presentment, status-post left TKA;

b.

Claimant's entitlement to permanent disability by reason
of left knee presentment, status-post TKA, specifically to
encompass whether Claimant presents as entitled to
total and permanent disability benefits, pursuant to oddlot theories, or otherwise;

c.

Whether Claimant's right knee presentment, specifically
to encompass need for right TKA, was either directly or
indirectly related to or as consequence of the August 17,
2001, industrial occurrence.

Should Claimant prevail

upon that issue, additional issues included:
(1)

Entitlement to medical benefits relating to right
knee presentment, specifically to encompass
recent right TKA;

(2)

Entitlement to temporary disability benefits related
to right knee presentment;

(3)

Entitlement

to

permanent

partial

impairment

related to right knee presentment, status-post
right TKA; and,
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(4)

Whether Claimant suffered permanent disability in
excess of impairment related

to right knee

presentment, specifically to encompass whether
Claimant presents as totally and permanently
disabled pursuant to theories

of odd-lot,

or

otherwise;
d.

Issues of apportionment;

e.

If Claimant presents as totally and permanently disabled,
whether Defendant, ISIF, would bear responsibility
therefor pursuant to Idaho Code § 72-332, and if so, the
determination thereof; and,

f.

Responsibility of Defendants employer and surety for
fees, pursuant to Idaho Code § 72-804.

7.

Defendants employer and surety retained Mr. William "Bill"
Jordan as a vocational expert.

By Mr. Jordan's report dated

September 16, 2011, he expressed opinion that there were
numerous "reasonable jobs" available for Claimant within her
community and noted that he had presented descriptions of
certain of those potential employments to Claimant's surgeon,
Dr. Petersen, and that several of the same were "approved" by
him.

It was

Mr.

Jordan's ultimate opinion that upon

consideration of both medical and relevant non-medical factors,
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Claimant suffered permanent partial disability of 42% of the
whole person.
8.

Counsel retained Mr. Douglas Crum upon behalf of Claimant,
as vocational consultant/expert. It was Mr. Crum's opinion that
upon consideration of Claimant's left knee presentment, statuspost TKA, she had lost all access to employment within her
labor market, even without consideration of Claimant's right
knee or other physical presentments.

9.

Following review of pertinent medical records; transcriptions of
the prior hearings, together with the exhibits introduced therein;
and, taking the deposition of Claimant, it was the position of
ISIF and its counsel, Mr. Thomas High, that the ISIF bore no
responsibility even should Claimant be ultimately determined to
be totally and permanently disabled. Upon said basis, the ISIF
advised that it would make no contribution to any potential
settlement of the then pending claims.

10.

Approximately three weeks prior to the scheduled September
20, 2011, hearing herein, Defendants employer and surety and
Claimant agreed to vacate said hearing and proceed to
mediation, which Commissioner Thomas P. Baskin agreed to
mediate.

At mediation, all remaining Title 72 claims against

Defendants employer and surety were settled, with two
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Agreements.

One Agreement provided that Defendants

employer and surety prepare and present a Medicare Set-Aside
for CMS approval, as Claimant is now a Medicare beneficiary/
recipient, with respect to future potential medical expenses.
Should the amount submitted as the Medicare Set-Aside not be
approved by CMS, Defendant-surety retained the unilateral
option to submit different amounts to CMS sufficient to obtain
CMS approval of the Medicare Set-Aside; or, to leave
Claimant's Title 72 medical benefits open.
Agreement encompassed all Title 72
prospective medical benefits.

The second

benefits excepting

Pursuant thereto, those claims

were settled with Defendants paying additional consideration of
$248,750.00, new and additional monies.
11.

That attorney's fees requested by Claimant's counsel with
respect to the proceeds of the above-referenced Lump Sum
Agreement not pertaining to prospective Title 72 medical
benefits,

were

pursuant to the

parties'

Contingent

Fee

Agreement of April 24, 2002, providing for fees through hearing
at the contingent rate of 30% of benefits obtained; and,
following the filing of an appeal, at the contingent rate of 40% of
benefits obtained.
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12.

The

Commission's

Amended

Order

Approving

in

Part

Stipulation and Agreement of Lump Sum Discharge, dated
December 9, 2011, to the extent pertinent to the instant issue,
approved fees at the 30% contingent rate, totaling $74,625.00,
and instructed the surety to release to affiant the sum of
$24,875.00, representing the differential between contingent
fees at 40% and 30%, to be held in trust by affiant pending
further order of the Commission.
13.

The Commission also authorized

payment of Claimant's

outstanding medical bills to Minidoka Memorial Hospital and Dr.
Petersen, and to retain in trust an appropriate amount to satisfy
Medicare's statutory lien.
14.

Affiant filed his Petition for Approval of Fees by document dated
December 17, 2009, together with supporting Affidavits dated
December 17, 2009, and December 28, 2009.

Further,

Claimant, VerDene Page, signed an Approval and Joinder of
Petition for Approval of Fees, dated December 22, 2009, of
record herein.

Responsive thereto, the Commission filed its

Order Regarding Attorney Fees, dated April 1, 2010, denying
approval of fees greater than 30% of the value of the benefits
awarded by its September 8, 2009, decision.
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15.

Following

the

Commission's

April

1,

2010,

Order,

disbursements were made as fully disclosed within that
Confidential Addendum to Lump Sum Settlement Agreement
Between Claimant and Defendants Employer and Surety dated
October 25, 2011, a true and correct photocopy of which is
herewith affixed, as Exhibit A hereto.

Subsequent to said

Confidential Addendum and pursuant to the Commission's
Order dated December 9, 2011, Claimant received Title 72
benefits totaling $130,504.17; Minidoka Memorial Hospital was
paid $1,269.78; Dr. Petersen was paid $351.57; affiant retains
in his trust account the sum of $15,253.36, as and for
Medicare's statutory lien; affiant received fees in the amount of
$7 4,625.00, together with reimbursement of costs totaling
$1,871.12; and, affiant is retaining in his trust account the sum
of $24,875.00, pending further Order of this Commission.
16.

That by that Confidential Addendum dated October 25, 2011,
attached hereto as Exhibit A,, referencing paragraph 3 at pages
12-21 thereof, a full accounting of Title 72 benefits received
together with disbursements thereof is set-forth and disclosed,
to the date of said Confidential Addendum.

17.

As

of current date,

Claimant

has

received

a total of

$265,959.45, from the proceeds of the instant action. The sum-
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total of indemnity benefits awarded herein, inclusive of the
Lump Sum Settlement approved by the Commission by its
Order Approving in Part, dated November 9, 2011, being the
total of temporary disability benefits together with consideration
as and for permanent impairment and/or disability, is in the sum
of $376.078.27. Thusly, amounts received by Claimant as of
current date equal 70.7% of all indemnity benefits, without
consideration

of monies

held

in

affiant's trust

account

representing the differential of contingent fees between a 40%
and a 30% rate. Such results from Claimant receiving benefit
of affiant's negotiation of certain of Claimant's medical billings;
of certain of Claimant's medical billings being satisfied at a
reduced level by Medicaid; and, of affiant adding into the "pot"
to be shared with Claimant certain of the l.C. § 72-804 fees
awarded herein.
18.

That the Contingent Fee Agreement entered into by and
between Claimant and affiant herein, dated April 24, 2002, of
record in this matter, is in a format providing for fees at different
rates for benefits obtained prior to hearing; following hearing, to
the point where appeal is filed or the matter is scheduled for rehearing; and, following the filing of an appeal or the scheduling
of re-hearing, which has been used by affiant/affiant's office for
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many years both prior to and following that April 24, 2002
Agreement.

Further, the format of said Contingent Fee

Agreement had been presented to the Idaho State Industrial
Commission upon multiple and numerous occasions prior to the
Commission's Order Regarding Attorney Fees, dated and filed
April 1, 2010, herein, in conjunction with the Commission's
review of proposed lump sum settlements involving affiant's
past clients. Yet, upon no occasion prior to the April 1, 2010,
Order Regarding Attorney Fees in the instant matter had affiant
been advised by or upon behalf of the Commission that it would
reject or consider with disfavor an increase in the contingent
fee rate greater than 30%, for benefits obtained following the
filing of an appeal or the scheduling of the matter for re-hearing.
Further,

having

knowledge

of

affiant's

standard

Contingent Fee Agreements, inclusive of the provision for an
increase in contingent fees from 30% following the filing of an
appeal or the scheduling of re-hearing, affiant was not advised
that the Commission would not approve contingent fees greater
than the rate set-forth within the parties' Stipulation Regarding
Attorney Fees prior to entry of the Commission's Order
Granting Stipulation, dated and filed October 22, 2009. Such
position of the Commission is not set-forth or referenced by or
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within IDAPA 17.02.08.033, Rule Governing Approval of
Attorney Fees in Workers' Compensation Cases, a true and
correct copy of said Rule as was in force from July 1, 1994 to
April 7, 2011, as well as in force from and following April 7,
2011, are, each, herewith affixed as Exhibit B, collectively.
19.

That, as disclosed by and within paragraph 4 of the Confidential
Addendum dated October 25, 2011, identified as Exhibit A
hereto, upon page 16 thereof, by reason of error on the part of
affiant,

no

fees

were withheld

from

Title

72

benefits

encompassed within Defendants' $15,630.73 check dated May
18, 2006, representing medical and additional temporary total
disability benefits, pursuant to the Commission's May 9, 2006,
Order. Affiant hereby specifically requests the approval of the
Commission for fees upon said $15,630. 73.

Fees at the

contingent rate of 30% equal $4,689.22, whereas fees at the
Contingent rate of 40% equal $6,252.29.
20.

Affiant currently holds in trust monies

representing the

differential between fees at a 40% rate and a 30% rate, totaling
$51,552.75.

If affiant's Fee Petition is denied, such that

Claimant receives said monies, Claimant will then have
received $317,512.20, in a matter where indemnity benefits
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paid total $376,078.27, being 84.43% of total indemnity
benefits.
21.

That throughout the period of time that affiant has represented
Claimant in the instant proceedings, affiant advanced costs
totaling $7,073.56, regarding which he has been reimbursed
$7,020.02, as approved by the Commission.

Further, as of

today's date, affiant's actual recorded time in his representation
of Claimant totals 752 hours.
22.

That your affiant currently holds within his office's trust account,
the

sum

of $42,341.32, to

satisfy

Medicare's statutory

lien/rights of subrogation, with respect to the instant matter.
Although Medicare will not "finalize" the amount of its lien
pending the full and final closure of Ms. Page's Title 72 claim,
inclusive of the decision of the Commission upon affiant's Fee
Petition, affiant believes that the amounts held in trust will be
found to be greater than Medicare's lien by $5,000.00 to
$7,000.00. To the extent of any excess monies within affiant's
trust account greater than Medicare's lien, the same will be
promptly remitted to Claimant.

Further, Medicare's lien is

subject to pro-rata reduction to the extent of attorney fees and
costs.

Thusly, Claimant will receive, dependent upon the

Commission's

decision

upon

affiant's

Petition for Fees,
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additional funds to the extent of either 30 or 40% of Medicare's
lien.
Affiant reasonably anticipates Claimant will receive
additional monies of at least approximately $16,000.00, being
$5,000.00 from funds within affiant's trust account held for
Medicare

excess

to

Medicare's

ultimate

lien

plus

reimbursement of fees upon pro-rata basis from Medicare's lien
at 30% of $37,341.00, being $11,202.00.
If affiant's Fee Petition is approved, Claimant will then
have received $281,959.45, in a matter where indemnity
benefits paid total $376,078.27, being 75% of total indemnity
benefits. Thusly, affiant is not proposing fees which result in
Claimant receiving less than 75% of total indemnity benefits
paid. Conversely, if affiant's Fee Petition is denied, Claimant
will then have received $337,448.60 in a matter where
indemnity benefits paid total $376,078.27, being 89.7% of total
indemnity benefits.
23.

Affiant herewith affixes true and correct photocopies of his
correspondences to Claimant, Ms. VerDene Page, dated
December 29, 2009; April 6, 201 O; May 13, 201 O; and, March
30, 2012, respectively identified as Exhibits C-F, hereof.
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WHEREFORE, your affiant advises of his opinion that, with the
submission of the instant Affidavit together with the Exhibits thereto, facts known to
affiant relevant and material to the Commission's consideration of the pending
Petition for Approval of Fees, dated December 17, 2009; and/or, Motion to
Reconsider and/or Motion for Further Findings and, Alternative Request for IDAPA
17.02.08.033.03.b Hearing, dated April 9, 2010, have been disclosed to and are of
record before the Commission.
Dated this

:J.j_ day of March, 2012

SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me this

21_ day of March,

2012.

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I hereby certify that I am a resident attorney of the State of Idaho and
that on the 30th day of March, 2012, I served a copy of the foregoing document by
depositing a true copy thereof in the United States mail, postage prepaid,
addressed to the following:
VerDene Page
507 West 300 South
Heyburn, ID 83336

L. Clyel
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L. CLYEL B

Y, CHARTERED

ATTORNEY AND

'NSELORATLA\V

P.O. BOX 302
Twin Falls, ID 83303-0302
Telephone: 2081734-9962
Fax Number: 2081734-9963
Idaho State Bar No. 1897

BEFORE THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO
VerDENE PAGE,

)

l.C. No. 02-007246

)

Claimant,

)
)

vs.

)
)

McCAIN FOODS, INC.,

)
)

Employer,

)
)

and

)

CONFIDENTIAL ADDENDUM
TO LUMP SUM SETTLEMENT
AGREEMENT BETWEEN
CLAIMANT AND DEFENDANTS
EMPLOYER AND SURETY

)

TRANSCONTINENTAL INSURANCE
COMPANY,

)
)
)

Surety,

)
)

STATE OF IDAHO, INDUSTRIAL
SPECIAL INDEMNITY FUND,

)
)
)

Defendants.
)
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~)
COMES NOW Claimant's counsel of record pursuant to that Order of
the Idaho State Industrial Commission, dated December 21, 1989, as amended by
IDAPA 17 Title 02 Chapter 08, and advises the Commission and its members as
follows:
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1.

That counsel became involved in this matter on or about April
24, 2002.

2.

That the then current issues and those issues which developed
subsequently and which were and/or are in controversy herein
are as follows:
(a)

Whether the occasion of Claimant suffering knee pain upon
rising from a seated position, during her employment upon
August

17,

2001,

constituted

a

compensable

event

(accident and/or injury) pursuant to Title 72;
(b)

Whether

Claimant's

oral/telephonic

statement to

her

immediate supervisor constituted sufficient notice pursuant
to Title 72, where no written notice was filed within the
prescribed sixty (60) day period;
(c)

Whether

Claimant's meniscus

injury,

for which

she

presented to Dr. Petersen and arthroscopic surgery was
performed, was causally related to or resultant of the
August 17, 2001, occurrence and,

if so,

Claimant's

entitlement to:
(1)

Medical benefits;

(2)

Temporary disability benefits;

(3)

Permanent partial impairment;
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(4)

Disability in excess of impairment, encompassing
odd-lot theories; and,

(5)

Fees, pursuant to l.C. § 72-804.

The above issues were the subject of the initial hearing
before the Idaho State Industrial Commission in this matter,
held upon April 22, 2003. By its Findings of Fact, Conclusions
of Law, and Order, dated and filed December 8, 2003, the
Commission held that Claimant failed to comply with the notice
requirements set forth in Idaho Code §§ 72-701 through 706;
and, that Claimant failed to prove she suffered an injury caused
by an accident arising out of and in the course of her
employment. Thusly, all other issues were rendered moot.
Claimant then appealed the December 8, 2003, decision
of the Commission to the Idaho Supreme Court. By its opinion
dated

April

8,

2005, the Supreme

Court

reversed the

Commission's determination that Claimant failed to give proper
notice to her employer; and, that Claimant did not experience
an "accident," pursuant to Title 72.

The matter was then

remanded back to the Industrial Commission for further findings
and/or proceedings.
Upon June 14, 2005, the Commission issued
Findings, Conclusions and Order on Remand.

its

Thereby, the
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Commission

determined that Claimant's torn

left

medial

meniscus occurred when she arose from a sitting position at
work, upon August 17, 2001; awarded Claimant medical
benefits through November 26, 2001, and determined that
medical care thereafter was a result of, "... other conditions not
related to the accident at work"; awarded Claimant one (1 %)
percent whole person permanent physical impairment; and,
found that Claimant suffered a five (5%) percent permanent
partial disability related to the industrial occurrence, inclusive of
PPI.

Following the Commission's June 14, 2005, Findings,
Conclusions, and Order on Remand, Claimant's counsel filed a
series of Motions, each of which was fully briefed, as follows:
a.

Motion

for

Reconsideration;

Motion

for Additional

Findings; and, Alternative Motion to Reopen, dated July
5, 2005, which Motions were, each, denied by the
Commission's Order Regarding Pending Motions, dated
September 23, 2005; and,
b.

Claimant's Second Motion for Reconsideration, dated
September 28, 2005, which was effectively denied by
the Commission's Order Regarding Claimant's Second
Motion for Reconsideration, filed November 23, 2005.
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Claimant and Defendants had a disagreement regarding
Defendants' obligations pursuant to the Commission's June 14,
2005, Findings, Conclusions, and Order on Remand.

To

resolve that dispute, counsel filed Claimant's Motion for Entry of
Order for Award Sum Certain/Motion for Additional Findings,
dated November 1, 2005.

The dispute presented by that

Motion involved the correct calculation of temporary total
disability benefits awarded; and, the obligation of Defendants
for medical benefits, inclusive of whether Defendants would be
allowed to "audit" those benefits or were responsible for the
medical costs as billed.

Following briefing and hearing, the

Commission, entered is Order Granting Benefits and Fees,
dated May 9, 2006, in favor of Claimant upon the disputes and
awarding fees against Defendants, pursuant to l.C. § 72-804.
Claimant appealed the Commission's June 14, 2005,
Findings, Conclusions, and Order on Remand to the Idaho
State Supreme Court. By its opinion dated January 31, 2008,
the Supreme Court reversed the Commission's denial of
Claimant's Motion to review the case to correct a manifest
injustice; reversed and remanded upon the Commission's
finding of apportionment of Claimant's permanent disability;
reversed the Commission's denial of Claimant's Motion to
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Reconsider on the basis of timeliness; and, reversed the
Commission's finding that Page was not entitled to fees on the
first Appeal, while declining to award fees for the second
appeal. Again, the matter was remanded to the Commission
for further findings and/or proceedings.
Upon remand from the January 31, 2008, Supreme
Court Opinion, the matter was set for full hearing before the
Idaho State Industrial Commission and hearing was thereupon
held, upon April 9, 2009. Following the taking and filing of the
parties'

post-hearing

depositions

and

full

briefing,

the

Commission filed its Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and
Order, dated September 8, 2009. Therein and thereby it was
determined, as follows:
a.

That Claimant's left total knee arthroplasty (TKA) by Dr.
Peterson of May 22, 2008, was causally related to the
August 17, 2001, industrial knee injury and that the need
for said TKA had been accelerated thereby;

b.

That Claimant had been within the period of medical
recovery from the date of her injury, being August 17,
2001, to September 21, 2008, four months status-post
left TKA;
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c.

That the issue of whether a right TKA would be
"reasonable medical care" was not ripe for decision; and,

d.

That Claimant was entitled to fees, pursuant to l.C. § 72-

804.
Following

the

Commission's

September

8,

2009,

decision herein, Claimant continued with medical care with her
orthopedic surgeon, Dr. Joseph Petersen, with the substantial
portion

of

said

treatment

being

progressive

and

increasing

right

related
knee

to

Claimant's

symptomatology.

Ultimately, Claimant proceeded with right TKA by Dr. Petersen
upon September 23, 2010.
It was the opinion of Or. Petersen that Claimant's need
for right TKA had been accelerated by reason of Claimant's
change of gait status-post her August 17, 2001, left knee injury.
Defendants' IME physician, Dr. Tallerico, expressed opposing
opinion. Based upon that opinion, Defendants denied Title 72
benefits related to Claimant's right knee presentment. To rebut
the opinions of Or. Tallerico, at Claimant's counsel's request,
Claimant underwent examination by Dr. Frederick Surbaugh, a
board-certified orthopedic surgeon whose practice is focused
upon injuries to and treatment of conditions involving the large
joints of the body, specifically the knee. Following examination
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of Claimant and pertinent records review, it was Dr. Surbaugh's
opinion

that

Claimant's

need

for

right TKA

had

been

accelerated by reason of her change of gait status-post the
August 17, 2001 left knee injury.
Upon October 27, 2009, Claimant's counsel filed a
Workers'

Compensation

Complaint Against the Industrial

Special Indemnity Fund (ISIF). Thereafter, following additional
discovery by or upon behalf of the respective parties, this
matter was set for additional hearing before the Idaho State
Industrial Commission, with hearing scheduled for September
20, 2011.

Issues to be determined within that proceeding

included the following:
a.

Claimant's entitlement to permanent partial impairment
by reason of left knee presentment, status-post left TKA;

b.

Claimant's entitlement to permanent disability by reason
of left knee presentment, status-post TKA, specifically to
encompass whether Claimant presents as entitled to
total and permanent disability benefits, pursuant to oddlot theories, or otherwise;

c.

Whether Claimant's right knee presentment, specifically
to encompass need for right TKA, was either directly or
indirectly related to or as consequence of the August 17,
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2001, industrial occurrence.

Should Claimant prevail

upon that issue, additional issues include:
(1)

Entitlement to medical benefits relating to right
knee presentment,

specifically to encompass

recent right TKA;
(2)

Entitlement to temporary disability benefits related
to right knee presentment;

(3)

Entitlement

to

permanent

partial

impairment

related to right knee presentment, status-post
right TKA; and,
(4)

Whether Claimant suffered permanent disability in
excess of impairment related to right knee
presentment, specifically to encompass whether
Claimant presents as totally and permanently
disabled pursuant to theories of odd-lot, or
otherwise;

d.

Issues of apportionment;

e.

If Claimant presents as totally and permanently disabled,
whether Defendant,

ISIF, would

bear responsibility

therefor pursuant to Idaho Code § 72-332 and, if so, the
determination thereof; and,
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f.

Responsibility of Defendants employer and surety for
fees, pursuant to Idaho Code§ 72-804.
The parties each retained a vocational consultant and/or

expert, to express opinions regarding Claimant's permanent
disability.

Defendants retained Mr. William "Bill" Jordan.

By

Mr. Jordan's report of September 16, 2011, he expressed
opinion that there were numerous "reasonable jobs" available
for Claimant within her community.
presented

descriptions

of

certain

Mr. Jordan thereafter
of

those

potential

employments to Claimant's surgeon, Dr. Petersen, several of
which were "approved" by him.

It was Mr. Jordan's ultimate

opinion that, considering the vocational factors of loss of
access and

loss of earning capacity,

Claimant suffered

permanent partial disability of forty-two (42%) percent of the
whole person.
Claimant retained Mr. Douglas Crum as her vocational
consultant/expert.

It was Mr. Crum's opinion that upon

consideration of Claimant's left knee presentment, status-post
TKA, she had lost all access to employment within her labor
market, without consideration of Claimant's right knee or other
physical presentments.
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Following review of pertinent medical records; transcripts
of the prior hearings together with the exhibits introduced
therein; and, taking the deposition of Claimant, it was the
position of ISIF and its counsel, Mr. Thomas High, that the ISIF
bore no responsibility even should Claimant be ultimately
determined to be totally and permanently disabled by the
Commission.

Upon that basis, the ISIF advised that it would

make no contribution to any potential settlement and, in fact,
filed its Motion To Be Excused From Mediation.
Approximately three weeks prior to the September 20,
2011 scheduled hearing, Defendants, employer and surety, and
Claimant agreed to vacate the September 20, 2011, hearing
and

proceed

with

mediation

upon

that

date,

which

Commissioner Thomas P. Baskin agreed to mediate.

In

mediation and subject only to approval by the Commission, the
parties

reached

settlement

of

all

issues,

current

and

prospective, herein.
Summarized, the

settlement reached

at mediation

provided for two lump sum settlements, with one Agreement to
provide that Defendants employer and surety prepare and
present a Medicare Set-Aside for CMS approval, as Claimant is
a Medicare beneficiary/recipient, with respect to future potential
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medical expenses.

Should the amount cited as a Medicare

Set-Aside be not approved by CMS, Defendant-surety retains
the unilateral option to submit different amounts to CMS
sufficient to obtain CMS approval of the Medicare Set-Aside, or
to leave Claimant's Title 72 medical benefits open. Secondly,
with regard to ail actual or potential claims for benefits which
Claimant has or may have pursuant to Title 72, Idaho Code,
and as direct or indirect consequence of the August 17, 2001,
occurrence, Defendants will pay to Claimant the sum of
$248,750.00, new and additional monies.
3.

That attorney's fees, requested by Claimant's counsel with
respect to the proceeds of the proposed Lump Sum Agreement
are pursuant to the parties' Contingent Fee Agreement of April
24, 2002, a true and correct photocopy of which is herewith
attached.

The amount of said fees is subject to review and

determination by the Commission, as said Fee Agreement
provides for fees through hearing at the contingent rate of thirty
(30%) percent of benefits obtained; and, following the filing of
an appeal, fees to then be at the contingent rate of forty (40%)
percent of benefits obtained.

The Commission currently has

pending before it Claimant's counsel's Motion to Reconsider
and/or Motion for Further Findings; and, Alternative Request for
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IDAPA 17.02.08.033.03.b hearing, which may now be set at the
convenience of the Commission.

There have been prior

receipts of fees by counsel related to this matter, as follows:
a.

$3,253.94, upon October 24, 2005, being thirty (30%)
percent of $10,846.46, tendered by Defendant-surety by
check dated October 4, 2005, which amount represented
Defendants' computation of non-medical benefits due by
the Commission's June 14, 2005, Findings, Conclusions
and Order, comprising temporary total disability; award
of five (5%) percent disability, inclusive of impairment;
and,

accrued

interest.

Additionally,

the

sum

of

$1,084.64, was deposited into counsel's trust account,
pending

review

and

final

determination

by

the

Commission of fees due counsel pursuant to the Fee
Agreement between Claimant and counsel providing for
post-appeal fees at the contingent rate of forty (40%)
percent of benefits obtained.
b.

$458.79, upon December 12, 2005, being thirty (30%)
percent of $1,529.29, tendered by Defendant-surety by
check

dated

represented

December
Defendants'

5,

2005,

computation

which

amount

of additional

temporary total disability benefits. Additionally, the sum
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of $152.93, was deposited into counsel's trust account,
pending

review

and

final

determination

by

the

Commission of fees due counsel pursuant to the Fee
Agreement between Claimant and counsel providing for
post-appeal fees at the contingent rate of forty (40%)
percent of benefits obtained.
c.

$5,700.00, upon June 1, 2006, being agreed fees
between Defendants and Claimant's counsel pursuant to
the Commission's May 9, 2006, Order Granting Benefits
and Fees upon Claimant's October 25, 2005, Motion for
Entry of Order for Award Sum Certain/Motion for
Additional Findings, compensating Claimant's counsel at
a

negotiated

hourly

rate

for

his

recorded

time

corresponding with said Motion.
d.

$11,790.00, upon June 25, 2008, representing monies
awarded as fees for the first appeal, by the Supreme
Court in the second appeal, Page v. McCain Foods,
Inc., 145 Idaho 302, 179 P.3d 265 (Idaho 2008). Said

fees compensated counsel upon an hourly basis for his
recorded hours corresponding with the first appeal to the
Supreme Court in this matter.
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e.

$39,478.30, on November 30, 2009, being thirty (30%)
of fees from surety's check dated November 3, 2009, in
the amount of $131,594.32, being Claimant's temporary
total disability award pursuant to the Commission's
September 8, 2009, Order.

Additionally, the sum of

$13, 159.43, was deposited into counsel's trust account,
pending

review

and

final

determination

by

the

Commission of fees due counsel pursuant to the Fee
Agreement between Claimant and counsel providing for
post-appeal fees at the contingent rate of forty (40%)
percent of benefits obtained.
f.

$17,612.44 received upon January 4, 2010, being thirty
(30%) percent of the Defendant-surety's check dated
December 9, 2009, in the amount of $58,708.13,
representing

attorney's

fees

awarded

by

the

Commission within its September 8, 2009, decision.
Additionally, the sum of $5,870.81, was deposited into
counsel's trust account,

pending

review and final

determination by the Commission of fees due counsel
pursuant to the Fee Agreement between Claimant and
counsel providing for post-appeal fees at the contingent
rate of forty (40%) percent of benefits obtained.
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g.

$19,229.82, upon February 11, 2010, being thirty (30%)
percent of fees from Defendant-surety's check dated,
November 3, 2009, totaling $64,099.41, representing
medical benefits pursuant to the September 8, 2009,
Commission Order. Additionally, the sum of $6,409.94,
was deposited into counsel's trust account, pending
review and final determination by the Commission of
fees due counsel pursuant to the Fee Agreement
between Claimant and counsel providing for post-appeal
fees at the contingent rate of forty (40%) percent of
benefits obtained.
Thusly, total fees received to date are in the amount of

$97,523.29.

Further,

monies

held

in

trust

pending

determination of Claimant's counsel's Petition for Approval of
Fees total $26,677.75.
4.

That pursuant to the Commission's May 9, 2006, Order
Granting Benefits and Fees, Defendants issues its check dated
May 18, 2006, in the amount of $15,630.73, for medical
benefits and additional temporary total disability benefits.

By

reason of counsel's error, no fees were withheld from said
monies. In this regard, it is noted for the Commission that the
$5, 700.00, received by counsel from Defendants, upon June 1,
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2006, represented fees between Defendants and counsel paid
at a negotiated hourly rate for counsel's recorded time
corresponding

with said

Motion

and

hearing thereupon,

whereas the benefits encompassed within the May 18, 2006,
check were due by reason of the Commission's June 14, 2005,
Findings, Conclusions and Order on Remand.

Counsel

requests the approval of the Commission for fees pursuant to
the above-referenced Contingent Fee Agreement.

In this

regard, fees at the contingent rate of thirty (30%) percent equal
$4,689.22. Should the Commission approve fees at the agreed
forty (40%) percent rate, fees would total $6,252.29.
5.

Counsel has previously received reimbursement of litigation
expenses incurred by counsel, from prior awards herein,
totaling $5, 148.90. Additionally, the total of litigation expenses
incurred by counsel and, to date, unreimbursed by Claimant, is
in the amount of $1,871.12, which amount will be reimbursed
counsel by Claimant from the proceeds of the proposed Lump
Sum Agreement, upon approval by the Commission. Attached
hereto is an Itemization of said costs.

6.

Counsel represents to the Commission that each of Claimant's
medical expenses set-forth within the Medical Itemizations of
record, through the April 9, 2009, hearing herein, has been
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settled with the medical providers thereupon identified. Further,
from monies representing medical benefits received from the
surety, to date, counsel discloses as follows:
a.

From May 18, 2006, check from surety:
(1)

Claimant received
amounts

$590.52,

"written-off'

by

representing

Minidoka

the

Memorial

Hospital, upon receipt of authority from the
provider for counsel to release said monies to
Claimant;
(2)

Claimant received $82.15, representing amounts
"written-off' by Southern Idaho Radiology, upon
receipt of authority from the provider for counsel
to release said monies to Claimant;

(3)

Claimant received the amount of $9,029.85,
representing amounts being held as and for the
potential subrogation claims of Claimant's group
healthcare
to

provider, after

satisfactorily

respond

Blue Cross failed
to

counsel's

correspondences to it of July 20, 2006; October
19, 2006; and, November 2, 2006, photocopies of
which are herewith affixed.
counsel "cleared"

his

At the time that

trust account of said
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monies, counsel advised Claimant, in written
format, that Claimant should hold those monies
for an appropriate period of time as against the
contingency that Blue Cross would contact either
Claimant or counsel to then assert any rights of
subrogation to which it may be entitled.

As of

current date, Claimant has advised counsel that
she has not been contacted by that insurer.
b.

That the surety's check for medical benefits dated
September 8, 2009, was for a period of time
and

within

which

Claimant

was

a

during

Medicare

beneficiary/recipient, such that, certain of Claimant's
medical billings had been submitted to, processed and
paid by Medicare. The effect of such was that, to the
extent of required Medicare reductions and/or provider
write-offs, Claimant received the sum of $14,219.73,
following retiring all outstanding balances due her
providers.
7.

As of record before the Commission by reference to Claimant's
Exhibit

18,

Disclosure,

Claimant's
Medicare

Second

had

Supplemental

made payment to

Rule

10

certain

of

Claimant's providers to the extent of $19,587.96, as of January
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27, 2009.

To the extent of such payments, Medicare enjoys

statutory rights of subrogation. Counsel is holding said amount
of $19,587.96 within

his office's trust account, pending

Medicare advising counsel of its net claim of subrogation
respecting those payments. Counsel attaches photocopies of
his correspondences to Medicare dated November 30, 2009,
and January 28, 2010.

Therein and thereby, counsel fully

advised Medicare of the current status of the instant claim.
Counsel has received no instructions from Medicare regarding
said monies as of current date and, thusly, counsel will
continue to hold the same in his office's trust account, pending
the determination of the Commission upon counsel's Petition
for Fee Approval.
8.

Counsel attaches herewith a Medical Itemization pertaining to
Claimant's

left

knee

presentment;

and,

an

Itemization

pertaining to Claimant's right knee presentment, for the period
April 9, 2009, to current.

As noted thereby, pertaining to left

knee presentment, there is a "O" balance due Claimant's
providers following a $110.08 payment by Medicare; the $85.21
payment by Claimant; and, a .73¢ "write-off."

For right knee

presentment, there is a $1,621.35 balance due Claimant's
providers, following payments by Medicare totaling $15, 143.28;
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payments by Claimant totaling $161.05; and, "write-offs"
totaling $38,500.40.

Counsel represents to the Commission

that upon approval o_f the proposed Lump Sum Agreement and
receipt of monies generated thereby, counsel will retire from his
trust

account

the

outstanding

balances

due

Claimant's

providers and will retain the full amount of payments by
Medicare within his trust account pending notification by and
from Medicare as to its net lien arising by reason of its
payments.
Upon the foregoing and upon consideration thereof, it is believed that
the proposed settlement is in the best interest of the parties hereto, and should be
approved by the Commission. However, counsel would be happy to respond to any
further inquiry by the Commission, should it have questions not answered herein.
DATED this

.J.L

day of October, 2011.
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APPROVAL OF CLAIMANT

I hereby affirm and acknowledge that I have, upon this date, reviewed
the foregoing Confidential Addendum to Lump Sum Settlement Agreement and
hereby confirm that the representations made therein are true and correct to the
best of my knowledge and thereby approve and join in the same.
DATED this

tJ. \-day of October, 2011.
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motion disputing CPT coded items prevails, Payor shall pay the amount found by the Commission to be owed, plus
an additional thirty percent (30%) of that amount to compensate Provider for costs and expenses associated with
using the dispute resolution process. For motions filed by a hospital or ambulatory surgical center, under section
031. 02.a. v., or by a provider under 031. 02. e, the additional thirty percent (3 0%) shall be due only if the Payor does
not pay the amount found due within thirty (30) days of the administrative order.
(3-12-07)
033.
RULE GOVERNING APPROVAL OF ATTORNEY FEES IN WORKERS' COMPENSATION
CASES.
01.
Authority and Definitions. Pursuant to Sections 72-404, 72-508, 72-707, 72-735 and 72-803,
Idaho Code, the Commission promulgates this rule to govern the approval of attorney fees.
(7-1-94)
a.
"Available funds" means a sum of money to which a charging lien may attach. It shall not include
any compensation paid or not disputed to be owed prior to claimant's agreement to retain the attorney.
(7-1-94)

b.
"Approval by Commission" means the Commission has approved the attorney fees in conjunction
with an award of compensation or a lump sum settlement or otherwise in accordance with this rule upon a proper
showing by the attorney seeking to have the fees approved.
(7-1-94)
c.
"Charging lien" means a lien, against a claimant's right to any compensation under the Workers'
Compensation laws, which may be asserted by an attorney who is able to demonstrate that:
(7-1-94)
1.

There are compensation benefits available for distribution on equitable principles;

(7-1-94)

ii.
The services of the attorney operated primarily or substantially to secure the fund out of which the
(7-1-94)
attorney seeks to be paid;
lll.

client;

It was agreed that counsel anticipated payment from compensation funds rather than from the
(7-1-94)

iv.
The claim is limited to costs, fees, or other disbursements incurred in the case through which the
fund was raised; and
(7-1-94)
v.

lien.

There are equitable considerations that necessitate the recognition and application of the charging
(7-1-94)

d.
"Fee agreement" means a written document evidencing an agreement between a claimant and
(7-1-94)
counsel, in conformity with Rule 1.5, Idaho Rules of Professional Conduct (IRPC).

e.
"Reasonable" means that an attorney's fees are consistent with the fee agreement and are to be
satisfied from available funds, subject to the element ofreasonableness contained in IRPC 1.5.
(7-1-94>
i.
In a case in which no hearing on the merits has been held, twenty-five percent (25%) of available
(7-1 ·94)
funds shall be presumed reasonable; or
In a case in which a hearing has been held and briefs submitted (or waived) under Judicial Rules of
ii.
Practice and Procedure (JRP), Rules X and XI, thirty percent (3 0%) of available funds shall be presumed reasonable;
or
(7-1-94)

m.
In any case in which compensation is paid for total permanent disability, fifteen percent (15%) of
such disability compensation after ten (10) years from date such total permanent disability payments commenced.
(7-1-94)
(7-1-94)

02.

Statement of Charging Lien.

a.

All requests for approval of fees shall be deemed requests for approval of a charging lien. (7-1-94)
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b.
An attorney representing a claimant in a Workers' Compensation matter shall in any proposed
lump sum settlement, or upon request of the Commission, file ·with the Commission, and serve the claimant with a
copy of the fee agreement, and an affidavit or memorandum containing:
(7-1-94)
!.

The date upon which the attorney became involved in the matter;

(7-1-94)

11.

Any issues which were undisputed at the time the attorney became involved;

(7-1-94)

111.
The total dollar value of all compensation paid or admitted as owed by employer immediately prior
to the attorney's involvement;
(7-1-94)
IV.

Disputed issues that arose subsequent to the date the attorney was hired;

(7-1-94)

v.

Counsel's itemization of compensation that constitutes available funds;

(7-1-94)

VI.

Counsel's itemization of costs and calculation of fees; and

(7-1-94)

vii.
The statement of the attorney identifying with reasonable detail his or her fulfillment of each
(7-1-94)
element of the charging lien.
c.
Upon receipt and a determination of compliance with this Rule by the Commission by reference to
its staff, the Commission may issue an Order Approving Fees without a hearing.
(7-1-94)

03.

Procedure if Fees Are Determined Not to Be Reasonable.

(7-1-94)

a.
Upon receipt of the affidavit or memorandum, the Commission will designate staff members to
determine reasonableness of the fee. The Commission staff v.rill notify counsel in writing of the staff's informal
determination, which shall state the reasons for the determination that the requested fee is not reasonable. Omission
of any information required by Subsection 033.02 may constitute grounds for an informal determination that the fee
requested is not reasonable.
(7-1-94)
b.
If counsel disagrees Vv1th the Commission staff's informal determination, counsel may file, within
fourteen (14) days of the date of the determination, a Request for Hearing for the purpose of presenting evidence and
argument on the matter. Upon receipt of the Request for Hearing, the Commission shall schedule a hearing on the
(7-1-94)
matter. A Request for Hearing shall be treated as a motion under Rule ill(e), JRP.
c.
The Commission shall order an employer to release any available funds in excess of those subject
to the requested charging lien and may order payment offees subject to the charging lien which have been determined
to be reasonable.
(7-1-94)

d.
The proponent of a fee which is greater than the percentage of recovery stated in Subsections
033.01.e.i., 033.01.e.ii., or 033.01.e.iii. shall have the burden of establishing by clear and convincing evidence
entitlement to the greater fee. The attorney shall always bear the burden of proving by a preponderance of the
(7-1-94)
evidence his or her assertion of a charging lien and reasonableness ofhis or her fee.
04.
Disclosure. Upon retention, the attorney shall provide to claimant a copy of a disclosure statement.
No fee may be taken from a claimant by an attorney on a contingency fee basis unless the claimant acknowledges
receipt of the disclosure by signing it. Upon request by the Commission, an attorney shall provide a copy of the
signed disclosure statement to the Commission. The terms of the disclosure may be contained in the fee agreement, so
long as it contains the text of the numbered paragraphs one (1) and two (2) of the disclosure. A copy of the agreement
must be given to the client. The disclosure statement shall be in a format substantially similar to the following:
State of Idaho
Industrial Commission

Client's name printed or typed
Attorney's name and address
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printed or typed

DISCLOSURE STATEMENT
1.
In workers' compensation matters, attorney's fees normally do not exceed twenty-five percent (25%) of the
benefits your attorney obtains for you in a case in which no hearing on the merits has been completed. In a case in
which a hearing on the merits has been completed, attorney's fees normally do not exceed thirty percent (30%) of the
benefits your attorney obtains for you.

2.
Depending upon the circumstances of your case, you and your attorney may agree to a higher or lower
percentage which would be subject to Commission approval. Further, if you and your attorney have a dispute
regarding attorney fees, either of you may petition the Commission to resolve the dispute.
I certify that I have read and understand this disclosure statement.
Client's Signature Date
Attorney's Signature Date

(7-1-94)

05.
Effective Dates. Subparagraphs i., ii., and iii. of Subsection 033.01.e. are effective as to fee
agreements entered into on and after December 1, 1992. All other provisions shall be effective on and after December
20, 1993.
(7-1-94)
034. -- 060.

(RESERVED).

061.
RULE GOVERNING NOTICE 10
SECTION 72-806, IDAHO CODE.

CLAIMA..~TS

OF STATUS CHANGE PURSUANT 10

01.
Notice of Change of Status. As required and defined by Idaho Code, Section 72-806, a worker
shall receive written notice within fifteen (15) days of any change of status or condition.
(1-6-92)
02.
By Whom Given. Any notice to a worker required by Idaho Code, Section 72-806 shall be given
by: the surety ifthe employer has secured Workers' Compensation Insurance; or the employer ifthe employer is self(1-6-92)
insured; or the employer if the employer carries no Workers' Compensation Insurance.
03.
Form of Notice. Any notice to a worker required by Idaho Code, Section 72-806 shall be mailed
within ten (10) days by regular United States Mail to the last known address of the worker, as shown in the records of
the party required to give notice as set forth above. The Notice shall be given on IC Form 8, as prescribed by the
Commission for this purpose, as substantially set forth below:
IC Form 8:
(1-6-92)
NOTICE OF CLAIM STATUS
Injured Worker

SSN

Date of Injury
Employer
Insurance Company
Address

State

Zip

This is to notify you of the denial or change of status of your workers' compensation claim as indicated in
the statement checked below.
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000.
LEGAL AUTHORITY.
These rules are adopted and promulgated by the Industrial Commission pursuant to the provision of Section 72-508,
Idaho Code.
(4-7-11)
001.
TITLE AND SCOPE.
These rules shall be cited as IDAPA 17.02.08, "Miscellaneous Provisions."

(4-7-11)

002.
WRITTEN INTERPRETA TIO NS.
No written interpretations of these rules exist.

(4-7-11)

ADMINISTRATIVE APPEALS.
003.
There is no administrative appeal from decisions of the Industrial Commission in workers' compensation matters, as
the Commission is exempted from contested-cases provisions of the Administrative Procedure Act.
(4-7-11)
004.
INCORPORATION BY REFERENCE.
No documents have been incorporated by reference into these rules.

(4-7-11)

OFFICE - OFFICE HOURS - MAILING ADDRESS AND STREET ADDRESS.
005.
This office is open from 8:00 a.m. to 5:00 p.m., except Saturday, Sunday, and legal holidays. The department's
mailing address is: P.O. Box 83720, Boise, ID 83720-0041. The principal place of business is 700 S. Clearwater
Lane, Boise, ID 83712.
(4-7-11)
006.
PUBLIC RECORDS ACT COMPLIANCE.
Any records associated with these rules are subject to the provisions of the Idaho Public Records Act Title 9, Chapter
3, and Title 41, Idaho Code.
(4-7-11)
007. - 032.

(RESERVED).

033.
RULE GOVERNING APPROVAL OF ATTORNEY FEES IN WORKERS' COMPENSATION
CASES.
01.
Authority and Definitions. Pursuant to Sections 72-404, 72-508, 72-707, 72-735 and 72-803,
(4-7-11)
Idaho Code, the Commission promulgates this rule to govern the approval of attorney fees.
a.
"Available funds" means a sum of money to which a charging lien may attach. It shall not include
any compensation paid or not disputed to be owed prior to claimant's agreement to retain the attorney.
(4-7-11)
b.
"Approval by Commission" means the Commission has approved the attorney fees in conjunction
with an award of compensation or a lump sum settlement or otherwise in accordance with this rule upon a proper
showing by the attorney seeking to have the fees approved.
(4-7-11)
c.
"Charging lien" means a lien, against a claimant's right to any compensation under the Workers'
Compensation laws, which may be asserted by an attorney who is able to demonstrate that:
(4-7-11)

i.

There are compensation benefits available for distribution on equitable principles;

(4-7-11)

ii.
The services of the attorney operated primarily or substantially to secure the fund out of which the
attorney seeks to be paid;
(4-7-11)
lll.

client;

It was agreed that counsel anticipated payment from compensation funds rather than from the
(4-7-11)
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iv.
The claim is limited to costs, fees, or other disbursements incurred in the case through which the
fund was raised; and
(4-7-11)
V.

There are equitable considerations that necessitate the recognition and application of the charging

(4-7-11)

lien.

d.
"Fee agreement" means a written document evidencing an agreement between a claimant and
counsel, in conformity with Rule 1.5, Idaho Rules of Professional Conduct (IRPC).
(4-7-11)

e.
"Reasonable" means that an attorney's fees are consistent ¥.rith the fee agreement and are to be
satisfied from available funds, subject to the element of reasonableness contained in IRPC 1.5.
(4-7-11)
i.
In a case in which no hearing on the merits has been held, twenty-five percent (25%) of available
funds shall be presumed reasonable; or
(4-7-11)
ii.
In a case in which a hearing has been held and briefs submitted (or waived) under Judicial Rules of
Practice and Procedure (JRP), Rules X and XI, thirty percent (30%) of available funds shall be presumed reasonable;
or
(4-7-11)
111.
In any case in which compensation is paid for total permanent disability, fifteen percent (15%) of
such disability compensation after ten (10) years from date such total permanent disability payments commenced.

(4-7-11)
(4-7-11)

02.

Statement of Charging Lien.

a.

All requests for approval of fees shall be deemed requests for approval of a charging lien. (4-7-11)

b.
An attorney representing a claimant in a Workers' Compensation matter shall in any proposed lump
sum settlement, or upon request of the Commission, file with the Commission, and serve the claimant with a copy of
the fee agreement, and an affidavit or memorandum containing:
(4-7-11)

i.

The date upon which the attorney became involved in the matter;

(4-7-11)

ii.

Any issues which were undisputed at the time the attorney became involved;

(4-7-11)

111.
The total dollar value of all compensation paid or admitted as owed by employer immediately prior
to the attorney's involvement;
(4-7-11)

iv.

Disputed issues that arose subsequent to the date the attorney was hired;

(4-7-11)

v.

Counsel's itemization of compensation that constitutes available funds;

(4-7-11)

vi.

Counsel's itemization of costs and calculation of fees; and

(4-7-11)

vii.
Counsel's itemization of medical bills for which claim was made in the underlying action, but
which remain unpaid by employer/surety at the time of lump sum settlement, along with counsel's explanation of the
treatment to be given such bills/claims following approval of the lump sum settlement.
(4-7-11)
vin.
The statement of the attorney identifying with reasonable detail his or her fulfillment of each
element of the charging lien.
(4-7-11)

c.
Upon receipt and a determination of compliance with this Rule by the Commission by reference to
(4-7-11)
its staff, the Commission may issue an Order Approving Fees without a hearing.
03.

Procedure if Fees Are Determined Not to Be Reasonable.

a.

Upon receipt of the affidavit or memorandum, the Commission \\rill designate staff members to
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determine reasonableness of the fee. The Commission staff will notify counsel in Viriting of the staff's informal
determination, which shall state the reasons for the determination that the requested fee is not reasonable. Omission
of any information required by Subsection 033.02 may constitute grounds for an infonnal detennination that the fee
requested is not reasonable.
(4-7-11)
b.
If counsel disagrees with the Commission staff's informal determination, counsel may file, within
fourteen (14) days of the date of the determination, a Request for Hearing for the purpose of presenting evidence and
argument on the matter. Upon receipt of the Request for Hearing, the Commission shall schedule a hearing on the
matter. A Request for Hearing shall be treated as a motion under Rule III( e), JRP.
(4-7-11)
c.
The Commission shall order an employer to release any available funds in excess of those subject
to the requested charging lien and may order payment of fees subject to the charging lien which have been determined
to be reasonable.
(4-7-11)
d.
The proponent of a fee which is greater than the percentage of recovery stated in Subsections
033.01.e.i., 033.01.e.ii., or 033.01.e.iii. shall have the burden of establishing by clear and convincing evidence
entitlement to the greater fee. The attorney shall always bear the burden of proving by a preponderance of the
evidence his or her assertion of a charging lien and reasonableness of his or her fee.
(4-7-11)
04.
Disclosure. Upon retention, the attorney shall provide to claimant a copy of a disclosure statement.
No fee may be taken from a claimant by an attorney on a contingency fee basis unless the claimant acknowledges
receipt of the disclosure by signing it. Upon request by the Commission, an attorney shall provide a copy of the
signed disclosure statement to the Commission. The terms of the disclosure may be contained in the fee agreement, so
long as it contains the text of the numbered paragraphs one (1) and two (2) of the disclosure. A copy of the agreement
must be given to the client. The disclosure statement shall be in a format substantially similar to the following:
State of Idaho
Industrial Commission
Client's name printed or typed_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __
Attorney's name and address_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __
printed or typed
DISCLOSURE STATEMENT

1.
In workers' compensation matters, attorney's fees normally do not exceed twenty-five percent
(25%) of the benefits your attorney obtains for you in a case in which no hearing on the merits has been
completed. In a case in which a hearing on the merits has been completed, attorney's fees normally do not exceed
thirty percent (30%) of the benefits your attorney obtains for you.
2.
Depending upon the circumstances of your case, you and your attorney may agree to a higher
or lower percentage which would be subject to Commission approval. Further, if you and your attorney have a
dispute regarding attorney fees, either of you may petition the Commission to resolve the dispute.
I certify that I have read and understand this disclosure statement.
Client's Signature D a t e - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - Attorney's Signature
(4-7-11)
034. - 060.

(RESERVED).

061.
RULE GOVERNING NOTICE TO CLAIMANTS OF STATUS CHANGE PURSUANT TO
SECTION 72-806, IDAHO CODE.

Page4
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01.
Notice of Change of Status. As required and defined by Idaho Code, Section 72-806, a worker
shall receive written notice within fifteen ( 15) days of any change of status or condition.
(4-7-11)

02.
By Whom Given. Any notice to a worker required by Idaho Code, Section 72-806 shall be given
by: the surety ifthe employer has secured Workers' Compensation Insurance; or the employer ifthe employer is selfinsured; or the employer if the employer carries no Workers' Compensation Insurance.
(4-7-11)
03.
Form of Notice. Any notice to a worker required by Idaho Code, Section 72-806 shall be mailed
within ten (10) days by regular United States Mail to the last known address of the worker, as shown in the records of
the party required to give notice as set forth above. The Notice shall be given on IC Form 8, as prescribed by the
Commission for this purpose, as substantially set forth below:
IC Form 8:
NOTICE OF CLAIM STATUS
Injured Worker

SSN

Date of Injury
Employer
Insurance Company

Address

State

Zip

This is to notify you of the denial or change of status of your workers' compensation claim as indicated in the
statement checked below.
Your claim is denied.
Reason
Your benefit payments will be

Reduced

Increased

Effective date
Reason
Your benefit payments will be stopped.

Effective date

Reason
Your claim is being investigated.
A decision should be made by
Effective date

Other
Explanation
See attached medical reports
Signature of insurance company adjuster/examiner

Date

Name (typed or printed)

Pages

IAC 2011
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IDAHO ADMINISTRATIVE CODE
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IC Form 8:
NOTICE OF CLAIM STATUS
A sample copy of IC Form 8 is available from the;
Industrial Commission
700 S. Clearwater Lane
P. 0. Box 83720,
Boise, Idaho 83720-0041
Telephone (208) 334-6000.

(4-7-11)
04.
Medical Reports. As required by Idaho Code, Section 72-806, if the change is based on a medical
(4-7-11)
report, the party giving notice shall attach a copy of the report to the notice.
05.
Copies of Notice. The party giving notice pursuant to Idaho Code, Section 72-806 shall send a
copy of any such notice to the Industrial Commission, the employer, and the worker's attorney, if the worker is
represented, at the same time notice is sent to the worker.
(4-7-11)
062. -- 999.

(RESERVED).
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L.CLYELBERRY,CHARTERED
ATTORi'i'EY and COUNSELOR at LAW
P.O. Box302
Twin Falls, ID 83303-0302

Telephone: (208) 734-9962
Fax Number: (208) 734-9963

December 29, 2009
VerDene Page
c/o Brad Page
507 West 300 South
Heyburn, ID 83336
Dear Ms. Page:
First, I wanted to thank you for your telephone call to me the morning of
December 28. You have no idea how much that telephone call meant to me or how much I
appreciated you expressing that even if the Commission did not approve fees in excess of
thirty (30%) percent, that you wanted to pay those fees to me, anyway. Your kindness in
this regard is much appreciated. However, to the extent that fees are not approved by the
Commission, I would not be at liberty of accepting your offer.
I am enclosing with this letter to you copies of the instruments which I have
filed with the Commission upon today's date, requesting that the Commission consider the
Fee Petition. Please note that the Petition, my original Affidavit and the Approval and
Joinder of you have each been previously forwarded to you by me. The only "new"
instrument which you have not previously reviewed is my Second Affidavit, which attaches
a copy of my December 17, 2009, correspondence to you and advises the Commission
that following my December 17, correspondence to you, I did not contact you upon the
issue of fees, so as to not influence you upon this issue; that I received your dated and
signed Approval and Joinder within my office's mail of December 24; and, of your
telephone call to me the morning of December 28.
In the consideration of the fee issue, it may be that a representative of the
Commission may contact you, to discuss this issue. If you are contacted by a
representative of the Idaho State Industrial Commission, I would encourage you to speak
candidly to that individual in your responses to any questions or concerns which might be
expressed by that individual.
Lastly, I again thank you for the kindness of your comments expressed to me
during our December 28, telephone conversation. Should you have any questions or
concerns, I would be more than happy to be responsive.
Very truly yours,

~~

L. Clyel Berry
LCB:mek
Enclosures

L. CLYEL BERRY, CHARTERED
ATTORNEY and COUNSELOR at LAW
Telephone: (208) 734-9962
Fax Number: (208) 734-9963

P.O. Box302
Twin Falls, ID 83303-0302

April 6, 2010
VerDene Page
c/o Brad Page
507 West 300 South
Heyburn, ID 83336
Dear Ms. Page:
I am writing this letter to you to advise that the Commission has now ruled
upon the Petition for Approval of Fees which I had filed, requesting approval of contingent
fees of 40 percent as opposed to 30 percent. I am enclosing a copy of the Commission's
April 1, 2010, Order, for your reference. As you will see, the Commission denied my
Petition.
Upon my firm belief that the Commission failed to consider the appropriate
statute, being IC § 72-803, but considered instead IC § 72-804, I am filing a Request for
Reconsideration and am enclosing a copy of the same, for your review.
As my earlier correspondence to you emphasized, I do not wish to file any
instrument with the Commission in your claim, regarding which you are not in concurrence.
For that reason, if for any reason you do not support the Motion for Reconsideration,
please contact me.
Secondly, I show your surgery as being scheduled for this Thursday, April 8.
If for any reason that surgery is delayed past April 8, please contact me promptly to notify
me of that fact.
Should you have any questions, concerns or wish to discuss any aspect of
your claim, I would be responsive to your call or, should you prefer, be more than happy to
schedule an office conference with you for that purpose. Best of luck regarding the
forthcoming surgery.
Very truly yours,

&11-

L. Clyel Berry
LCB:sm
Enclosures

L. CLYEL BERRY, CHARTERED
ATTORNEY and COUNSELOR at LAW
P.O. Box302
Twin Falls, ID 83303-0302

Telephone: (208) 734-9962
Fax l\'umber: (208) 734-9963

May13,2010
VerDene Page
c/o Brad Page
507 West 300 South
Heyburn, ID 83336
Dear Ms. Page:
I am writing this letter to you to supplement my earlier correspondence to you
of April 6, 2010. That correspondence advised that the Commission had ruled upon the
Petition for Approval of Fees, which I had filed, and enclosed a copy of the Commission's
April 1, 2010, Order, for your reference. That correspondence also enclosed a copy of my
Request for Reconsideration, regarding that Order.
The Motion for Reconsideration will be heard before the Commission, in Twin
Falls. Toward the latter part of April, I received a telephone call from a representative of
the Commission, for the purpose of scheduling that hearing. At that time, you had been
scheduled for right knee surgery by Dr. Petersen, upon April 22 but had suffered a sudden
onset of symptoms involving your neck and/or shoulder, for which you had undergone MRI
and was scheduling re-examination with Dr. Petersen, to review the MRI results as well as
to, potentially, reschedule the knee surgery. Upon my so advising the Commission of
these facts, together with the potential that if Dr. Petersen scheduled you for knee surgery
in the near future, it vv'ould be doubtful that you vJould be ab!e to be present at the hearing
upon the Motion for Reconsideration, the Commission has advised that it will wait to
schedule any hearing until it is known whether you will be undergoing knee surgery in the
near future to ensure your availability for that hearing, in Twin Falls. The Commission has
ordered that I keep it advised regarding your medical status. For that reason, the purpose
of this instant letter to you is only to emphasize that at the point in time that you and Dr.
Petersen have made decisions regarding your knee surgery as had been scheduled,
please advise me of the same such that I might, in turn, so advise the Commission.
I am certain that you might have questions regarding this correspondence
and would welcome your call or, should you prefer, I would be more than happy to
schedule an office conference, to discuss those concerns or any questions which you
might have.
Very truly yours,

0Jcy(
L. Clyel Berry

LCB:mek

L. CLYEL BERRY, CHARTERED
ATTORNEY and COUNSELOR at LAW
Telephone: (208) 734-9962
Fax Number: (208) 734-9963

P.O.Box302
Twin Falls, ID 83303-0302

March 30, 2012
VerDene Page
c/o Brad Page
507 West 300 South
Heyburn, ID 83336
Dear Ms. Page:
I hope that this letter finds you to be doing well. I am writing this letter to you
for two purposes. First, I wanted to remind you of the 10:30 a.m. hearing of the
Commission's consideration of the Fee Petition, upon Tuesday, April 10, 2012, at the
Industrial Commission Field Office, in Twin Falls. Although you have been to the
Commission's Twin Falls Office upon several occasions, the address is 1411 Falls Avenue
East, Twin Falls. Should you have any questions or concerns regarding that proceeding,
please call me and I would be more than happy to respond to your questions or concerns,
either during a telephone conversation with you or, I would be more than happy to
schedule an office conference with you for that purpose.
Although I have no means of knowing with certainty, I presume that at the
time of the hearing the Commission will request a statement from me and may well ask me
questions regarding my representation of you in your workers' compensation claim, over
the years. Additionally, the Commission may well ask you questions regarding the issues
with which your claim presented; my representation of you in your industrial claim together
with whether or not you were satisfied with that representation; whether I had fully
disclosed to you the substance of our Fee Agreement, providing for fees at 25% of benefits
obtained prior to hearing, 30% of benefits at or following hearing, and fees at 40% of
benefits obtained from and following appeal or re-hearing. Obviously, should the
Commission ask you any questions, I would hope that your answers and responses to
those questions will be candid.
Secondly, I am enclosing with this letter to you my Third Affidavit, in Support
of Petition for Approval of Fees, which attempts to bring the Commission current with
regard to facts I believe to be pertinent and relevant to the consideration of fees,
subsequent from the filing of my first two Affidavits. Should you have any questions
regarding any representation set-forth within or by the Third Affidavit, again, I would be
more than happy to be responsive.

VerDene Page
March 30, 2012
Page 2

At the time of the hearing upon the Fee Petition, you are more than welcome
to bring whatever "moral support" you wish, specifically to encompass your daughter-in-law
or your son, Brad. I hope to see you at the hearing, if I do not hear from you prior to that
proceeding.
Very truly yours,

(j)1)
L. Clyel Berry
LCB:mek
Enclosure

L. CLYEL BERRY, CHARTERED
ATTORNEY AND COUNSELOR AT LAW
P.O. BOX302
Twin Falls, ID 83303-0302
Telephone: 2081734-9962
Fax Number: 2081734-9963
Idaho State Bar No. 1897

BEFORE THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO
)
)

VerDENE PAGE,
Claimant,

l.C. No. 02-007246

)
)

)

vs.

)

McCAIN FOODS, INC.,
Employer,
and
TRANSCONTINENTAL INSURANCE
COMPANY,

)
)
)
)

POST-HEARING BRIEF
UPON ATTORNEY FEE
ISSUE

)
)
)

)
)

)
Surety,
)
Defendants.
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~)

PRELIMINARY STATEMENT
Counsel was retained by Ms. VerDene Page, Claimant herein, in a workers'
compensation claim against Claimant's employer, McCain Foods, pursuant to a
,

Contingent Fee Agreement, dated April 24, 2002, providing for contingent fees of
twenty-five (25%) percent of benefits obtained prior to hearing; thirty (30%) percent
following hearing; and, forty (40%) percent upon appeal or re-hearing. At all times,
Defendants herein denied obligation for Title 72 benefits.

CLAIMANT'S POST-HEARING BRIEF UPON ATTORNEY FEE ISSUE -1

The accident of August 17, 2001, consisted of Claimant experiencing on-set
of knee pain upon arising from a chair.

At the time that counsel was retained,

Claimant had not filed or perfected notice pursuant to statute and no Title 72
benefits had been paid. Following hearing, the Commission's December 8, 2003,
decision held that Claimant failed to comply with the notice requirements set forth
within Idaho Code§§ 72-701 through 706; and, had failed to prove that she suffered
injury caused by an accident arising out of and in the course of her employment.
That determination was appealed to the Idaho State Supreme Court, which
released its Opinion dated February 17, 2005, which reversed and remanded back
to the Commission.
The Commission then released its Findings, Conclusions and Order on
Remand, dated June 14, 2005, holding that Claimant was entitled to temporary total
disability benefits from August 18 through November 26, 2001; was entitled to
medical benefits from August 17 through November 26, 2001; was entitled to a one
(1%) percent whole person permanent partial impairment related to the August 17,
2001, occurrence; and, awarded a five (5%) percent whole person permanent
partial disability, inclusive of impairment.
Following the Commission's June 14, 2005,

decision,

counsel filed

Claimant's Motion for Reconsideration; Motion for Additional Findings; and,
Alternative Motion to Reopen, with Claimant's Memorandum in Support, each dated
July 5, 2005.

Following briefing by the parties, the Commission released its

September 23, 2005, Order Regarding Pending Motions, denying the same.
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Counsel then filed Claimant's Second Motion for Reconsideration together
with his Affidavit in Support and Claimant's Memorandum.

By its November 23,

2005, Order, the Commission denied the same.
Upon October 25, 2005, counsel filed Claimant's Motion for Entry of Order for
Award Sum Certain/Motion for Additional Finding~; and, counsel's Affidavit in
Support.

Following briefing, an evidentiary hearing was held upon February 2,

2006. Thereafter, upon May 9, 2006, the Commission released its Order Granting
Benefits and Fees, responsive to said Motion.
By instruments dated January 18, 2006, counsel filed Claimant's Motion for
l.C. § 72-719(3) Review to Correct Manifest Injustice together with his Affidavit in
Support. Following briefing by the parties, upon March 16, 2006, the Commission
filed its Order Dismissing Further Reconsideration. Counsel then filed Claimant's
second Notice of Appeal, upon June 13, 2006.

Following briefing and oral

argument, the Idaho State Supreme Court released its Opinion upon January 31,
2008, and again remanded to the Commission.
Following the filing of further Motions together with the parties' Briefs
regarding the same, upon November 11, 2008, counsel filed Claimant's Request for
Q

Calendaring; and, Request for Emergency Hearing, together with his Affidavit in

~~
~ j

Support.

An evidentiary hearing was held upon April 9, 2009.

Following post-
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hearing depositions and the filing of the parties' respective Briefs, the Commission
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released its September 8, 2009, Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and Order,

"' °'~ t--.
~~~~
<:::, " '

<:::, .... "

"7

favorable to Claimant. In due course, Defendants paid Title 72 benefits awarded by
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the Commission's September 8, 2009, decision.

Thereafter, issues remaining
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herein included Claimant's entitlement to medical benefits for right TKA; entitlement
to temporary disability benefits following September 21, 2008; entitlement to
permanent partial impairment; and, entitlement to permanent disability in excess of
impairment, inclusive of total and permanent disability upon theories of odd-lot, or
otherwise.
Upon September 23, 2010, Claimant underwent right TKA.

It was the

opinion of Claimant's orthopedic surgeon, Dr. Joseph Petersen, that Claimant's
need for right TKA had been accelerated by reason of Claimant's change in gait
which was, in turn, resultant of Claimant's industrial left knee injury.
Defendants thereafter required that Claimant undergo IME by Dr. Brian
Tallerico, D.O., upon March 26, 2010, and August 5, 2011.

Following those

examinations, Dr. Tallerico expressed opinion that neither Claimant's left nor right
TKAs were related to the August 17, 2001, industrial accident. To respond to the
opinions of Dr. Tallerico, counsel retained Dr. Frederick Surbaugh, a board certified
orthopedic surgeon, who conducted a records review; performed an orthopedic
examination upon Claimant; and, thereafter indicated his concurrences with Dr.
Petersen, that Claimant's change of gait by reason of left industrial knee injury
resulted in, " ... an acceleration of right knee degenerative joint disease with need for
total knee arthroplasty."
Following additional discovery by and upon behalf of the respective parties,
the matter was again set for hearing to be held upon September 30, 2011.
Defendants then retained Mr. William Jordan as a vocational expert. By his report
Mr. Jordan expressed opinion that there were numerous "reasonable jobs" available
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for Claimant within her community, and that Claimant presented with permanent
partial disability of approximately forty-two (42%) percent of the whole person.
Counsel retained Mr. Douglas Crum upon behalf of the Claimant. It was Mr.
Crum's opinion that upon consideration of Claimant's left knee presentment, statuspost TKA, she had lost all access to employment within her labor market, even
without consideration of Claimant's right knee or other physical presentments.
Approximately three weeks prior to the scheduled September 20, 2011,
hearing, Defendants and Claimant agreed to vacate said hearing and proceed to
mediation, with Commissioner Thomas P. Baskin as mediator.

At mediation, all

remaining Title 72 claims against said Defendants were settled by two Agreements.
One Agreement provided that Defendants prepare and present a Medicare SetAside for CMS approval, as Claimant is now a Medicare beneficiary/recipient, with
respect to future

potential medical expenses.

The second Agreement

encompassed all Title 72 benefits except prospective medical benefits. Pursuant
thereto, those claims were settled for $248,750.00, new and additional monies.
Settlement was thereafter approved by the Commission, with the exception of
counsel's request for approval of fees greater than thirty (30%) percent.
The attorney fee issue is two-pronged.

The initial issue is whether the

Commission should approve fees at a contingent rate greater than thirty (30%)
percent upon consideration of the Contingent Fee Agreement, which provides for
fees at forty (40%) percent upon appeal or re-hearing; and, the seconq issue is
whether and to what extent the Stipulation Regarding Attorney Fees between
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Claimant and Defendants as approved by the Commission's Order Granting
Stipulation, dated October 22, 2009, effects said Contingent Fee Agreement.
ARGUMENT

I.
The April 24, 2002, Contingent Fee Agreement Entered into by and Between
Claimant and Counsel, Providing for Fees at the Rate of Forty (40%) Percent
of Benefits Obtained upon Appeal or Re-hearing, Should be Approved.
A.

The April 24, 2002, Contingent Fee Agreement is "reasonable."
IDAPA 17.02.08.033 sets-forth the "Rule Governing Approval of Attorney

Fees in Workers' Compensation Cases." Sub-paragraphs .01.e.i. and e.ii. provide
that contingent fees of twenty-five (25%) percent shall be presumed reasonable in a
case in which no hearing on the merits has been held; and, in a case in which a
hearing has been held and briefs submitted or waived, thirty (30%) percent of
available funds shall be presumed reasonable.
fees

presumed

reasonable

upon

appeal

However, the Rule is silent as to
or

re-hearing.

Rather,

IDAPA

17.02.08.033.04 states that,
"Depending upon the circumstances of your case, you and your
attorney may agree to a higher or lower percentage which would be
subject to Commission approval."
IDAPA 17.02.08.033.01.d. mandates that the fee agreement be in conformity with
Rule 1.5, IRPC. Counsel notes that sub-paragraph (c) thereof provides that,
"A contingent fee agreement shall be in a writing signed by the client
and shall state the method by which the fee is to be determined,
including the percentage or percentages that shall accrue to the lawyer
in the event of settlement, trial or appeal, ... ".
The point being made is that the specific Rule which IDAPA 17.02.08.033.01.d.,
mandates that the fee agreement in workers' compensation cases be in conformity
CLAIMANT'S POST-HEARING BRIEF UPON ATTORNEY FEE ISSUE -6

with provides for a staggered or different percentage rate in the event of settlement;
trial; or, appeal.
In considering whether the staggered or different fee rates set-forth within the
Contingent Fee Agreement at issue herein passes the "circumstances of the case,"
referenced within IDAPA 17.02.08.033.04, as noted by Idaho's Supreme Court in
Clark v. Sage, 102 Idaho 620, 629 P.2d 656 (1981), the Commission is under a
duty to determine what would be a reasonable attorney fee on a contingent fee
basis. As specifically discussed in Clark, a contingent fee involves a risk factor.
There, referencing Berger, "Court Awarded Attorneys' Fees: What is Reasonable?"
126 U. of Pa.L. Rev. 281, 324-325 (1977), the Court noted that,
'The experience of the market place indicates that lawyers generally
will not provide legal representation on a contingent basis unless they
receive a premium for taking that risk. Ordinarily, when lawyers
undertake a representation on a contingency basis, they bargain for a
percentage of the recovery. That percentage is sufficiently high to
compensate the lawyer not only for the reasonable value of the time he
or she anticipates devoting to the particular lawsuit, but also for the
time devoted to other lawsuits undertaken on the same basis but
unsuccessful in result. Thus, in a rough and arbitrary way, the
contingent percentage fee accounts for the risk on non-recovery."
In determining whether a contingent fee agreement is reasonable, the
Commission must consider those nine factors specifically set-forth by the Supreme
Court in Hogaboom v. Economy Mattress, 107 Idaho 13, 684 P.2d 990 (1984).
Discussion is as follows:
1.

Anticipated time and labor required to perform the legal services
properly: As of the March 29, 2012, Third Affidavit of Clyel Berry in
Support of Petition for Approval of Fees, as noted within paragraph 21
thereof, counsel's actual recorded time in his representation of
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Claimant herein totaled 752 hours.

Since March 27, 2012, counsel

prepared for and engaged in the April 10, 2012, hearing, and
thereafter prepared the instant Post-Hearing Brief.

Counsel hereby

represents to the Commission that as of the date of filing the instant
Brief, he has recorded 785.6 hours in this matter.
2.

Novelty and difficulty of the legal issues involved:

At the time that

counsel was retained by Claimant, the claim presented with Title 72
issues believed to be both novel and difficult, encompassing both lack
of statutory notice as well as whether the act of standing/arising from a
seated position and experiencing onset of knee pain rose to the level
of a compensable accident without a fall, twist, jolt or other trauma.
As noted by the Commission within its April 1, 2010, Order
Regarding Attorney Fees, as of that date, the instant matter had been
heard by the Commission on three occasions and been appealed to
the Idaho State Supreme Court twice. The Commission further noted
that, " ... the risk of no recovery was substantial; indeed, Claimant's
entitlement was initially denied by the Commission."
3.

Fees customarily charged for similar legal services: It is not believed
that the Commission has promulgated rules, guidelines or regulations
providing for fees presumed reasonable in Title 72 matters past the
hearing stage. Further, counsel is not aware of other Title 72 claims
or actions where the legal procedures involved three evidentiary
hearings; seven contested and briefed motions; two appeals to the
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Supreme Court; and, multiple mediations, as does the instant matter.
Thusly, counsel is unable to comment as to fees customarily charged
for "similar legal services."
4.

Possible total recovery if successful: As of the date that counsel was
retained by Claimant herein, Claimant had undergone what appeared
to be a simple arthroscopic meniscectomy, from which individuals
typically recover with minimal impairment or residuals. Following the
initial evidentiary hearing, of April 22, 2003, and the Supreme Court's
February 17, 2005, Opinion (Page /), the Commission's June 14,
2005, Findings, Conclusions, and Order on Remand awarded benefits
which the Commission, itself, subsequently described as "meager." It
was not until following the Supreme Court's January 31, 2008, Opinion
(Page //) and the evidentiary hearing of April 9, 2009, that the
Commission's September 8, 2009, Order set the stage by which total
anticipated Title 72 benefits herein became potentially substantial.

5.

Time limitations imposed by client or circumstances of the case:
Although having benefit of a client who has, at all times, been most
understanding and patient, by reason of Ms. Page's circumstances,
being disabled for an extended period of time without Social Security,
Medicare or Title 72 benefits, counsel has attempted to be diligent in
his representation of Claimant herein and the prosecution of the
underlying cause.
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6.

Nature and length of the attorney-client relationship:

Counsel has

represented Ms. Page in this matter since April 24, 2002, being a
period in excess of ten years, over and during which counsel has
expended considerable of his office's time and resources in the
prosecution of this matter.

As affiant is a solo practitioner, the

resources required and expended herein resulted in his preclusion
from other employment such that, had counsel been unsuccessful in
this matter and no fees generated thereby, said representation would
have had a significant negative effect upon his office.
7.

The experience, skill and reputation of the attorney:

Counsel has

been a licensed attorney practicing within the State of Idaho since
April 1976, through current. Throughout this thirty-six year period of
practice, counsel has devoted his energies primarily to the areas of
personal injury and workers' compensation law.

It is believed that

counsel enjoys a high reputation for his experience and skills.
8.

Ability of client to pay for legal services to be rendered: As recognized
by the Commission at page 2 of the April 1, 2010, Order Regarding
Attorney Fees, "Claimant would not have been able to secure
representation absent a contingent fee agreement, ... ".

9.

Risk of no recovery: Throughout the course of the instant proceedings
Defendants argued that Claimant was without entitlement to Title 72
benefits, to any extent, by reason of the August 17, 2001, event.
Further, such was the holding of the Commission by its decision dated
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December 8, 2003, from which the initial appeal was made.

The

Commission specifically recognized at page 2 of its Order Regarding
Attorney Fees, dated April 1, 2010, that, " ... the risk of no recovery was
substantial, ... ".
The Supreme Court, in Curr v. Curr, 124 Idaho 686, 864 P.2d 132 (1993),
specifically determined that, "Reasonableness (of a fee agreement), derives from
the totality of the circumstances from the perspective of the parties at the time that
the fee agreement was made."

See 864 P.2d 132 at 136.

It is respectfully

submitted that from the perspective of both Ms. Page and counsel at the time that
the April 24, 2002, Contingent Fee Agreement was entered into, upon consideration
of the "totality of circumstances," the Fee Agreement at issue was reasonable.
Counsel further submits that, even if the reasonableness of the Contingent
Fee Agreement at issue should be considered having benefit of 20/20 hindsight, the
Fee Agreement providing for fees at forty (40%) percent of benefits recovered
following appeal or re-hearing remains reasonable. Counsel attaches as Exhibit 1
hereto a Summary fully disclosing and setting-forth with specificity all receipts and
disbursements of Title 72 benefits related to the instant claim. The monetary value
of Title 72 benefits realized by reason of counsel's representation of Claimant
herein totals $549,582.44. This result was achieved solely by reason of counsel's
determination and doggedness in his representation of Claimant. As noted by Ms.
Page during the April 10, 2012, hearing, following the Commission's June 14, 2005,
Findings, Conclusions, and Order on Remand, Ms. Page was defeated, and wanted
to "give up." Counsel had to convince Ms. Page to allow him to file the second
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appeal. April 10, 2012, Tr., p. 22, LL. 4-14. As of current date, monies personally
received by Ms. Page by reason of the instant claim total $265,959.45.
As set-forth within paragraph 22 upon page 14 of the Third Affidavit of Clyel
Berry, dated March 29, 2012, counsel reasonably anticipates that Ms. Page will
receive additional monies of at least approximately 16,000.00, which, if counsel's
Fee Petition is approved, will bring Claimant's total net receipts to approximately
$281,959.00, in a matter where indemnity benefits paid total $376,078.27. Thusly,
even upon approval of fees at forty (40%) percent, Ms. Page will receive
approximately seventy-five (75%) percent of total indemnity benefits paid.
Conversely, if counsel's Fee Petition is denied, Ms. Page will then have received
approximately $337,450.00, and realize eighty-nine and seven-tenths (89.7%)
percent of total indemnity benefits.
8.

The Commission is without jurisdiction to modify the April 24, 2002,
Contingent Fee Agreement.
Most certainly, counsel's Petition for Approval of Fees is absent any "dispute"

between Ms. Page and counsel.

Rather, the instant proceeding involves the

Commission refusing to approve a Contingent Fee Agreement upon a Fee Petition
in which Ms. Page specifically joined by that Approval and Joinder in Petition for
Approval of Fees, dated December 22, 2009. At the point in time at which counsel
was retained by Ms. Page and the April 24, 2002, Contingent Fee Agreement
entered into, counsel carefully and thoroughly explained to Ms. Page that the usual
attorney fees approved by the Commission in workers' compensation matters were
at the rate of twenty-five (25%) percent of benefits recovered prior to hearing, to
increase to thirty (30%) percent at hearing;

and, that because of what counsel
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perceived to be certain of the difficulties with Ms. Page's potential Title 72 claim, if
the prosecution of that claim required appeal, fees would increase to forty (40%)
percent.
At hearing, Ms. Page testified that she understood the fee structure set-forth
within the Contingent Fee Agreement and agreed to the same.

April 10, 2012, Tr.,

p. 21, LL. 6-23. Further, upon being advised that the Commission initially denied
fees at greater than thirty (30%) percent, Ms. Page telephoned counsel to advise
that even if the Commission did not approve fees at forty (40%) percent, she
wanted to gift those fees to counsel. Even at hearing, Ms. Page expressed that she
had "no problem" with fees at forty (40%) percent. April 10, 2012, Tr., p. 23, L. 4 p. 24, L. 18.

In Curr, supra, Idaho's Supreme Court specifically provided that, in modifying
attorney fee agreements under authority of Idaho Code § 72-803 where there is no
fee dispute, the Commission is acting in a quasi-legislative as opposed to its quasijudicial capacity.

The Court then specifically determined that, "[i]n sua sponte

modifying uncontested attorney fees absent the guideline of a properly enacted
regulatory scheme, the Commission infracts both parameters and exceeds the
~

Commission's statutory authority." See 864 P .2d 132, at 137.

~
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Upon review of IDAPA 17.02.08.033, it is clear that no guidelines have been
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by the Commission's specific reference, within IDAPA 17.02.08.033.01.d, that the
fee agreement be in conformity with Rule 1.5, Idaho Rules of Professional Conduct.
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As earlier discussed, referencing sub-paragraph (c) thereof, IRPC 1.5 specifically
recognizes that contingent fee rates for settlement, trial or appeal shall be, each,
separately provided for within the fee agreement, and recognizes that the fees for
each stage of the proceedings may well be different.
·The Court further expressed in Curr, supra, that, to modify attorney fee
agreements, the Commission must have formally published clear guidelines upon
which it will base fee modifications. The Court held that,
"Without clear guidelines nestled in appropriately promulgated
regulations, attorney's actions are plagued by doubt, which may have a
chilling effect on the underlying purpose of the Workers' Compensation
Act that the Commission is constrained to promote under l.C. § 72508."
See 864 P.2d 132, at 137.
C.

Modifying the April 24, 2002 Contingent Fee Agreement violates the
Idaho State and U.S. Constitutions.
The Curr Court held that,
"An attorney fee agreement constitutes a valid contract under Idaho
Law, and (attorneys perform services for their clients) in reliance upon
the terms of their fee agreements. It is clear that, in Idaho, parties to a
contract have a property interest in the subject matter of the contract
that is protectable both under the Contract Clause and the Due
Process Clause of the United States Constitution. In addition, the right
to follow a recognized and useful occupation is protected by a
constitutional guarantee of liberty under the Fourteenth Amendment to
the U.S. Constitution and Idaho Const, Art 1, § 13."

See 864 P.2d 132, at pages 137-8. The Curr Court determined that, at a minimum,
the Commission must "... formally publish clear guidelines upon which it will base
the fee modifications in order to eliminate any latent arbitrariness." Absent such,
"[tJhe net result of the Commission's sua sponte conduct is a deprivation of (the
attorney's) property rights under the fee agreement without due process of law."
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II.
Whether and to What Extent the Parties' Stipulation Regarding Attorney Fees
and/or the Commission's October 22, 2009, Order Granting Stipulation
Modifies, Effects and/or Supersedes the April 24, 2002, Contingent Fee
Agreement.
A.

The parties' Stipulation Regarding Attorney Fees and Commission's
October 22, 2009, Order Granting Stipulation were without effect upon
the April 24, 2002, Contingent Fee Agreement.
The Commission's April 1, 2010, Order Regarding Attorney Fees, was in

response to counsel's Petition for Approval of Fees, dated December 17, 2009. By
its April 1, 2010, Order, the Commission noted but failed to discuss, to any extent,
whether fees requested at forty (40%) percent were reasonable upon consideration
of the factors set-forth within Hogaboom, supra, but only noted that, "[i]n the
Affidavit accompanying his Petition for Fees, Mr. Berry discusses each of the
Hogaboom factors." The Commission then concluded that,
"Having considered Mr. Berry's Petition and the Hobaboom factors, we
do not find the requested fee of 40% percent to be reasonable.
Claimant and Defendants have stipulated to fees of 30%. The
Commission ordered Defendants to pay attorney fees to Claimant, and
we do not find it reasonable to approve a Petition that would take a
portion of the fees from Claimant's awarded benefits rather than from
Defendants."
Upon the face of the Order, it is obvious that the Commission reviewed the
Petition for Approval of Fees, submitted pursuant to l.C. § 72-803, upon the basis of
l.C. § 72-804.

However, the consideration of factors in determining "reasonable

fees" as between the code sections is not identical.
Swett v. St. Alphonsus Regional Medical Center, 29 P. 3d 385, noted that
IDAPA 17.02.03, " ... by its terms, applies to approval of attorney fees under l.C. §
72-803, not to the awarding of attorney fees under Idaho Code§ 72-804."
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The parties' Stipulation to Fees at the contingent rate of thirty (30%) of
benefits awarded by the September 8, 2009, decision pursuant to l.C. § 72-804,
should not be controlling in the determination of what a reasonable fee is between
Claimant and her counsel, pursuant to l.C. § 72-803.

IRCP 54(e)(7) specifically

provides that, "[t]he allowance of attorney fees by the Court ... is not to be construed
as fixing the fees between attorney and client." Idaho's Appellate Court, in Na/en v.
Jenkins, 114 Idaho 973, 763 P.2d 1081, noted that a Court-ordered objectively

"reasonable" fee may be higher or lower than what the party must pay to the
attorney under their agreement.
The Commission "tying" fees approved pursuant to l.C. § 72-803 to the
parties' Stipulation of fees punitively awarded pursuant to l.C. § 72-804, fails to
consider that those fees were awarded solely by reason of Defendants' conduct
from and following the January 31, 2008, Supreme Court Opinion in Page II.
Simply stated, Defendants' conduct prior to the January 31, 2008, Page II opinion
could not be considered by the parties or the Commission in determining
"reasonable fees" pursuant to the September 8, 2009, Order. In Finding 39, at page
14, of that Order, the Commission specifically addressed the conduct of Defendants
by reason of which fees were awarded. There, the Commission rationalized that,
"[tlollowing the issuance of Page II, Defendants were aware that
Claimant was claiming additional medical care benefits and temporary
total disability benefits. Defendants had a duty to evaluate Claimant's
claim in light of the holdings in both Page I and Page 11, as well as
existing case law." (Emphasis added)
It is clear that the l.C. § 72-804 fees awarded by the Commission's
September 8, 2009, decision were for the period from and following the Page II
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opinion.

Thusly, Defendants' responsibility for fees was governed by IDAPA

17.02.08.033.01.e.ii, relating to a case in which a hearing has been held and briefs
submitted, being thirty (30%) percent of available funds. Any other result would,
using the vernacular of the Commission, represent a "double dipping" by
considering Defendants' conduct prior to the Page II opinion, when that conduct had
previously been addressed by both the Commission and the Supreme Court.
The point which counsel is attempting to make hereat is that, clearly, the Fee
Agreement specifically references counsel's efforts from and following April 24,
2002, the date the Fee Agreement was entered into, whereas the period
encompassed by the September 8, 2009, I .C. § 72-804 fee award was only from
and following Page II, encompassing but a single hearing.
Further counsel was not advised by appropriately promulgated regulation,
rule, or otherwise by the Commission that a stipulation as to fees between Claimant
and Defendants would control and supersede the Contingent Fee Agreement
between Claimant and Counsel.
B.

~

Both the parties' Stipulation for Fees and the Commission's October
22, 2009, Order Granting Stipulation are specifically limited to benefits
awarded by the September 8, 2009 decision.
Even if the parties' Stipulation for Fees could be interpreted as controlling

~~
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between Claimant and counsel, the stipulated thirty (30%) percent rate would only
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2009, decision. It must therefore follow that fees for Title 72 benefits other than as
specifically awarded by that September 8, 2009, decision must be considered
pursuant to the Contingent Fee Agreement between Claimant and counsel.

Ill.
Counsel's Entitlement to Fees from the May 18, 2006, Title 72 Benefit Check
As fully disclosed and set-forth by and within paragraph 4 of the Confidential
Addendum, dated October 25, 2011, identified as Exhibit A to that Third Affidavit of
Clyel Berry, dated March 29, 2012, by reason of error, no fees were withheld from
the Title 72 benefits encompassed within Defendants' May 18, 2006, check in the
amount of $15,630.73. Although counsel requested Commission approval for fees
related thereto, both within the above-referenced Confidential Addendum and his
Third Affidavit, it is not believed that the Commission has as of yet addressed this
issue. Although request is made for approval of fees at forty (40%) percent, being
$6,252.29, at the minimum counsel would be entitled to fees at a thirty (30%)
percent rate, being $4,689.22.

IV.
Counsel's Response to Commissioner Limbaugh's Request for Discussion
At the conclusion of the April 10, 2012, hearing, counsel inquired of the
Commission whether there were any specific topics or issues which the
Commission

requested

be

discussed

within

counsel's

Post-Hearing

Brief.

Commissioner Limbaugh identified three issues, being further explanation of the
Stipulation Regarding Attorney Fees between Claimant and Defendants, as
granted/approved by the Commission's Order, dated October 22, 2009; why
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counsel believed that the Motion to Reconsider and/or Motion for Further Findings;
and, Alternative Request for IDAPA 17.02.08.033.03.b Hearing, dated April 9, 2010,
remained on the table for determination by the Commission; and, why the issue of
fees was not resolved by or within mediation/lump sum settlement.

Counsel's

response to/discussion of the Stipulation Regarding Attorney Fees is above setforth, in section II hereof.

Counsel's discussion/response to the remaining two

topics/issues follows:

A.

Claimant's Motion to Reconsider and/or Motion for Further Findings;
and, Alternative Request for IDAPA Hearing, dated April 9, 2010, does,
indeed, remain on the table.
Following the September 8, 2009, Order, counsel's Petition for Approval of

Fees was filed by instrument dated December 17, 2009, together with a supporting
Affidavit, of even date.

The Commission responded to that Motion by its Order

Regarding Attorney Fees, dated April 1, 2010, which limited fees to a thirty (30%)
percent contingent rate. A Motion to Reconsider and/or Motion for Further Findings;
and, Alternative Request for IDAPA Hearing was filed by instrument dated April 9,
2010.

Thereafter, counsel was contacted by Commission staff regarding the

scheduling of said Motion for hearing. Upon counsel's understanding that Ms. Page
wished to attend and participate in any such hearing and in light of counsel's belief
that Ms. Page would soon be undergoing right TKA, counsel suggested that hearing
be deferred until following Ms. Page's surgery and upon her ability to attend
hearing. The Commission's Order Regarding Attorney Fee Hearing, dated May 11,
2010, noted that hearing would be scheduled, "[o]nce Claimant's availability for
hearing has been ascertained, ... ".
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Attached as Exhibit 2 hereto are true and accurate photocopies of the
records of Ms. Page's orthopedic surgeon, Dr. Joseph Petersen, for the period
January 7, 2010, through July 12, 2011. As therein noted, Ms. Page was scheduled
for right TKA upon April 22, 2010.

However, that surgery was cancelled as Ms.

Page presented with an urinary tract infection.

Further, in April, 2010, Ms. Page

began to experience significant neck and shoulder symptomatology such that Dr.
Petersen ordered a cervical MRI.

Ms. Page was then scheduled for arthrogram

which was interpreted by Dr. Petersen upon May 6, 2010. The right TKA was again
discussed in Dr. Petersen's dictations of June 23 and July 12, 2010. Upon August
25, 2010, he reported that Ms. Page was "... ready to get that knee done."
Ms. Page underwent right TKA upon September 23, 2010.

Dr. Petersen

determined that Ms. Page achieved MMI upon November 17, 2010. However, Ms.
Page advised counsel that she had extreme difficulty with ambulation and did not
leave her home except for medical appointments or when she "had to."

Dr.

Petersen's dictation of January 25, 2011, confirmed that Ms. Page was also then
having significant symptomatology in her low back.
By reason of Ms. Page's on-going complaints; upon consideration of her lack
~

of mobility; and, her reluctance to leave her home during the winter and spring of

~
~~

2011, out of concern for weather conditions, counsel did not believe it to be in Ms.
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Page's best interests to require her to travel to Twin Falls for a fee hearing. In fact,

~~

Dr. Petersen's dictation of July 12, 2011, confirmed that, even then, Ms. Page
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uses a walker when she walks outside, ... ".

Thusly, at least into the summer
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months of 2011, Ms. Page continued to present with documented medical issues
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such that counsel felt that requiring Ms. Page to travel from her home to attend any
hearing would place her at unreasonable risk of injury and/or re-injury.
Hearing upon the claim in chief had been set for August 30, 2011. As the
attorney fee issue concerned not only benefits already received but also benefits to
be received, counsel believed it would have been an imprudent use of Commission
resources to have then requested hearing upon the fee petition issue, with the
hearing upon the claim in chief scheduled for August 30, 2011.
Counsel affixes a true and correct photocopy of correspondence from the
attorney representing the ISIF, Mr. Thomas High, dated May 9, 2011, as Exhibit 3. It
is there seen that Mr. High had a conflict with the August 30, 2011, hearing, which
was then vacated and reset for September 30, 2011. However, approximately three
weeks prior to that setting, the parties agreed to mediate.
Upon this record, counsel believes that the Motion to Reconsider and/or
Motion for Further Findings; and, Alternative Request for IDAPA Hearing does, in
fact, remain on the table and appropriate for resolution by the Commission. As
there was an Affidavit supporting said Motion filed in conjunction therewith, JRPP
3E2 does not apply. Further, JRPP 12b, pertaining to non-prosecution, provides for
written notice to the parties of the Commission's intent to dismiss. Although such
Rule is specific to a Complaint, where there is no rule providing for the dismissal of
a motion upon grounds of non-prosecution, it is believed that due process requires
prior notice of any such intent by the Commission.
Request for Calendaring re Claimant's counsel's Petition for Approval of
Fees/Request for IDAPA Hearing was filed by instrument dated November 21,
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2011, promptly following the September 20, 2011, mediation and the submission of
the parties' Stipulation and Agreement. Counsel further notes that the October 25,
2011, Confidential Addendum to Lump Sum Settlement Agreement specifically
referenced the pending Motion to Reconsider and/or Motion for Further Findings;
and, Alternative Request for IDAPA Hearing, and noted that the same could then be
set for hearing at the convenience of the Commission, within paragraph 3 upon
pages 12 and 13 thereof, such that the Commission had full notice of counsel's
intent to proceed with such Motion prior to the Commission's approval of settlement
herein.
B.

Neither the mediation of September 20, 2011 nor the submission of the
parties' Stipulation and Agreement encompassed, resolved or was with
prejudice to the April 9, 2010, Motion to Reconsider and/or Motion for
Further Findings; and, Alternative Request of IDAPA Hearing
1.

The September 20, 2011, mediation was without effect upon or to the
April 9, 2010, Motion, or the issue of fees between Claimant and
counsel.
Mediation is addressed within Rule 17, JRPP. The September
20, 2011, mediation was between Defendants employer and surety,
on the one hand, and Claimant, on the other. Mediation is a process
by which to facilitate settlement of the claim between the parties by
and upon good faith negotiation.

Most certainly, mediation is not a

vehicle by or within which the issue of attorney fees between a
Claimant and the Claimant's counsel is resolved or even discussed,
with the exception of the Claimant being made aware of the
approximate "net" to be achieved upon settlement.
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Prior to mediation, Commissioner Baskin required the parties to
file

their

respective

Pre-Mediation

Memorandums.

Defendants'

Memorandum, dated September 12, 2011, omits any reference to the
issue of fees as being encompassed within Defendants' analysis or
evaluation of the claim.

Claimant's Pre-Mediation Memorandum,

dated September 9, 2011, set-forth a Claim Evaluation at pages 6-13.
The entirety of discussion regarding Defendants' potential for an
additional fee sanction encompasses two paragraphs, and was limited
to noting that Defendants had not tendered permanent partial
impairment benefits related to Claimant's left knee presentment.
Upon review of correspondences between Mr. Mark Peterson,
attorney for Defendants, and counsel prior to mediation, the absence
of reference to the issue of Defendants' responsibility for fees speaks
loudly that neither Defendants nor Claimant believed that Defendants'
risk for another fee award was significant.

Counsel attaches as

Exhibit 4, collectively, photocopies of counsel's correspondence to Mr.
Peterson of August 31, 2011, and Mr. Peterson's correspondence to
~

counsel, of September 16, 2011, which set-forth the evaluation and
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believed that Defendants' position would most likely have been found
by the Commission to be upon reasonable grounds, had mediation
failed and the matter proceeded with and through hearing.
2.

The submission of the parties' Stipulation and Agreement was clearly
not intended by either Claimant or her counsel to have resolved or
effected, to any extent, the then-pending April 9, 2010, Motion to
Reconsider and/or Motion for Further Findings; and, Alternative
Request for IDAPA Hearing.
Fully disclosed within the Stipulation & Agreement and/or the
Notation attached thereto was the fact that the April 9, 2010, Motion
would not be resolved by the Commission's approval of the
Stipulation.

Paragraph (c), within Disclosure of Claimant's Attorney

Fees & Costs at page 6 of the Stipulation, originally indicated that fees
were "to be determined pending Claimant's Petition for Approval of
Fees." However, Mr. Dennis Burks, during a telephone conversation
with counsel, advised that fees at the rate of thirty (30%) percent
needed to be inserted and "penciled in" the same. Doing so did not
affect the clear disclosure that the issue of fees between thirty (30%)
percent and forty (40%) percent remained on the table, as did
~

counsel's entitlement to fees from the May 18, 2006, benefit check.
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Claimant's Confidential Addendum, specifically approved by
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" ... pending review and final determination by the Commission of fees
due counsel pursuant to the Fee Agreement between Claimant and
counsel providing for post-appeal fees at the contingent rate of forty
(40%) percent of benefits obtained." The Commission is directed to
pages 13 - 16 of the Confidential Addendum.
Upon review of the record, counsel is at a loss as to how he
could have better or more clearly disclosed these facts to the
Commission.
CONCLUSION
Idaho's Supreme Court, in Curr, supra, determined that the Commission,
" ... must formally publish clear guidelines upon which it will base fee modifications."
The Court continued by noting that, "[w]ithout properly enacted guidelines it is
impossible for the Commission to exercise its duty to approve undisputed attorney
fees under l.C. § 72-803." See 864 P.2d 132, at 139. Responsive to Curr, IDAPA
17.02.08.033 was adopted.

Therein, it is stated that fees at a twenty-five (25%)

percent rate shall be presumed reasonable in a case in which no hearing on the
merits has been held; and, in a case in which a hearing has been held and briefs
submitted or waived, thirty (30%) percent shall be presumed reasonable. However,
even though the Rule specifically states that fee agreements shall be in conformity
with Rule 1.5, IRPC, which provides for a different contingent fee upon settlement,
trial or appeal, the Rule is silent as to what fees shall be presumed reasonable in
the event of appeal and/or re-hearing.
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Absent formally published, "clear guidelines" as to what fee shall be
presumed reasonable upon appeal or re-hearing, the facts and issues herein
presented are on all fours with Curr, which clearly must control.
In Curr, the Supreme Court noted that,
"Moreover, the Commission's arbitrary actions made suspect
appellants' (Claimants' attorneys) integrity in the eyes of their clients,
thereby seriously undermining the attorney-client relationship."
In the instant matter, counsel has represented Ms. Page for a period in excess of
ten years, through three evidentiary hearings; multiple fully contested and briefed
motions; multiple mediations; and, two appeals. At the April 10, 2012, hearing, Ms.
Page testified that she not only approved of fees at forty (40%) percent but, wanted
to "give" counsel the differential between fees at forty (40%) percent and thirty
(30%) percent, even should the Commission refuse to approve the same. Ms. Page
testified that she was "very satisfied" with the Title 72 benefits received by her and
with counsel's work product. April 10, 2012, Tr., p. 22, L. 22 - p. 25, L. 12.
In that hearing, the Commission used the phrase "double dip" in referencing
the Fee Petition, and thereby insinuated in the presence of Ms. Page and her son
that counsel's conduct herein had been improper.

Tr. p. 9, LL. 3-15.

Counsel

represents to the Commission that following hearing he received a telephone call
from Ms. Page, who expressed that she "felt awful," regarding what she perceived
to be the Commission's questioning of counsel at hearing. Counsel can only be left
to wonder as to what may grow from the seed planted in Ms. Page's mind by the
Commission's questions together with the ripple effect thereof, potentially to
encompass Ms. Page's family and friends regarding this counsel's credibility and
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reputation before the Commission. Such is all the more perplexing when seen from
the perspective of counsel's efforts in making full disclosure and accounting to the
Commission by reference to the Confidential Addendum as well as by and within
the March 29, 2012, Third Affidavit of Clyel Berry, at pages 7-10 thereof.
Rhetorically, upon consideration of the factors required to be considered by
Hogaboom and Clark, supra, whether going forward from and following the April

24, 2002, Contingent Fee Agreement or viewed with benefit of 20/20 hindsight,
based upon results and looking back over the last ten year period of time, if fees at
a contingent rate of greater than thirty (30%) percent are not both reasonable and
justified in the instant matter, how could they ever be. Idaho's Supreme Court, in
Rhodes v. Industrial Commission, 125 Idaho 139, 868 P.2d 467, at 469, stressed

the importance of "predictability" in the application of l.C. § 72-803. As is clearly
illustrated by the instant matter, "predictability" is nowhere to be found in workers'
compensation cases where the contingent fee agreement provides for fees at
different rates upon settlement, trial, or appeal, as suggested by Rule 1.5 IRPC.
Curr,

supra,

recognized that a reasonable contingent fee must be

"sufficiently high to compensate the lawyer not only for the reasonable value of the
time he or she anticipated devoting to the particular lawsuit, but also for the time
devoted to other lawsuits undertaken on the same basis but unsuccessful in result."
864 P.2d 132, at 139.

In Clark, the Court observed that a contingent fee also

involves a risk factor such that, "... lawyers generally will not provide legal
representation on a contingent basis unless they receive a premium for taking that
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risk." 929 P.2d 657, at 661. In the instant matter, contingent fees at thirty (30%)
percent fail, upon both counts.
Counsel's current hourly fee rate is $225.00.

As of the date of filing the

instant post-hearing brief, counsel has recorded 785.6 hours in the instant matter. If
fees are approved at only a thirty (30%) percent level, counsel will receive fees
totaling $172, 148.29. Most admittedly, that amount is significant and substantial, at
first blush.

However, when divided by counsel's recorded time herein, counsel's

effective contingent hourly rate is $219.13, being $5.87 less than his current hourly
fee. If contingent fees at forty (40%) percent are approved, counsel's total fees will
be in the amount of $223,671.04.

Those fees when divided by counsel's total

recorded time result in an hourly rate of $284.71, being $59.71 greater than
counsel's hourly fee rate. Counsel attaches as Exhibit 5 hereto a true and correct
copy of the Executive Director's Report published in the January, 2012, issue of the
Idaho State Bar Advocate. Upon page 17, it is seen that, for 2011, approximately
nine (9%) of the attorneys in Idaho charged hourly fees greater than those
requested by counsel upon a contingency basis.
In the end analysis, counsel believes that the litmus test is whether the fees
requested are not only "reasonable" upon consideration of the Hogaboom factors
but, perhaps even more importantly, are fair to the client.

Upon approval of

counsel's Fee Petition for contingent fees at forty (40%) percent, Ms. Page will
receive approximately $281,959.00 in a matter where indemnity benefits total
$376,078.27, being approximately seventy-five (75%) percent of total indemnity
benefits.

Conversely, if the Fee Petition is denied, Ms. Page will then receive
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approximately $337,450.00, being eighty-nine and seven-tenths (89.7%) percent of
total indemnity benefits paid. It is upon this end result that counsel believes it to be
clear and obvious that approval of fees at the requested forty (40%) percent rate
would not only be reasonable, but results in fairness from both the perspective of
Ms. Page and counsel.
In Curr, supra, the Court noted that the Hogaboom opinion recognized two
general philosophies for the Commission to consider along with the Clark factors,
being, " ... to encourage claimants to pursue rightful legal claims and attorneys to
take on such claimants' interests. See 684 P.2d 132, at 139. As noted by counsel
during the April 10, 2012, hearing herein, had counsel suspected that the
Commission would deny fees at a contingent rate in excess of thirty (30%) percent
upon appeal or re-hearing, he most likely would not have appealed the
Commission's December 8, 2003, original decision.

Most certainly, following the

Supreme Court's Opinion in Page I, and upon consideration of the Commission's
June 14, 2005, Order on Remand, awarding Claimant but five (5%) percent
permanent partial disability inclusive of impairment, there would not have been a
second appeal.
As seen from the attached Summary and Accounting, the June 14, 2005,
Order on Remand awarded Title 72 benefits totaling but $12,375.75. Such amount
would have been the total gross Title 72 benefits realized by Ms. Page's industrial
claim but for the second appeal.

Ms. Page testified at hearing that the Title 72

benefits realized by her by reason of the appeals in this matter were the means by
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which she was able to pay her family's bills, keep her home and "survive." April 10,

2012, Tr., p. 24, LL. 19-24.
Solely by reason of appeals being filed in this matter, Ms. Page's past
medical expenses have been satisfied; her future medical needs provided for; and,
significant indemnity benefits paid. Both Ms. Page and counsel respectively request
that the Commission approve fees in this matter at the forty (40%) percent
contingent rate set-forth within their April 24, 2002, Contingent Fee Agreement.

·'*

RESPECTFULLY SUBMITIED this_/_ day of May, 2012.

L. Clyel B rry
Attorney for Claimant
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SUMMARY AND ACCOUNTING OF TITLE 72 BENEFITS RECEIVED IN/PAID OUT
BY L. CLYEL BERRY, CHARTERED, RE: VERDENE PAGE

Pursuant to the request of the Commission during the April 10, 2012,
hearing, the summary of Title 72 benefits received in/paid out by L. Clyel Berry,
Chartered, in this action, specific as to check and type of benefit, is as follows:
Following Findings, Conclusions, and Order on Remand, dated June 14, 2005

$ 10,846.46 Check#502003056 dated10/4/05 in payment ofTID Benefits
$ 3,899.01

$ 3,253.94
$ 2,608.87
$ 1,084.64

paid to Client upon 10/24/05
fees paid to LCB upon 10/24/05, at 30% rate
costs paid to LCB upon 10/24/05
held in trust re 10% differential between 30% and 40% fee rate

$ 10,846.46

$

1,529.29 Check #502003091 dated 12/5/05 in payment of additional TTD Benefits
$
$

917.57
458.79
$
152.93
$ 1,529.29

to Client upon 12/12/05
to LCB re Fees upon 12/12/05, at 30% rate
held in trust re 10% differential between 30% and 40% fee rate

Following Order Granting Benefits and Fees, dated may 9, 2006

$ 15,630.73 Check #502003430 dated 5/18/06, in payment of additional TIO of
$232.91; and, payment of medical benefits totaling $15,397.82
$ 791.05
$ 1,578.04
$
45.00
$ 563.76
$ 530.25
$
30.13
$ 749.07
$ 672.67
$ 9,029.85
$ 1,640.91

to Minidoka Memorial Hospital/Credit Bureau of Rupert on 6/7/06
to Ambulatory Surgery Center/Bonneville Collections on 6/7 /06
to Joseph R. Petersen, M.D. on 6/7/06
to Laurence Hicks, D.O. on 6/21/06
to Dr. Petersen on 7/18/06
to Dr. Petersen on 7124106
to Dr. Petersen on 8/9/06
to Client on 10/19/06
to Client on 12/5/06 re benefits held as reserve for
BlueCross/BlueShield
to Client on 12/5/06 remainder of money in trust re Order, dated
519106

$ 15,630.73

$

5,700.00 Check #502003438 dated 5/31/06 paid to L. Clyel Berry, Chartered, as
and for fees upon hourly basis for recorded time related to Motion for
Award Sum Certain, awarded by the Commission

Following January 31, 2008, Opinion in Page II, awarding fees for the first appeal
(Page I) while declining to award fees for second appeal (Page II);
and, awarding costs for Page II
$

934.10 Check #314000920 dated 4/7/08, paid to L. Clyel Berry, Chartered on
4/9/08, for costs re Page II

$ 11.790.00 Check# 104022676 dated 5/22/08, paid to L. Clyel Berry, Chartered on
6/25/08, as and for fees at hourly rate for recorded hours re Page I

Following September 8, 2009, Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and Order
$131,594.32 Check #104278282 dated 11/3/09, in payment of temporary total disability
benefits awarded
$ 77,350.66
$ 39,478.30
$ 1,605.93
$ 13, 159.43
$131,594.32

paid to Client on 11/30/09
fees paid to LCB on 11/30/09, at 30% rate
costs paid to LCB on 12/14/09
held in trust re 10% differential between 30% and 40% fee rate

$ 64,099.41 Check #104278281
awarded
$
458.79
$
14.05
$ 2,607.03
$
448.78
$ 1,123.31
$ 6,719.73
$ 19,229.82
$ 6,409.94
$ 19,587.96
$ 7,500.00

dated 11/3/09, in payment of medical benefits

to Dr. Petersen on 12/1 /09
to Snake River Pathology on 12/1 /09
to Rite Aid on 12/1/09 (Not cashed - money still in trust)
to Southern Idaho Radiology/Action Collection on 12/1 /09
to Minidoka Memorial on 12/1/09
to Client on 2/11/10
to LCB on 2/11/10, at 30% rate
held in trust re 10% differential between 30% and 40% fee rate
held in trust re Medicare subrogation
held in trust re supplemental Medicare reserve and future out-ofpocket expense set-aside

$ 64,099.41

$ 58, 708.13 Check #104292856 dated 12/9/09, in payment of attorney's fees pursuant
to parties' Stipulation Regarding Attorney Fees, and the Commission's
Order Granting Stipulation, dated October 22, 2009
$
$
$
$

35,224.88
17,612.44
5,870.81
58,708.13

to Client on 1/4/10
to LCB on 1/4/10, at 30% rate
held in trust re 10% differential between 30% and 40% fee rate

Note: Unlike the receipt of fees following the May 9, 2006, Order Granting
Benefits and Fees or the Page II Opinion, granting fees for Page I,
Summary and Accounting of Title 72 Benefits Received In/Paid Out by L. Clyel Berry,
Chartered, Re: Verdene Page - Page 2

with fees received upon an hourly basis for recorded time, the fee
check of $58,708.13, dated December 9, 2009, was added into
Title 72 benefits to be disbursed pursuant to Contingent Fee
Agreement.
The difference in the treatment of these fees is that the
Motion for Award Sum Certain was not to establish Claimant's
entitlement to additional Title 72 benefits over those awarded by the
Commission in its June 14, 2005, Findings, Conclusions, and Order
on Remand. Rather, the Motion for Entry of Award Sum Certain
was required to collect the benefits awarded by and within the June
14, 2005, Order on Remand, and the fee award therefore
compensated counsel at his hourly rate for the hours recorded in
doing so. Similarly, Page II awarded fees for Page I. No Title 72
benefits were awarded by the Court in Page I, such that the
Contingent Fee Agreement between Claimant and counsel did not
apply. Thusly, counsel received fees at his hourly rate for his
recorded hours required by the appeal in Page I.
Conversely, the September 8, 2009, Findings of Fact,
Conclusions of Law, and Order, was related to and following an
evidentiary hearing by reason of which additional Title 72 benefits
were sought and awarded. Upon that basis, fees were negotiated
with Defendants upon a contingent basis and added to other Title
72 benefits awarded by that proceeding to which the Contingent
Fee Agreement between Claimant and counsel applied.
Following mediation and upon Industrial Commission Amended Order Approving
in Part Stipulation and Agreement of Lump Sum Discharge, dated December 9,
2011
$130,504.17 Check #104567967 dated 12/16/11, tendered directly to client 12/22/11
$118,245.83 Check #104568914 dated 12/20/11, in payment of portion of Lump Sum
Settlement representing outstanding medical bills and/or Medicare
statutory lien; attorney fees at contingent rate of 30% together with costs,
totaling $76,496.12; and, $24,875.00 as "unsubstantiated attorney fees,"
to be held in trust by counsel
$ 1,269.78
$
351.57
$ 74,625.00
$ 1,871.12
$ 24,875.00
$ 15,143.28
$
110.08
$118,245.83

to Minidoka Memorial on 1/9/12
to Joseph Petersen, M.D. on 1/9/12
to LCB on 1/9/12, representing fees approved at 30% contingent
rate
to LCB on 1/9/12, for costs approved
held in trust, pursuant to Amended Order Approving in Part
Stipulation and Agreement of Lump Sum Discharge
held in trust re Medicare Subrogation re right knee
held in trust re Medicare Subrogation re left knee

Summary and Accounting of Title 72 Benefits Received In/Paid Out by L. Clyel Berry,
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RECAP OF TITLE 72 BENEFITS RECEIVED AND DISBURSED
Total monies received $549,582.44
$265,959.45
$ 10,560.61
$ 42,341.32
$ 7,020.02
$172, 148.29
$ 51,552.75

monies received by Claimant, VerDene Page (See 1 below)
monies paid to medical providers (See 2 below)
monies held in trust re Medicare subrogation (See 3 below)
LCB costs received to date (See 4 below)
LCB fees received to date at approved 30% rate (See 5 below)
monies held in trust representing differential between fees at 30% and
40% rate (See 5 below)

$549,582.44

Total monies held in trust
$ 42,341.32
$ 51,552. 75

re Medicare subrogation
re 10% differential between fees at 30% and 40%, held in trust pending
Commission determination
$ 93,894.07 Total monies held in trust

1.

Summary of benefits paid to VerDene Page from LCB Trust Account
$ 3,899.01
$

917.57

$

672.67

$ 9,029.85

$ 1,640.91
$ 77,350.66
$ 35,224.88
$ 6,719.73
$130,504.17

10/24/05 from TTD benefit check #502003056 in the amount of
$10,846.46
12/12/05 from TTD benefit check # 502003091 in the amount of
$1,529.29
10/19/06 re monies written off by Minidoka Memorial ($590.52) and
Southern Idaho Radiology ($82.15), from benefit check #502003430 in
the amount of $15,630.73.
12/5/06 monies held as reserve for Blue Cross and BlueShield
subrogation. Please see above re $15,630.73 benefit check #502003430
dated 5/18/06.
12/5/06 remainder of monies due from 5/9/06 Order. Please see above
re $15,630. 73 benefit check #502003430 dated 5/18/06.
11/30/09 from TTD benefit check #104278282 dated 11/3/09 in the
amount of $131,594.32
1/4/10 from Attorney's fee award check #104292856 dated 12/9/09 in the
amount of $58, 708.13
2/11/10 from medical benefit check #104278281dated11/3/09 in the
amount of $64,099.41
12/22/11 check #104567967 dated 12/16/11 as per IC Order dated
September 8, 2009

$265,959.45

Summary and Accounting of Title 72 Benefits Received In/Paid Out by L. Clyel Berry,
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2.

Summary of benefits paid to Medical Providers
From medical
$
791.05
$ 1,578.04
$
45.00
$
563.76
$
530.25
$
30.13
$
749.07

benefit check #502003430, dated 5/18/06
6/7/06 Minidoka Memorial Hospital/Credit Bureau of Rupert
6/7/06 Ambulatory Surgery Center/Bonneville Collections
6/7/06 Joseph R. Petersen, M.D.
6/21/06 Lawrence Hicks, D.O.
7/18/06 Joseph R. Petersen, M.D.
7124106 to Dr. Petersen
819106 to Dr. Petersen

From medical
$
458. 79
$
14.05
$ 2,607.03
$
448.78
$ 1, 123.31

benefit check #104278281, dated 11 /3/09
12/1 /09 to Dr. Petersen
12/1/09 to Snake River Pathology
12/1/09 to Rite Aid (Check #6516 not cashed)
12/1/09 Southern Idaho Radiology/Action Collection
12/1 /09 Minidoka Memorial

From check #104568914, dated 12/20/11
1,269.78 1/9/12 to Minidoka Memorial
351.57 1/9/12 to Dr. Petersen

$
$

$ 10,560.61

3.

total paid to medical providers

Monies held in trust re Medicare subrogation
$ 27, 087. 96 from check #104278281, dated 11 /3/09
$ 15,253.36 from check#104568914, dated 12/20/11
$ 42.341.32

4.

total monies held in trust re Medicare subrogation

Costs paid to LCB to date
$
$
$
$

2,608.87 costs paid to LCB upon 10/24/05 from check #502003056, dated10/4/05
934.1 O costs paid to LCB upon 4/9/08 from check #314000920, dated 417108
(Appeal II Court Awarded Costs)
1,605.93 costs paid to LCB on 12/14/09 from check #104278282, dated 11/3/09
1,871.12 costs paid to LCB on 1/9/12 from check#104568914, dated 12/20/11

$

7,020.02 total costs paid to LCB to date

Summary and Accounting of Title 72 Benefits Received In/Paid Out by L. Clyel Berry,
Chartered, Re: Verdene Page - Page 5

@
.\

5.

Summary of Attorney Fees Received/Held in Trust Account
Received upon 10/24/05 by LCB:
$ 3,253.94,
between fees at 40% and 30%
Commission approval
Received upon 12/12/05 by LCB:
$ 458.79,
between fees at 40% and 30%
Commission approval
Received upon 6/1/06 by LCB:
$ 5,700.00,
of Attorney fees
Received upon 6/25/08 by LCB:
$ 11,790.00,
Received upon 11/30/09byLCB:
$39,478.30,
between fees at 40% and 30%
Commission approval
Received upon 1/4/10 by LCB:
$17,612.44,
between fees at 40% and 30%
Commission approval
Received upon 2/11/10 by LCB:
$ 19,229.82,
between fees at 40% and 30%
Commission approval
$ 74,625.00,
Received upon 1/9/12 by LCB:
between fees at 40% and 30%
Commission approval

with
$ 1,084.64, being differential
rates, deposited in trust, pending
with
$ 152.93, being differential
rates, deposited in trust, pending
re fee award from Motion for Award
re fee award
with
$13,159.43, being differential
rates, deposited in trust, pending
with
$ 5,870.81, being differential
rates, deposited in trust, pending
with
$ 6,409.94, being differential
rates, deposited in trust, pending
with
$24,875.00, being differential
rates, deposited in trust, pending

with
$51,522. 75, representing the
Total Fees Received by LCB:
differential in fees between 40% and 30% rates, being in trust, pending
Commission determination of Fee Petition
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\TERDENG PAGE
011071201 u
SUBJECTIVE: 65 years of age. She y,·ill be back in Lhe next month to check up for a total knee
in :\larch. She is using hydrocodone as needed and doing very well. \Vrote a p:tescription for
~. t, Kyle today. Wnile she v;as here, she brought a letter from RJyel Berry. She is havi11g low back
~\.~\pain nmv, not knowing whether it is coming out of that right leg that fa giving her problems t1Jat
\ ,
she is going to have replaced. She has put on a little bit of ·weight because she ~s jl:st not actiYe.
i \' \~\ ~\ D Vv'e have a doubie-edged sword. I got a bad lmee, a bad back, and \Ve have got weight gain. We
, 1
have got to get this knee done on the right side so \Ye can get her going and see if this \\ill help
that back. I still feel that the pem1anent paitial impairment still is equal to what we submitted
before, 85% was preexisting and 15%- .:vas related to an industrial injury. I 1vou1d go with a
typica) total !<..nee impairment rating. Sbe has got a good result out of i1 and so whmever the 15%
would be on top of it 1vould go along with foat. I realize that there is references to pemmnent
disability. That hinges over on fue fact that now we have got a total knee in there and she v,,ill
have some follovv· her into the other. Since she has had that Jeft knee dont::, I think the right 1-.nee
has taken a bit more abuse. 1 thinl{ that she J)robably would be consistent \Yiih "vhat we said in
the past and the right lmee vvould probably be 3-5% rna-dmum with 97% preexisting on that right
knee. I \Vould go along with everything \Ve have said so far.
ASSESSMENT AJ\l) PLi\.N:
.
See her back in about 4-5 weeks to schedule that
knee.
JRPims
1

@J
\ \\J

\J/

VERDENE PAGE
04/21/20i0
S1JBJECTNE: She was supposed to have surgery tomorrov'. With that, she came in and labs
show that she has a sit urinary tract infection.
OBJECTNE: We put her on Cipro and canceied tt~e surgery because of the urina_ry tract
infection. Looking at her right arm, she has significant pai.t.'1 that comes down out of her neck and
into the arm area. Lateral deviation and rotation to the right give her pain. We got an x-ray of it
and 5-6 and 6-7 are both down. We are going to go ahead and get that chased with an open MRI
tomorrow secondary to the fact that she cannot get into a dosed 1\1Rl We wiil see if there is
something in there that we need to get taken care of. If the arm hurts that much, there is no way
she can be up on crutches. JRP /ms

04/28/2010
VERDENE PAGE
SlJBJECTNE: That MRJ came back from Pinnacle.
OBJECTIVE: She has got a C2 small disk but not enough to impinge it. We are going to come
now and look at the shoulder to see if it is coming out of the shoulder. It shows C2-3
degenerative changes and shallow central disk herniation without stenosis.
ASSESSMENT A.ND PLAN: Scheduled her for an arthrogram on Monday and we \".i.11 see her
back next Wednesday. JRP/ms
05/06/2010
VERDENE PAGE
SUBJECTIVE: Says that knee is doing better now. The problem she has got is that right
shoulder. We have done an 1\1Rl of the neck.
OBJECTIVE: MRI shows mild bulging disks. The shoulder, itself, has degenerative changes of
the AC joint without osteophyte and some degenerative changes in the shoulder, itself, but
nothing to get excited about. Went ahead an injec.ted that with 1 mL of Kenalog with a mixture
of Marcaine and Xylocaine for a total of 10 mL and split it between the AC joint and the
subacromial area.
ASSESSMENT A.ND PLAN: We will see her back in a couple of weeks to see ifit helped at
all. JRP/ms
VERDENE PAGE
6/23/20JO
SUBJECTNE: She is in today and wants tc go to the coast next month. Then when she gets
back, she wants to do that knee. OPt ~ ~
OBJECTIVE: She wanted to come back in a couple weeks to get a shot in that which I have no

pro blems with at all to get her tbx:ougb until sbe gets back from the coast
ASSESS.rvr:ENT Af\""D PLAN: She was scheduled to do LlUs before but she had a urinary tract
infection so we put it off. JRP/ms
VERD2-JE PAGE
7/12/2010
SUBJECTIVE: She is on her 1-vav to California.
re~ 7,.
OBJECTIVE: Went ahead and u;jected that knee today v,ith 1 mL of Kenalog vvith a mixture o~§~
Marcaine and Xy1ocaine for a total of 1OmL.fo1 · OA ~ ~'\i/3.. .
,/_,..::rft. /,10
ASSESS:\1ENT Ai"JD PLA..N: Vv'hen she gets back from Cahrom1a, we Vl'lll go ahead and do
ff,
that~ knee for her. JRPims

VERDENEPAGE

8/25/2010
S1JBJECTIVE: She is now back from Oregon. She is ready to get tha.r knee done.
OBJECTIVE: It hTu.--ts enough that she is not getting around well.

ASSESS11E1\TT AfID PLAl-J: We are going to go a}1ead and do iliat at the Rupert Hospital on

/.i)_, , ,,,

{/\·
I

the 23rd. We need to get her clezred through a medical exam. She had an infection last tLu.e.
She had a lot of problems \\ ith nausea 2w.'1d emesis the last time. We will see if we cannot ch2w.'1ge
that a little bit this time \Vith Pbenergan.. JRP!n1s
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OPERATIVE REPORT
Name: VERDENE L PAGE

E

Medical Record#: 4065
Admission#: 310936
Sex: F
Age: 66Y
Patient Type: SURGERY
AdJ.njtting Physician: Joseph Petersen, M.D.
Attending Physician: Joseph Petersen, M.D.
Operation Date: 09/23/2010
D: 09/23/2010

T: 09/24/201 o

PREOPERATIVE DIAGNOSIS:
Osteoarthritis of the right knee.
POSTOPERATIVE DIAGNOSIS:
Osteoarthritis of the right knee.
PROCEDURE PERFORMED:

TotaJ knee rutbroplasty.

SURGEON:
Joseph Petersen, M.D.
ANESTHESIA:
Spinal, with central sedation.
Femoral block at the end of the case.
BLOOD LOSS:
Estimated b1ood loss probably about 50 cc.
DRAINS:

One Consta Vac.
TRANSFUSIONS:

None.

COMPLICATIONS:
None.
TOURNIQUET TIME:

One honr and 23 minutes at 300 mm.Hg at the high thigh area.

INDICATION:
This is a 66 year old female who had a left tota1 knee arthroplasty in May 2008, and has done very well with it
She presents at this time for a right total knee arthroplasty.

OPER~TIVE

REPORT
VERDENE L PAGE
Page 1 of 2
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OPERATIVE REPORT
TECHNIQUE!
The patient was brought to the operating room and placed in the supine position. She was transferred from the
OR cart to the OR table. Prophylactic antibiotics were given. The patient had IV sedation with a spinal
anesthetic. She was placed supine and a Foley catheter was placed. The tourniquet was placed high on the
upper thigh, and she was prepped and draped in the usual sterile manner. The leg was then csmarched out and
the tourniquet inflated.
An incision was made at the midlinc of the kneeJ with the knee in a flexed position, down through the skin and
subcutaneous approximately 6 to 7inches111 length, with hemostasis by cautery. Going down through the
qnadriceps mechanism, over the quadriceps, pulling from proximal to distal and around the medial aspect of the
patella. Rolling the patella laterally and bringing it up to flexion, examination of the lmee showed significant
degenerative changes in all three compartments. The guide was placed in t11e tibial area and the tibial plateau
was resected off. Using the guide, we set it at approximately 9 to 11 nun of cut resection and then going to the
femur we placed a drill hole down the center of the femur. We placed the alignment guide down the shaft of the
femur with the distal femoral block cutter. On the end of it, we took off an extra 2 mm and th.en. placed the
block for resection of the anterior and posterior condyles and the Chamfer cuts. With this completed, a lria1
prosthesis was placed into position, with a good tight fit. We retreated and then went back to the tibial
component. We brought the knee up into a strong tibial flexion and placed the Cobb retractor behind the tibia.•
puiled it forward. Took out the soft tissues, cleaned it up and piaced the punch down the center of the tibia for
trial prosthesis.

The trial prosthesis fit perfectly. We found that it was loose with a 9 and snug at 11. We elected to go with that
after using the trial prosthesis for the flexion, extension and guides. We rou:nded out the patella at the patellar
button. I started jrrigation on the back table. Tue Methylmethacrylate was prepared with one bag ofnonnal
and one bag of Tobramycin. We started the irrigation at 3,000 cc, followed by another 3,000 of nonnal saline,
and then followed up with another 1,000 of one gram of Ancef. Once the glue was prepared, we put
Methylmethacrylate in all three compartments. With complete and full extension, the excess glue was retrieved.
Taken through a full range of motion, with full extension, we placed U1e ConstaVac in position and closed the
quadriceps mechanism with #1 Vicryl, subcuticuJar 0-Vicryl and approximatin.g staples to close the incision.
The tourniquet was allowed to come down once we completed the subcuticular tissues. We cleaned up the
Beta<line, blood and debris w1th Xeroform, 4 x 4's, l':'luffs, head roll, Webril, ice pad, more Webril, ace wraps
and knee immobilizer. The femoral block was then placed. She was then taken off the operating room table
and to the recovery room.
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OPERATIVE REPORT
VERDENE LPAGE
Page 2of2

v'ERDENE PAGE
10114/2010
SUBJECTIVE: Status post total knee art..hrop1asty, right Jr.nee. She is doing much better than
the other one.
OBJECTIVE: She has 90 degrees of flex.ion atJ.d ful1 extension. Physical therapy is working
wifa her. The problem she has is \\liID nausea and emesis. She is on Phenenrn.i-i ai1d that is
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working well for her.

ASSESSMENT AND PLAN: She is gettiI1g around much better on this knee tha.11 she did the
last one. Worl~inan's Compensation is after her to do something about this. I gave her options of
the things to do. JRPhns

VERDEl\TE PAGE

11/03/2010
SUBJECTIVE: She is stressed out. She came in today complaining about pain dov.·n the

inferior pate11ar te:::i.don area.

OBJECTIVE: She has excellent rrnge of motion to it. She said it feels good it just bums and
hlli"ts. She car..not take her pain pills because she throws them back up. I put her back on some

Phenerga.n and gave her some BioFreeze.
ASSESS:\1ENT A.1\TD PLAN: We \VilJ see her back in about 2 \'>'eeks to see how she is doirnz
and get ahead of it. I also told her she needed to take one-half of one of those pain pills to se; if
we can get t.1.at to the point that she can tolerate medicines jusi a little bit better <md also food.
JRP/ms
I

VERD2NE PAGE
11/17/2010
SUB.lECTiVE: She is doing much better. She needs a pain pill now and ihcn.
OBJHCTIVE; We have reached maximum stability. Range of motion today was about 95
degrdes, full extension. The pain is getting better. They have increased her antidepressants. 1
ihinklthat has helped more than anythi11g else.
ASSESSMENT AND PLAN: We are goimr to have a confernnce some time here witb the
ind:.i.,1ri.al people on heL JRP/ms
~

VERIPENE PAGE
1/11/2011
Ques1.~oned by Clycl Berry, T\vin Falls attorney.
Ik hJd some questions as to whether or not Ms. Pagels right total knee ar1.hroplasty on
Septeh1ber 23, 2010, i,vas either a direct or indirect consequence Df an indnsn·ial left k.i1ee injury.
1 believe it was. That was noted in the deposition taken May 5, 2009. She does have an
impailnnent rating. The notes that he expressed noted a 3°10 ind-u.strial and 97% preexisting. 1 do
11ot r~member where those numbers v>'cre but having seen that knee, 1 would probably go with
20% industrial and 80% preexisting, That is extenuated by the fact tlmt the other "knee was the
pa1i that gave her the problems. She is basic,tlly only limited as far as a total knee arthroplasty.
1
\VhcJ}:er ~he had had that at the. present time ..or at a iater tirne;. those.· san~e. r:stri. ~ti~ns ; ~uld~
have applied to her. I do not tlunk there needs to be any compensation ror mm IaCl. anu ,he met
that :>he would have had a total knee some day and those rcstrk.tions would have been with her at
~hat 1fme. 1 think tbe rresentat:on at t11is time is a go?~ total kn.ee tha.t.certai~ly could ~a~e an
imparrment rating ass1gned to it and we could close tms case with the mdustnal comm1ss10n.
JRP/p1s
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1/25/2011 s
V.!:JZlJnN""E PAGE
SUBfECTIVE: She is 66 years of age. I had done k11ee surgery on her. She says that her 1cnees
are fantastic
and that she loves them. The •Droblem she has now is her lowe.r back.
I
OBJ~CTIVE: We got an x-ray of it and she has sigrMicam degener4iivc joint disease. She does
not ~·~:mt to do anything about it. We are just going to keep her on a muscie relaxant and pain
pm$ needed.
ASSfSSMENT AND PLA.1\1: See her back as needed. \Vi th her pain pills working, we w"ill
leav9 it alone. ?he has had so:11e concem ab~ut independent medical exarn by 1hc insurance
c.om1rru1y. She has been meetmg the standards that they wanted her to. JRP/ms
I
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--VERDENEPAGE_

__ _______
7112/20li
SU~JECTIVE: She is 67 years of age. She has had lME's .. I do not see areport from anybody. · ·OBJ)E~TIVE: 1. am impressed at_ how Vl:e!l she is d?~ng. ~~1ab~ut4? poun9s orr. and l thi~ s~e
wouJd JUSt be domg much better than sh.: is. She saic.i facrc JS edema m the right knee. Fk1.1~n 15
exc~lient, fnll exten.sion. She Vl.'alks with just a little bit ofvvaddk. She use.: a.walker wher1 she
walks o~Ltside and going very far for stability only, rather than a cane. That 1s JUst fine.
AS~ESS:tviENT AND PLA?-..J; 1 am impressed at ho'v well she is doing. She will just continue
do}do better. See her back in about 2 months. JRP/ms
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L. Clyd Berry, Chartered
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Mark C. Peterson
MOFFATT THOMAS BARRETT
ROCK & FIELDS, CHARTERED
P.O. Box 829
Boise, ID 83701-0829
RE:

Page v. McCain Foods & ISIF

Dear Clyel and Mark:
I have been given a trial setting in a long disputed claim involving a subdivision
and the City of Kimberly for August 29th. The claim is expected to go five days before a
jury. It has been highly contested all the way through. I don't expect it to settle. Prior
mediation attempts have failed.
Would you be willing to stipulate to move the Page trial from its current setting,
which is in the middle of my claim involving the City of Kimberly? I would be happy to
prepare the Stipulation and run the issues down with the Industrial Commission.
Please advise.

TBH/ka
(15718\BeJTy & Peterson-ltr)

Exhibit3

L. CLYEL BERRY, CHARTERED
ATTOR~EY

and COUNSELOR at LAW

P.O. Box 302
Twin Falls, ID 83303-0302

Telephone: (208) 734-9962
Fax Number: (208) 734-9963

August 31, 2011

Mark C. Peterson
MOFFATI, THOMAS, BARRED,
ROCK & FIELDS, CHARTERED
P.O. Box 829
Boise, Idaho 83701-0829

Re:

Page v. McCain Foods, Inc. & Transcontinental

Dear Mark:
Earlier, in late 2009, you made inquiry whether Ms. Page would be willing to mediate
her Title 72 claim. By my correspondence to you of December 30, 2009, I noted the two
earlier unsuccessful attempts at mediation and attempted to set-forth my evaluation of Ms.
Page's Title 72 claim, such that if my evaluation was significantly higher than that of your
clients', Ms. Page would be spared the frustration of a third failed mediation. If my memory
serves me correctly, following your receipt of my December 30, 2009, correspondence, you
did not provide me with benefit of your evaluation and made no further mention of
mediation, until most recently.
At this juncture, I would request that you re-visit my December 30, 2009,
correspondence. The intent of the instant correspondence is to bring my evaluation of Ms.
Page's claim current, with Ms. Page having undergone right TKA and having benefit of
additional medical opinion upon the issues of causal relation, permanent impairment and,
physical restrictions and permanent disability. The format of this instant correspondence
will follow that of the earlier December 30, 2009, letter.
My evaluation of Ms. Page's current entitlement to Title 72 benefits, is as follows:

1. Medical Expenses Incurred As Of Current Date:
a. Right knee: Ms. Page has now undergone right TKA. My office has prepared
a medical itemization documenting total expenses incurred related to the right
knee of $55,400.02.

Mark C. Peterson
MOFFATT, THOMAS, BARRETT,
ROCK & FIELDS, CHARTERED
Re: VerDene Page
August 31, 2011
Page 2

b. Left knee; Ms. Page has incurred $196.02 in unreimbursed medical expenses
for periodic checkups of her left knee with and by Dr. Peterson.
2.

Future Medical Expenses:
As stated within my earlier correspondence, to the extent that your clients are
responsible for Ms. Page's initial TKAs, they have co-equal responsibility for
future medical costs associated with "re-dos." Dependent upon variable factors,
it is my understanding that the average life expectancy of a TKA is five to seven
years. In today's dollars, a conservative assignment of potential financial risk for
future TKAs vvould be for r.vo procedures, with total costs being $110,000 to
$125,000.

3. Additional Temporary Total Disability:
By its September 8, 2009, decision, the Commission awarded Ms. Page
temporary total disability through September 21, 2008. If the Commission finds
Ms. Page's right TKA to be compensable, I believe it logical that the Commission
will reinstate Ms. Page's temporary total disability benefits effective
September 22, 2008, through November 17, 2010, the date upon which Dr.
Peterson advised Ms. Page had achieved maximum medical improvement
status-post right TKA. This period would approximate 112 weeks and
correspond with benefits of approximately $47,500.
4. Permanent Partial Impairment:
Although we now have benefit of medical opinion from Ors. Peterson,
Surbaugh and Tallerico upon Ms. Page's permanent partial impairment
status-post bilateral TKAs, in light of the fact that permanent impairment is
encompassed within any consideration of permanent disability, I find no need to
separately discuss permanent impairment at this juncture.
5. Permanent Disability in Excess of Impairment:
I would share with you that Doug Crum has provided me with his opinion that
considering Ms. Page's left TKA, independent of any consideration of the right
knee, low back or other potential impediments, Ms. Page is totally and

Mark C. Peterson
MOFFATT, THOMAS, BARRETT,
ROCK & FIELDS, CHARTERED
Re: VerDene Page
August 31, 2011
Page 3

permanently disabled. If so, Ms. Page would be entitled to total and permanent
disability benefits commencing with the date of her medical stability status-post
right TKA, being November 17, 2010. As of that date, she would enjoy a future
life expectancy of 18.2 years, over-which she would receive disability benefits
totaling approximately $410,000, with any net present value reduction
being negated by periodic/annual increases in the weekly benefit rate.

Although you may disagree, with the Commission having found that the left TKA
was compensable and related to Ms. Page's industrial accident, I believe it to be highly
probable that the Commission will find Ms. Page's right TKA was accelerated in time as a
consequence of her change in gait due to her compensable left knee injury. I thusly feel
that your clients are squarely faced with a high degree of probability for responsibility of the
above-indicated Title 72 benefits. Obviously, if a Medicare set-aside proposal is accepted,
you would limit exposure for Ms. Page's future medical presentment.

Ms. Page, having waged a long and frustrating battle with your clients, is tired and
would like to effect settlement of her claim upon a lump sum basis. However, although
prepared to compromise and negotiate in good faith, having benefit of the prior Supreme
Court Opinions as well as the most recent award by the Commission, she will not be
_____ _
inclined to accept a low-ball or unrealistic proposal by your clients.

In my mind, the above analysis and evaluation is well-supported. The greatest
unknown is whether and to what extent the Commission may find responsibility on the part
of the ISIF, should this matter proceed to hearing. With the exception of Ms. Page's
presentment to chiropractic physician Hanson, with a burning in her shin, the medical
record is devoid of any medical presentment which would subject the ISIF to risk. Such
was noted by Tom High following his recent deposition of Ms. Page. For that reason, I
would seriously doubt whether the ISIF will be prepared to make a significant or meaningful
contribution towards settlement of this claim, at mediation. As l have earlier shared with
you, I have never settled with an employer and its surety without settling with the ISIF, at
the same time.

Mark C. Peterson
MOFFATT, THOMAS, BARRETT,
ROCK & FIELDS, CHARTERED
Re: VerDene Page
August 31, 2011
Page 4

Again, I believed it to be of benefit for you to be aware of my current analysis and
evaluation of this claim, prior to mediation.

Ms. Page and I look forward to the hopeful resolution of this claim, at mediation.

Very truly yours,

LCB:jb
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L. Clycl BeITy
Atto111ey at Law
PO Box 302
Twin Falls, ID 83303

Re:

Vcrdene Page v. McCain Foods, Inc., et al.
I.e. No. 2oo:z.~007246
MTBR&F File No. 15300.0236
Dear Clycl:
Thank you for your letter of August 31, 2011, outlining yoLir position as it relates to this case.
As an initial point, we did pay out a 5 percent impairment for Ms. Page's left knee; what
additional impairment are you saying is owed? f do not recall this ever being addressed by you
until reviewing your recent memorandum.
In any event, I assure you we are prepated to mediate this matter in good faith. Clearly, it is
likely the Commission will find some significant disability as it relates to this case and ti.,~re is
admittedly a possibility the Commission will find total disability. I do disagree that total
disability is a foregone conclusion as you would suggest. Ms. Page has not looked for work at
all since the accident and our vocational consultant will be able to present evidence of viable
jobs available to her that fall within herrestrictions. I have yet to see the report, but have been
promised it will be complete prior to the mediation and will send it to yoi.1 immediately upon
receipt. With that said, as you have already said you have received Mr. Crnrn's report, you are
obligated to provide it and would appreciate you doing so immediately. In this regard, while I
agree 1t has taken Mr. Jordan a long time to complete the evaluation, Mr. Crnm 's interview of
your client was reportedly a month earlier than Mr. Jordan and you just received his report.
Further, in the unlikely event the Commission finds Ms. Page to be totally disabled, her life
expcctalicy is not as long as you .suggest. I personally assisted in completing a life expectancy
analysis and her life expectancy according to the analysis is 77 years old. This is obviously not
something I wanted to bring up in front of her at the mediation, but I wanted yoll to be aware of
in te1111s of where we arc coming from regarding this case. I can assure you that I did not utilize
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foaccurate infom1ation to manufacture a low life expectai1cy. This projected life expectancy
peculiar to Ms. Page is lower than for the citizenry at large that you have utilized.
In addition, 1 think there is a good chance the Commission will not find the right knee
compensable. Dr. Tallerico 's opinion in this regard is u11equivocal as is Dr. Surbaugh 's
contrary opinion. I think Dr. Petersen's opinion will ultimately be quite equivocal iii this regard
if his posL-heal'ing deposition is taken.
As it relates to future medicals, J disagree wholeheartedly with the idea that the average life
span of a total b1ee is 5 to 7 years. I attach a recent article put out by the American Association
of Orthopaedic Surgeons that counters this notion. In any event, as CMS approval of a
Medicare Set-aside is required, we would utilize that amount for purpose of detennining the
amount of future medical exposure to be included in any lump sum. That is, my intent would
be lo agree on the arnount of the settlement as it reiates to all issues except for future medicals
and agree to an additional amount for future medicals required to satisfy CMS as part of the
approval process.

In any event, I assure you that we are prepared to settle this matter al an amount that I believe to
be reasonable. Whether what 1have analyzed as being reasonable and what you deem
reasonable intersect will be determined at the mediation. I do appreciate your courlesies as it
relates to this case a11d look fo1ward to seeing you at the mediation in Boise on September 20.
V cry truly yours,

~6~
Mark C. Peterson

mq1(i11muflatt.com
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IDAHO STATE BAR

2011 ISB

EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR' s REPORT

MEMBERSHIP SURVEY

Diane K. Minnich
Executive Director, Idaho State Bar

In 1994, 1999, 2007, and again in
2011, the Idaho State Bar conducted a
survey of its membership. The purpose of
the survey was to establish a demographic
profile of the membership, their attitudes
and actions toward pro bono and public
service, and a snapshot of the state of the
practice of law for
Idaho lav.ryers.
In
October
2011, every licensed member of
the bar received a
rnembership survey. Most members received the
survey by email.
Those
without
Diane K. Minnich
email addresses
were mailed a
copy of the survey.
The response rate was 33%, slightly lower
than the 2007 response rate of 38%.
General demographics
The survey included some questions
for which the responses can be verified by
information in the bar's records. These
questions help us to confinn that the respondents fairly reflect the bar membership.
Sex: The percentage of women lawyers increased slightly since 2007; 73% of
the respondents were male, 27% female
(the actual statistic is 75% male, 25%
female). This is a 2% increase in woman
la\\ryers since 2007; however, female bar
membership has only increased 1% since
1999.
Gender
1999

2007

2011

. Male

76%

77%

75%

. Female

24%

23%

25%

Age: The Bar continues to age. In
2007, 47% of the membership was over
50; in 2011, 51 % was over 50. The percentage of members under 30 have decreased from 5.8% to 4.5%.
16
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The percentage of
lawyers that thinks Idaho lawyers have an image problem
continues to decrease; the percentage that say yes has
declined from 69% in 1999
to 46% in 2011.

Age
II

1999

2007

Under 37

I 25.3%

25.7%

I 2011
I 23%

37 - 49

I 42.5%

30.5%

i

28.2%

I

30.7% I

28.3%

I

22.5%

II
I

I

I 50 - 59
Over 59

i

23.3%

I

7.3%

I

16.6%

Diversity: The number of bar members who identify themselves as non-Caucasian remains at 5%, the same percentage as the 1999 and 2007 surveys.
Years in the Bar: This category reaffirms that the bar is aging; 46.5% of bar
members were admitted more than 20
years ago. This is a 1.5% increase over
2007 and a 16.5% increase over 1999.
Attorneys admitted less than 5 years remained steady at 17%.
Firn1 Size: About 47% of Idaho lawyers practice in fin11S of 1-3 attorneys.
This is a slight decreased (2%) from the
1999 survey. About 25% of lawyers practice in :fin11S with 4-10 la\\ryers.
Type of Practice: 43% of bar members hold a license in more than one state,
an increase of 13% over 2007.
The percentage of attorneys indicating
they are in private practice has decreased
3% since the 2007 survey. Those indicating they are unemployed increased 1%.
Sole practitioners have decrease 2%
to 20% since 2007 as have partners or
shareholders in finns, from 25% to 23%.
In 1994, 35% of the survey respondents
indicated they were paiiners or shareholders in fin11s.

Income: As in 2007, the largest percentage of respondents indicated they
made between $50,000 and $75,000,
22.4%; followed closely by $75,000 $100,000 at 17.4%. Fifty-eight percent of
Bar respondents' income was $100,000
or less.
Income

$50,000

40%

22%

18%

$50,000 75,000

20%

26%

22%

I $75. ooo 16%

17%

17%

$100,000 $150,000

12%

16%

18

$150,000 $200,000

5.5%

8%

9%

4%

9%

10.5%

I $100,000

Over
$200,000

Pro bono and public service
The survey included an expanded
section on pro bono and public service
activities. Idaho attorneys continue their
commitment to pro bono and volunteer
service.
More than 50% of the respondents indicated they did more than 10 hours of pro
bono work in the past year. Another 27%
noted that they perfon11ed no pro bono
service. The survey results indicated that
most employers or fin11S do encourage pro
bono service ( 83 %) by their attorneys, /'.
with 30% of employers/firms having a pr1 ~,J

Exhibits

W

bono policy. As you would expect, the
main factor noted for not providing pro
bono legal services was lack of time; 69%
were discouraged from doing pro bono
work due to lack of time.
More than 70% of the respondents
regularly give legal advice over the phone
without expectation of payment. Almost
60% of the attorneys state they offer initial case evaluation and/or consultation
free of charge.
About h~lf of the respondents indicate
that they participate in a legal related organization such as bar sections or committees, ITLA or Idaho Women LaVvyrers.
Bar members are committed to serving
the profession and public through volunteer service and pro bono legal services.

Lawyer professionalism
job satisfaction
Job Satisfaction: As in the past surveys, lawyers responded that they are
fairly satisfied with their income, job, and
career oppmiunities. Over 70% indicated
that their expected income was good, very
good, or excellent. Nearly 80% noted that
their job satisfaction and career opportunities were good, very good or excellent.
This compares to the results in the 2007
survey, although the good, very good and
excellent career opportunities percentage
was slightly lower than 2007.
Consistent with the last two surveys,
almost 90% of the lawyers responding
plan to continue to work in the legal profession until they retire.
Public Image: The percentage of lawyers that thinks Idaho lawyrers have an image problem continues to decrease; the
percentage that say yes has declined from
69% in 1999 to 46% in 2011.
When asked what factors contribute
to the public perception problem, more
than 90% of the respondents indicated
that the public's misunderstanding of the
legal system contributes; followed by the
public's perception that attorneys charge
too much (84%), and the public's perception that attorneys don't solve clients
problems quickly enough (76%). These
percentages are consistent with the 2007
survey but considerably higher than the
1999 percentages.
Idaho attorneys believe that their fellow attorneys are, for the most part, honest, ethical and comieous; although the
percentages are slightly lower than in the
previous survey.
Advertising: Attorneys who indicate
they do not advertise has increased slightly from 50 to 53%. Internet adve1iising has increased about 10% and yellow
pages advertising decreased by the same
percentage from 2007, but decreased 25%
since 1994.

Economics and office practice
Workload: Given the economic climate
for the past few years, it is not suiprising
that less than half the attorneys stated that
2010 was more profitable than 2009. In
the last two surveys about 65% said the
current year was more profitable than the
previous year. The percentage of lawyers
that noted they have enough work or more
work than they can handle has decreased
16% since 1999.
Billable Hours: Thirty seven percent
of the respondents state that billable hours
are not applicable to them. This is consistent with the 2007 survey results.
Billable hours per week
1999 I 2007
2011

i

i Less than
10 hours

3%

10 - 24
hours

11%

I
I

3%

5%

i
I

12%

12%

I

25 - 39
hours

I
33%

40 - 50
hours

16%

I

More
than 51
hours

I

I

31%

30%

13%

13%

II
I

II
I

3.5%

I

2.5%

4%

Total hours worked
1999
2007 I 2011
Less
than 25
hours

I

I 2s - 39
I hours

I

I

II

i

I
I

I

6%

I
I

14%

10%

11%

12%

13%

42%

37%

I 40 - 49
hours

42%

50 - 60
hours

29%

28%

27%

Over 60
, hours

7%

9%

12%

I

I

Hourly rates
1999

2007
I
I

Less than $75

1%

$76-$100

19%

3%

$101 - $150

39%

24%

$151-$200

9%

25%

Over $200

1%

12%

1%

Hourly rates

$76 - $125

I
I
I

I $126- $175

I

Less than $75

I

2011
1.5%
4.5%
19%

$176- $225

23%

$226 - $275

10%

$276 - $325
Over $325

I
I

5%
4%

Professional liability insurance
Sixty-five percent of the respondents
indicate they have professional liability
insurance, a 3% increase from 2007. This
is slightly lower than the percentage of
lawyers that certify through licensing that
they have malpractice coverage, which is
about 70%.
Technology
Only one technology question was on
this year's survey, "Which of the following legal research databases does your office use?" The two main legal research
tools used by Idaho lawyers are WestLaw
and Casemaker. Seventy-nine percent of
the respondents use \VestLaw and about
73% use Casemaker. About 60% indicate
that they use LexisNexis.
As I noted at the beginning of this article, this is the fourth time in the last 17
years that we have conducted a survey of
Idaho Bar members. The changes in the
Bar during these years are considerable:
•The Bar continues to grow older. In the
1994 survey only 19.4°/o of bar members
were over 50, in 2011 it is 51 %. Also in
1994 only 22.5% of Bar members had
been members for more than 20 years, it
2011 that percentage is 46.5%.
•The Bar is becoming more diverse but
very slowly. In 17 years, woman members have increased from 15% to 25%.
Ethnic diversity has only increased 1. 7%
since 1994.
•Income and hourly rates continue to increase but legal work is in sh01ier supply.
•Fewer lawyers think that lawyers have a
public image problem; a 36% decrease
since 1994.
•Although the questions have differed
over the years, the Bar is still committed
to pro bono and public service. A large
percentage of members give of their
time to provide services to those in need
and volunteer for law-related entities.
Thank you to those Ia-wyers who completed the survey. We appreciate your
participation. The infonnation is valuable
to the Bar and its members as we plan for
the future.The complete survey results for
the 201 J and 2007 surveys are posted
the Idaho State Bar website: www.isb /\ \
idaho.gov.
\ \
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BEFORE THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF THE STATE OF IDAHO

VERDENE PAGE,
Claimant,

IC 2002-007246
ORDER ON ATTORNEY FEES

v.
McCAIN FOODS, INC.,
Employer,
and
TRANSCONTINENTAL INSURANCE
COMPANY,
Surety,
Defendants.

This matter comes before the Commission on a variety of issues dealing with attorney
fees due to Claimant's counsel (Counsel). This matter was mediated and a lump sum settlement
agreement was approved by the Commission on November 8, 2011. On November 21, 2011,
Counsel filed a Request for Calendaring Re Claimant's Counsel's Petition for Approval of
Fees/Request for ID APA 17.02.08.033.03.b Hearing. A hearing was held on April 10, 2012 and
Counsel submitted a post hearing brief on May 2, 2012.
The issues addressed by the Commission in this order are summarized below. The
Commission is aware that this recitation of the issues was not presented prior to hearing, but was
instead molded from what was presented at hearing and by Counsel in his Post-Hearing Briefing
upon Attorney Fees.
ORDER ON ATTORNEY FEES - 1

1. Whether Counsel's Motion for Reconsideration filed on April 12, 2010, was extinguished
by the execution of a lump sum settlement agreement,
2. If not, whether the Commission should grant the Motion for Reconsideration and award
an attorney fee beyond what was approved on October 22, 2009, as submitted by
stipulation, and
3. Whether Counsel has proven entitlement to an attorney fee greater than 30% of the lump
sum settlement agreement proceeds.
Claimant's April 12, 2010 Motion for Reconsideration
Counsel argues that he is entitled to additional attorney fees on benefits awarded by the
Commission's September 2009 order. The necessary timeline for evaluating the April 12, 2010
Motion for Reconsideration is as follows.

On September 8, 2009 the Commission issued a

decision in Claimant's case which included an award of attorney fees pursuant to Idaho Code §
72-804.

A stipulation was submitted stated that Counsel agreed to accept, and Defendants

agreed to pay, 30% of the total benefits awarded in the September 8, 2009 order as attorney fees
to Counsel. The Commission issued an order approving the stipulation on October 22, 2009.
Then on December 30, 2009, Counsel filed Claimant's Petition for Approval of Fees
requesting attorney fees on the benefits awarded in the September 2009 order in addition to those
paid by Defendants. On April 1, 2010, the Commission issued an order denying Counsel any
attorney fees beyond the 30% previously paid by Defendants pursuant to the stipulation. On
April 12, 2010, Claimant filed a Motion to Reconsider and Request for Hearing on the Order on
Attorney Fees. A hearing was never held because Claimant was receiving medical treatment and
she desired to be present at the hearing. Thus, no order on the motion to reconsider was ever
issued by the Commission.
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Thereafter, the case with Employer was settled through mediation. The settlement lists
the prior attorney fees taken but it does not reference the intention that the motion for
reconsideration of attorney fees is excluded from the settlement. Filed concurrently with the
lump sum settlement was Claimant's Confidential Addendum to Lump Sum Agreement Between
Claimant and Defendants Employer and Surety signed by Counsel and Claimant. On pages 1213 of the 22 page document is the following sentence, "The Commission currently has pending
before it Claimant's counsel's Motion to Reconsider and/or Motion for Further Findings; and,
Alternative Request for IDAPA 17.02.08.033.03.b hearing, which may now be set at the
convenience of the Commission."
The lump sum settlement agreement was approved on November 8, 2011, by an Order
Approving in Part Stipulation and Agreement of Lump Sum Discharge. The Order stated that
the agreement was approved with the exception of the request for 40% attorney fees claimed
from the settlement amount. The Commission approved 30% attorney fees and ordered Counsel
to hold the remaining 10% in trust pending further order of the Commission.
Then on November 21, 2011, Counsel filed a Request for Calendaring Re Claimant's
Counsel's Petition for Approval of Fees/Request for IDAPA 17.02.08.033.03.b Hearing. The
Petition requests a hearing on the issue of Claimant's December 30, 2009 Petition for Approval
of Fees and the April 9, 2010 Motion for Reconsideration of the order denying the Petition for
Approval of Fees.
The matter was set for hearing at which time Counsel clarified that he was seeking an
additional 10% in attorney fees from the September 2009 order, as well as an additional 10% in
attorney fees from the lump sum settlement amount. The request for attorney fees on the lump
sum settlement will be addressed later in this order.
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First the Commission will address whether it is proper to rule on the April 12, 2010,
Motion to Reconsider. Generally a lump sum settlement agreement resolves all issues in a case
and the pending litigation, including motions, are merged into the settlement and resolved.
However, this case was different in several respects. As set forth above, Claimant's Confidential
Addendum to Lump Sum Agreement stated that the Commission could now set a hearing for the
Motion for Reconsideration. Further, the lump sum settlement agreement was very specific in
only resolving income benefits. The settlement agreement left entitlement to medical benefits
open and did not mention attorney fees for Counsel other than the breakdmvn amount of prior
attorney fees taken prior and attorney fees taken from the settlement agreement.

The

Commission finds enough ambiguity in the timeline and documents that a ruling on April 12,
2010 Motion to Reconsider is warranted.
Counsel argues that the Commission is bound by the contingent fee agreement entered
into by Counsel and Claimant on April 24, 2002, which allows for an attorney fee of 40% if the
matter is taken on appeal. The Commission has no need to approve or modify the contingent fee
agreement entered into between Claimant and Counsel. While instructive in determining the
understanding of the parties at the outset of the case, the contingent fee agreement is not
determinative of the fees to be awarded by the Commission in an award of Idaho Code §72-804
attorney fees or Idaho Code §72-803. See Hogaboom v. Economy Mattress, 107 Idaho 13, 16,
684 P.2d 990, 993 (1984).
The most important fact in the assessment of attorney fees pursuant to Idaho Code § 72804 and the Commission's September 2009 order in this case is that Counsel and Defendants
came to an agreement as to the amount of attorney fees Defendants would pay Counsel in
satisfaction of the award of Idaho Code § 72-804 attorney fees. The only fees that Counsel will
ORDER ON ATTORNEY FEES - 4

receive pertaining to the benefits awarded in the September 2009 order are those paid by
Defendants. No additional attorney fees pertaining to the September 2009 order will be granted
to Counsel pursuant to the fee agreement executed with Claimant. If Counsel wanted to argue
for more than 30% in attorney fees he could have made that argument to Defendants or to the
Commission at that time. Counsel chose to accept 30% attorney fees from the September 2009
order. The Commission will not award additional attorney fees on the same benefits. Claimant's
Motion for Reconsideration is DENIED.
Calculation of Attorney Fees from the September 2009 Order

Further, the Commission takes exception with Counsel's calculation of attorney fees from
the September 2009 order and award. The award provided for medical benefits and temporary
disability, as well as attorney fees pursuant to Idaho Code § 72-804.

As discussed above,

Counsel and Defendants came to an agreement as to the amount of attorney fees Defendants
would pay Counsel in satisfaction of the award of Idaho Code § 72-804 attorney fees. Counsel
chose to accept 30% attorney fees from the September 2009 order.
Three checks were issued by Defendants. The first check was for medical benefits, the
second check was for temporary disability, and the third check was for attorney fees. The
Commission would have expected Counsel to accept the third check as payment for attorney
fees. The third check was issued after the Commission issued its order approving the stipulation
and the check was in the amount of 30% of the total of check one and two. Instead of accepting
the amount of the third check as 30% of the benefits awarded, Counsel added the attorney fee
check into the total pot of money and then took 30% of that larger total. Calculated as Counsel
did, the attorney fee represents 39% of benefits awarded.
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Check 1
Check 2

$131,594.32
$64,099.41
$195,693.73

Medical benefits
Temporary disability benefits
Total benefits awarded

Check 3

$58,708.13

Equaling 30% of $195,693.73

$254,401.86
$76,320.56

Total of Checks 1, 2, and 3
Attorney fees taken - 30% of all funds received ($254,401.86)

Counsel argues that the award of Idaho Code §72-804 attorney fees is a benefit to
Claimant that should be included in the total amount of benefits received, and then attorney
should take 30% of the grand total. The Commission disagrees. Attorney fees granted after an
unreasonable denial are just that, attorney fees granted to pay the attorney so that a claimant does
not have to carry the additional burden of paying attorney fees from the benefits claimant
receives.
Counsel is not entitled to the 10% of the benefits he holds in trust from the prior benefits
Claimant has received. Further, Counsel is not entitled to $17,612.44 of the attorney fees he took
from the checks received following the September 2009 order. $17,612.44 is the difference
between the attorney fees taken and the attorney fees paid by Defendants per the stipulation
($76,320.56 - $58,708.13). Of the money Counsel holds in trust, $17,612.43 will be returned to
Claimant.
Fees on the Lump Sum Settlement Agreement

Attorney fees from the proceeds of lump sum settlement agreements are provided for
through Idaho Code § 72-803 and IDAPA 17.02.08.033. Under Idaho Code § 72-803, the
Industrial Commission is empowered to approve all claims for attorney's fees. Pursuant to its
rule making authority under Idaho Code § 72-508, the Commission has adopted a set of criteria
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for the approval of attorney's fees in workers' compensation cases. See, IDAPA 17.02.08.033.
Under these rules, a claimant's attorney is entitled to reasonable attorney's fees which are
consistent with the fee agreement, and are to be satisfied from "available funds". Available
funds are defined as a sum of money to which a charging lien may attach. It shall not include
any compensation paid or not disputed to be owed prior to claimant's agreement to retain the
attorney. IDAPA 17.02.08.033.01.c. Under section 01.C, a "charging lien" may be asserted by
an attorney who is able to demonstrate that:
1.

There are compensation benefits available for distribution on equitable principles;

11.

The services of the attorney operated primarily or substantially to secure the funds
out of which the attorney seeks to be paid;

m.

It was agreed that counsel anticipated payment from compensation funds rather
than from the client;

iv.

The claim is limited to costs, fees, or other disbursements incurred in the case
through which the fund was raised; and,

v.

There are equitable considerations that necessitate the recognition and application
of the charging lien".

IDAPA 17.02.08.033.01.c.
Further, the rules in a case in which no hearing has been held, 25% of available funds is
presumed reasonable and in a case in which a hearing has been held and briefs submitted 30% of
available funds shall be presumed reasonable. IDAPA 17.02.08.033.01.e.
While, as Counsel argues, the IDAPA does not have a specific fee percentage set for
situations of cases that go to re hearing or on appeal, it is able handle those situations within the
current framework. It cannot be said that no guidelines are in place for this case. The properly
enacted regulatory scheme applies to this case just as it does to all cases settled by way of lump
sum settlement agreement. There is no practical way to create a rule that fits every foreseeable
ORDER ON ATTORNEY FEES - 7
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situation. Instead the current rules give the Commission authority to evaluate the individual case
and determine entitlement to attorney fees.
In support of his argument for attorney fees on the lump sum settlement Counsel sets

forth the long road that this case has taken and the dogged persistence which he maintained
through the years of litigation at the Commission and the Idaho Supreme Court.

Claimant

testified that it was Counsel who pushed her along and had faith, even after unfavorable
decisions, that the claim was valid and worth pursuing. Counsel's efforts in this case are beyond
the ordinary case and the Commission finds that such an effort entitles Counsel to a fee beyond
the ordinary.
The Commission finds Counsel responsible for obtaining the lump sum settlement and
further, that his efforts warrant an attorney in the amount of 40% of the proceeds of the lump
sum settlement agreement. Thus, Mr. Berry is entitled to attorney fees in the amount of 40% of
$248,750.00. Counsel has already received 30% leaving 10% ($24,875.00) to be disbursed to
Counsel as the remainder owed.
Attorney Fees on the May 18, 2006 Benefit Payment

Counsel further requests attorney fees from the $15,630. 73 benefit check issued on May
18, 2006. Counsel states that in an oversight he did not deduct fees from that check. The
Commission will approve Counsel's request for 30% of $15,630.73 in attorney fees, equaling
$4,689.22.
Amount Remaining in Trust

By the Commission's calculations, $4,376.10 remains in Counsel's trust account after the
above deductions have been made ($51,552.76 - $17,612.43 - $24,875.00 - $4,689.22

=

$4,376.11). This amount has been held in trust but Counsel has not proven that he is entitled to
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further attorney fees. Thus, the remaining $4,376.11 is payable to Claimant.
Conclusion

In accordance with the foregoing, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that of the $51,552.76
remaining in Counsel's trust account, Counsel is entitled to attorney fees of $24,875.00 and
$4,689.22 and Claimant is entitled to $17,612.43 and $4,376.11.

Claimant's Motion for

Reconsideration is DENIED.
Mr. Berry is entitled to additional attorney fees of $29 ,564.22.
Claimant is entitled to $21,988.54.

0

'llf'day of~
DATED this _i:fl._~;

'2012.

INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION

Rec used

Thomas P. Baskin, Commissioner
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
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I hereby certify that on the r/ day of
, 2012 a true and correct copy of
ORDER ON ATTORNEY FEES was served by regular United States Mail upon each of the
following persons:
L CL YEL BERRY
PO BOX 302
TWIN FALLS ID 83303-0302
MARK PETERSON
PO BOX 829
BOISE ID 83701-0829
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L. CLYEL BERRY,

ARTERED

ATIORNEY AND COUNSELOR AT LAW
P.O.BOX302
Twin Falls, ID 83303.0302
Telephone: 208/734-9962
Fax Number: 208/734-9963
Idaho State Bar No. 1897

BEFORE THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO
)
)

VerDENE PAGE,
Claimant,

l.C. No. 02-007246

)

)
)
VS.
)
)
McCAIN FOODS, INC.,
)
)
Employer,
)
)
and
)
)
TRANSCONTINENTAL INSURANCE
)
COMPANY,
)
)
Surety,
)
Defendants.
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~)

MOTION TO
RECONSIDER AND/OR
MOTION FOR FURTHER
FINDINGS; AND, BRIEF
IN SUPPORT OF SAID
MOTION

!

Ul

'~ -)

COMES NOW Claimant herein, by and through souns~f record and
pursuant to Judicial Rules of Practice and Procedure 3E and/or F, and hereby
respectfully petitions the Idaho State Industrial Commission to reconsider its June
21, 2012, Order on Attorney Fees.
FEES PERTAINING TO THE SEPTEMBER 8, 2009, ORDER
Summarized, the Commission continued in its earlier position that
counsel's fees regarding benefits awarded by the September 8, 2009, Order would
be limited to thirty (30%) percent, upon the basts that,
Motion to Reconsider and/or Motion for Further Findings; and,
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" ... Counsel and Defendants came to an agreement as to
the amount of attorney fees Defendants would pay
Counsel in satisfaction of the award of Idaho Code § 72804 attorney fees. The only fees that Counsel will
receive pertaining to the benefits awarded in the
September 2009 order are those paid by Defendants.
No additional attorney fees pertaining to the September
2009 order will be granted to Counsel pursuant to the
fee agreement executed with Claimant."
The Commission further stated that in reaching this decision,
"[t]he commission has no need to approve or modify the
contingent fee agreement entered into between
Claimant and Counsel. While instructive in determining
the understanding of the parties at the outset of the
case, the contingent fee agreement is not determinative
of the fees to be awarded by the Commission in an
award of Idaho Code § 72-804 attorney fees or Idaho
Code § 72-803."
The Commission cited Hogaboom v. Economy Mattress, 107 Idaho 13, 16, 684
P2d 990, 993 (1984), for this principle.
The Hogaboom Court actually determined that the contingent fee
agreement, " ... though persuasive evidence, is not itself dispositive, but rather must
be considered in conjunction with the factors cited in Clark, supra, 102 Idaho at 26566, 629 P2d 657, in order to determine whether the fee provided ... is reasonable
under all the circumstances."

See 684 P2d 990 at 993.

Overlooked by the

Commission is the fact that the Hogaboom Court referenced Berger, Court
Awarded Attorneys' Fees: What Is "Reasonable?", 126 U.Pa.L.Rev. 281, 282
(1977), believed to be exactly on point to the issue before this Commission but not
addressed thereby, that,
"[u]nder either equitable or statutory rationales for fee
awards, the amount the client agreed to pay the attorney
Motion to Reconsider and/or Motion for Further Findings; and,
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does not necessarily determine what others should be
compelled to pay by the Court .... What constitutes a
reasonable fee may be more or less than the client is
obligated to pay the attorney. It is a determination that
must be made by the Court."
The Court's ruling in Hogaboom most certainly did not limit the
attorney's right to fees from his client to the l.C. § 72-804 fee award against the
Defendants. Rather, while recognizing that an l.C. § 72-804 fee award, " ... may be
more or less than the client is obligated to pay the attorney," the Court specifically
and expressly determined that the fee agreement, "... though persuasive evidence,
is not itself dispositive, but rather must be considered in conjunction with the factors
cited in Clark, ... ".
It is respectfully submitted that the Commission's June 21, 2012,
Order on Attorney Fees erroneously limited its focus to the parties' Stipulation
Regarding Attorney Fees together with the Commission's October 22, 2009, Order
Granting Stipulation.
At this juncture, counsel states the obvious.

The Commission

determined that contingent fees of forty (40%) percent upon monies generated by
the parties' Lump Sum Settlement Agreement were warranted upon acknowledging
that, "Counsel's efforts in this case are beyond the ordinary case and the
Commission finds that such an effort entitles Counsel to a fee beyond the ordinary."
Obviously, but for the parties' Stipulation the Commission would have approved
fees between counsel and Ms. Page at the 40% rate set-forth within their
Contingent Fee Agreement, against all benefits awarded by the September 8, 2009,
Order. Upon the basis of the argument and citations set-forth within llA, at pages
Motion to Reconsider and/or Motion for Further Findings; and,
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15 - 17 of Claimant's Post-Hearing Brief Upon Attorney Fee Issue, dated May 1,
2012, it is respectfully submitted that limiting fees to 30% constitutes clear error.
CALCULATION OF FEES FROM THE SEPTEMBER 8, 2009, ORDER
By its Order on Attorney Fees, the Commission took "exception" with
counsel's calculation of fees to the extent that counsel added the l.C. § 72-804 fee
check into the "pot" of Title 72 benefits to be divided with Ms. Page, pursuant to
their Contingent Fee Agreement.

Rather, the Commission's Order on Attorney

Fees determined that, "[a]ttorney fees granted after an unreasonable denial are just
that, attorney fees granted to pay the attorney so that a claimant does not have to
carry the additional burden of paying attorney fees from the benefits claimant
receives." Most certainly, this expression of principle is highly noble but, in the real
world, is unrealistic.
From the perspective of this counsel, the l.C. § 72-804 fee award
within the Commission's September 8, 2009, Order, represented a Title 72 benefit
which required counsel's energies, time, resources and work-product, no different
than the other benefits which the September 8, 2009, Order awarded.
Reviewing

the

parties'

post-hearing

briefs,

upon

which

the

Commission entered its September 8, 2009, Order, it is seen that the attorney fee
issue was heavily contested and fully briefed.

Within Claimant's Post-Hearing

Opening Brief, dated June 2, 2009, following the introduction and statement of facts,
argument upon Claimant's entitlement to reinstatement of temporary disability
benefits following November 26, 2001, required approximately one page of briefing.
Argument upon Claimant's entitlement to continuation/reinstatement of medical
Motion to Reconsider and/or Motion for Further Findings; and,
Brief in Support of Said Motion - 4

benefits following November 26, 2001, required approximately four pages of
briefing. Argument upon Claimant's entitlement to l.C. § 72-804 fees also required
approximately four pages of briefing.
Defendants' Post-Hearing Brief devoted approximately four pages
rebutting Claimant's entitlement to fees.

Ironically, counsel cannot help but note

that although it was Defendants' conduct by reason of which the l.C. § 72-804 fee
award was entered, counsel has no doubt but that Defendants' counsel fully
imposed legal fees upon his clients to defend against the l.C. § 72-804 fee
argument, which fees were neither scrutinized by the Commission nor require its
approval as a condition precedent to payment.
Upon review of Claimant's Post-Hearing Reply Brief, dated July 1,
2009, arguments specific to Ms. Page's entitlement to medical benefits required
approximately three pages of briefing, at pages 16-18. Argument upon Claimant's
entitlement to temporary disability benefits required approximately five pages of
briefing, at pages 18-23. Argument upon entitlement to l.C. § 72-804 fees required
approximately five and one-half pages of briefing, at pages 23-27.
The point which counsel is attempting to make in support of his
argument that an l.C. § 72-804 fee award represents a "benefit" which should be
included in the total amount of Title 72 benefits from which contingent fees are due
is premised upon the fact that the potential of an l.C. 72-804 fee award is no
different than Claimant's potential for any other Title 72 benefit. Whether and to
what extent the Commission is persuaded to grant any Title 72 benefit is dependent
upon Claimant's counsel's ability to present facts and supporting law sufficient for
Motion to Reconsider and/or Motion for Further Findings; and,
Brief in Support of Said Motion - 5

the Commission to determine entitlement.

Bluntly stated, but for the efforts of

counsel in this regard, Ms. Page would have received nothing from her Title 72
claim arising by reason of the August 17, 2001, industrial event, and most certainly
would not have received an l.C. § 72-804 fee award. As hopefully illustrated by
counsel's briefing, above-noted, counsel and his office exerted significant time,
resources and energy upon the l.C. § 72-804 issue. In doing so, counsel and Ms.
Page fully anticipated that upon counsel's efforts generating a fee award, he would
be entitled to fees pursuant to the Contingent Fee Agreement. Please see Affidavit
of Berry in Support of Motion for Reconsideration, with attached copy of Interim
Distribution Schedule re Attorney Fee Award.
From the Commission's June 21, 2012, Order on Attorney Fees, it is
clear that the Commission somehow anticipates and expects that a claimant's
attorney's time, resources, energies and work-product required to develop and
effectively present a claimant's potential entitlement to an l.C. 72-804 fee award
must be without the attorney's expectation of payment.

However, such is not

realistic and, in effect, results in a claimant's attorney being required to develop,
present and brief what can be a significant segment of his client's potential claim,
without compensation. This result was specifically rejected by the Court in Curr v.
Curr, 124 Idaho 686, 864 P2d 132, at 138.
If fees upon an l.C. § 72-804 fee award do not come within the
Contingent Fee Agreement between Ms. Page and counsel, then counsel asserts
entitlement to fees upon principals of quantum meruit or implied contract, upon the

Motion to Reconsider and/or Motion for Further Findings; and,
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basis of his providing services in addition to those encompassed by said contingent
fee arrangement.
CONCLUSION

Irrespective of the Commission's statement, at page 4 of its June 21,
2012, Order on Attorney Fees that, "[t]he Commission has no need to approve or
modify the Contingent Fee Agreement entered into between Claimant and
Counsel," the Commission did, in fact, "modify" the Contingent Fee Agreement
entered into by and between Ms. Page and counsel, which was submitted upon a
Petition for Approval in which Ms. Page specifically concurred and joined.

The

Commission concedes, at page 7 of its Order, that, " ... the IDAPA does not have a
specific fee percentage set for situations of cases that go to rehearing or on
appeal." The Commission excuses such omission upon the basis that, " ... it is able
(to) handle those situations within the current frame work."

It is respectfully

submitted that such ignores the clear mandate of Idaho's Supreme Court expressed
in Curr, supra, that, "[i]n sua sponte modifying uncontested attorney fees absent the
guideline of a properly enacted regulatory scheme, the Commission ... exceeds (its)
statutory authority." See 864 P2d 132, at 137.
It is with some degree of trepidation that counsel submits the instant
Motion for Reconsideration. Counsel has no interest in testing the patience of the
Commission nor does counsel wish to "taint" the Commission's impression of
counsel. However, counsel firmly submits that the above-referenced portions of the
Commission's Order on Attorney Fees are clearly in error.

Further, the practical

effect thereof will be in direct conflict to the stated intent of the enactment of Title
Motion to Reconsider and/or Motion for Further Findings; and,
Brief in Support of Said Motion - 7

72, generally, and specifically l.C. § 72-804. Simply stated, the great majority of
claimants' counsel in Title 72 matters do exactly as counsel did herein, by adding
any statutory fee award into the "pot" of benefits to be disbursed with their clients
pursuant to their contingent fee agreements.

Otherwise, counsel's work-product

devoted to the fee issue which resulted in the fee award would be without
compensation. The Curr Court determined that the Commission may not require
such on the part of Claimant's counsel. Further, as a practical matter, no claimants'
counsel would have interest in developing any potential l.C. § 72-804 issue.
RESPECTFULLY submitted this_J

day of July, 2012.

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I hereby certify that I am a resident attorney of the State of Idaho and
day of July, 2012, I served a copy of the foregoing document by
that on the
depositing a true copy thereof in the United States mail, postage prepaid,
addressed to the following:
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VerDene Page
507 West 300 South
Heyburn, ID 83336

L.
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RTERED

L. CLYEL BERRY,

ATIORNEY ANDCOUNSELORATLAW
P.O.BOX302
Twin Falls, ID 83303-0302
Telephone: 208/734-9962
Fax Number: 208/734-9963
Idaho State Bar No. 1897

BEFORE THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO
VerDENE PAGE,

)
)
Claimant,
)
)
vs.
)
)
McCAIN FOODS, INC.,
)
)
Employer,
)
)
and
)
)
TRANSCONTINENTAL INSURANCE
)
COMPANY,
)
)
Surety,
)
)
STATE OF IDAHO, INDUSTRIAL SPECIAL
)
INDEMNITY FUND,
)
)
Defendant.
)
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~)
STATE OF IDAHO

l.C. No. 02-007246

AFFIDAVIT OF CLYEL
BERRY IN SUPPORT
OF MOTION FOR
RECONSIDERATION

)
) SS.

County of Twin Falls.

)

L. Clyel Berry, having been first duly sworn on oath, deposes and
states as follows:
1.

That your affiant is an attorney licensed to practice law by and
within the state of Idaho, and is counsel of record for Claimant,
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VerDene

Page,

herein.

Further,

affiant makes factual

representations herein based upon personal knowledge as to
matters upon which he would be competent to testify before the
Idaho State Industrial Commission or a Court of appropriate
jurisdiction.
2.

That affiant was not aware that the April 10, 2012, hearing
would encompass as an issue whether an l.C. § 72-804 fee
award must be accepted by the claimant's counsel

as

discharge and payment of fees due counsel by and from
claimant, as opposed to the fee award being added into the
"pot" of benefits to be disbursed between claimant and counsel
pursuant to their contingent fee agreement. Upon that basis,
the purpose of the instant Affidavit is to submit further facts to
the Commission believed pertinent to this issue in the instant
matter.
3.

Attached hereto as Exhibit A is a true and correct copy of the
December 16, 2009, Interim Distribution Schedule re Attorney
Fee Award, forwarded to Ms. Page at her home for review;
reviewed and signed by Ms. Page upon December 17, 2009;
returned to counsel's office by Ms. Page and received upon
December 18, 2009; and, which was further discussed by and
between

Ms.

Page

and

counsel

during

a

telephone
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conversation in which counsel specifically inquired whether Ms.
Page had any questions or concerns, to which Ms. Page
replied that she did not.
4.

The submission of the Interim Distribution Schedule to Ms.
Page by counsel regarding the attorney fee award was in the
same format and followed the same procedure as distributions
of other benefits. Counsel herewith affixes, as Exhibit B, true
and correct photocopies of the Interim Distribution Schedule re
Medical Benefits, dated December 2, 2009; and, the Interim
Distribution Schedule re TTD Benefits, dated November 30,
2009, as illustration and example.

5.

That the Contingent Fee Agreement entered into by and
between Ms. Page and counsel, of record herein, provided that
the contingent fees would be upon "all benefits" recovered by
and through counsel's efforts. The same was fully discussed
by and between counsel, Ms. Page and Ms. Page's family
members, and it was fully understood thereby that the
Contingent Fee Agreement would be applicable to and
encompass all monies recovered by and through counsel's
efforts, potentially to include an l.C. § 72-804 fee award.

6.

As represented by counsel to the Commission at hearing,
counsel had reviewed the propriety of adding fee awards to the
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"pot" to be disbursed with his client pursuant to their contingent
fee award with Attorney Tom High, who had served upon the
ethics committee regarding fees. Mr. High advised counsel of
his belief and understanding that that is the practice, procedure
and custom followed by most attorneys and, of his opinion that
the same represents the procedure which should be followed
by attorneys. Please see line 7 through 23, page 36, April 10,
2012, transcript.
7.

That following receipt and review of the Commission's June 21,
2012, Order on Attorney Fees, counsel "surveyed" other
claimants' counsel by telephone, calling attorneys known by
counsel to be highly regarded by their peers and believed to be
highly regarded

by the

Commission.

Counsel

hereby

represents to the Commission that each of those attorneys
advised counsel that they also add any fee award into the "pot"
to be disbursed with their clients pursuant to their contingent
fee agreement. Otherwise, claimants' attorneys would be
economically precluded from aggressively seeking statutory fee
awards in Title 72 matters where the same often requires
significant briefing and, upon occasion, separate hearing limited
to the fee issue. Further, none of the attorneys contacted by
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counsel were aware of or had notice that such procedure was
or would be considered improper by t

mmission.

l.CI~
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me this

MELODYE KREF'
Notary Puhlic

J

day of July, 2012.

N tar/ Publiqfar Idaho
Residflng at FMet, Idaho •
My Cdmmission Expires 2/8/13

State of Idaho

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
J)jereby certify that I am a resident attorney of the State of Idaho and
that on the 0_ day of July, 2012, I served a copy of the foregoing document by
depositing a true copy thereof in the United States mail, postage prepaid,
addressed to the following:
VerDene Page
507 West 300 South
Heyburn, ID 83336

L. Cl
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L.CLYELBERRY,CHARTE~.ED

ATTORNEYandCOUNSELORatLAW
P.O. Box302
Twin Falls, ID 83303-0302

Telephone: (208) 734-9962
Fax Number: (208) 734-9963

VerDene Page
Interim Distribution Schedule re Attorney Fee Award
December 16, 2009
~,

J

Monies Currently Available:

$58,708.13

LESS:
1. Attorney's Fees Post-appeal at 40% a

$23,483.25

Total

23,483.25

$35.224.88

Available to Client

Accepted and so agreed by client this_../_?,____ day of December, 2009.

VerDene Page

CJ

It is hereby disclosed to client and client hereby acknowledges that fees in excess of 30% are subject to
review and approval by the Industrial Commission. For that reason, it is hereby understood and agreed
that the fees in excess of 30%, being the amount of $5,870.81, shall be held in trust by Clyel Berry
pending the full conclusion of the instant matter, at which time Clyel Berry will seek the review and
approval of the same by the Commission. Retained fees in excess of 30% not approved by the@~"
Commission shall be returned to client to the extent in excess of future costs incurred by Cly el Berry in .~.\.\
~
the continued prosecution of this matter.

a

EXHIBIT A

L.

CLYEL BERRY, CHA.RTERED
ATTORNEY and COUNSELOR at LAW

Telephone: (208) 734-9962
Fax Number: (208) 734-9963

P.O.Box302
Twin Fal.ls, ID 83303-0302

VerDene Page
Interim Distribution Schedule re Medical Benefits
December 2, 2009

$64,099.41

Monies Currently Available:
LESS:
1. Attorney's Fees Post-appeal at 40%
2. Outstanding Meds b
Minidoka Memorial
Joseph Petersen
S.R. Pathology/Dr. Hauer
Southern Idaho Radiology
Rite Aid

a

$25.639.76

$ 1,123.31
458.79
14.05
448.78
2,607.03
$ 4,651.96

3. Medicare Recovery c

$19.587.96

Total

49,879.68

Available to Client

$14.219.73

Accepted and so agreed by client this

day of December, 2009.

VerDene Page · tJ

It is hereby disclosed to client and client hereby acknowledges that fees in excess of 30% are subject to
review and approval by the Industrial Commission. For that reason, it is hereby understood and agreed
that the fees in excess of 30%, being the amount of $6.409.94, shall be held in trust by Clyel Berry
pending the full conclusion of the instant matter, at which time Clyel Berry will seek the review and
approval of the same by the Commission. Retained fees in excess of 30% not approved by the
Commission shall be returned to client to the extent in excess of future costs incurred by Clyel Berry in
the continued prosecution of this matter.
b Certain of the providers' accounts were subject to reduction/adjustment by reason of Medicare. To the
extent that any provider asserts claim to additional monies due to such adjustment, or otherwise, by
client's acceptance of the above $14,219. 73, client specifically agrees to hold her attorney, Clyel Berry,
harmless from such claims of her providers and to accept full responsibility therefor.
c Medicare reserve is subject to final review by Medicare. Further, Medicare lien is subject to reduction
on pro-rata basis for legal fees. To such extent, fee reduction is passed through to client.
a

EXHIBIT B

L. CLYEL BERRY, CHARTERED
ATTORNEY and COUNSELOR at LAW

Telephone: (208) 734-9962
Fax Number: (208) 734-9963

P.O.Box302
Twin Falls, ID 83303-0302

VerDene Page
Interim Distribution Schedule re TTD Benefits
November 30, 2009

$131,594.32

Monies Currently Available:
LESS:
Attorney's Fees Post-appeal at 40% 1
Outstanding Costs

$52,637.73
1,605.93
54,243.66

Total Legal

$ 77,350.66

Available to Client

Accepted and so agreed by client this

/___ day of

VerDene Page

1

~r, 2009.

0

It is hereby disclosed to client and client hereby acknowledges that fees in excess of 30% are subject to
review and approval by the Industrial Commission. For that reason, it is hereby understood and agreed
that the fees in excess of 30%, being the amount of $13, 159.43, shall be held in trust by Clyel Berry
pending the full conclusion of the instant matter, at which time Clyel Berry will seek the review and
approval of the same by the Commission. Retained fees in excess of 30% not approved by the
Commission shall be returned to client to the extent in excess of future costs incurred by Clyel Berry in
the continued prosecution of this matter.
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L. CLYEL BERRY, CHARTERED
ATTORNEY AND COUNS.ELOR AT LAW
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BEFORE THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO

VerDENE PAGE,

)

l.C. No. 02-007246

)
Claimant,

)

)
)
)
)
McCAIN FOODS, INC.,
)
)
Employer,
)
and
)
)
TRANSCONTINENTAL INSURANCE
)
COMPANY,
)
)
Surety,
)
)
Defendants.
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~)

vs.

ADDENDUM TO BRIEF
IN SUPPORT OF MOTION
TO RECONSIDER AND/OR
MOTION FOR FURTHER
FINDINGS

COMES NOW Claimant herein, by and through counsel of record, and
hereby provides further argument in support of that Motion to Reconsider and/or
Motion for Further Findings, dated July 3, 2012, upon the issue of counsel's
entitlement to fees upon an l.C. § 72-804 fee award.
Within that Motion to Reconsider and/or Motion for Further Findings;
and, Brief in Support of Said Motion, dated July 3, 2012, the argument relevant to
the calculation of fees from the September 8, 2009, Order, at pages 4 through 6
thereof, counsel noted that,

Addendum to Briof In Support of Motion to Reconsider
andfor Motion for Further Findings - 1
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L. CL YEL BERRY, HARTERED
ATTORNEY AND COUNSELOR AT LAW
P.O. BOX302
Twin Falls, ID 83303-0302
Telephone: 2081734-9962
Fax Number: 2081734-9963
Idaho State Bar No. 1897

BEFORE THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO
VerDENE PAGE,
Claimant,
vs.
McCAIN FOODS, INC.,

)
)
)

l.C. No. 02-007246

)
)

ADDENDUM TO BRIEF
IN SUPPORT OF MOTION
TO RECONSIDER AND/OR
MOTION FOR FURTHER
FINDINGS

)
)

)
Employer,

)
)

)

and
TRANSCONTINENTAL INSURANCE
COMPANY,

)
)
)

)
)
Surety,
)
Defendants.
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~)

COMES NOW Claimant herein, by and through counsel of record, and
hereby provides further argument in support of that Motion to Reconsider and/or
Mot!on fm Further Findings, dated .July 3, 2012, upon the issue of counsel's
entitlement to fees upon an l.C. § 72-804 fee award.
Within that Motion to Reconsider and/or Motion for Further Findings;
and, Brief in Support of Said Motion, dated July 3, 2012, the argument relevant to
the calculation of fees from the September 8, 2009, Order, at pages 4 through 6
thereof, counsel noted that,

Addendum to Brief in Support of Motion to Reconsider
and/or Motion for Further Findings - 1

"From the perspective of this counsel, the l.C. § 72-804
fee award within the Commission's September 8, 2009,
Order, represented a Title 72 benefit which required
counsel's energies, time, resources and work-product,
no different than the other benefits which the September
8, 2009, Order awarded."
It was upon that basis that counsel added the l.C. § 72-804 fee award into the "pot"
of other Title 72 benefits awarded by the September 8, 2009, Order to be divided
with Ms. Page, pursuant to their Contingent Fee Agreement.

As noted within

counsel's Affidavit in Support of Motion for Reconsideration, at paragraph 6 thereof,
such is the practice, procedure and custom followed by each of the Title 72
attorneys contacted by counsel.

However, upon revisiting arguments made by

counsel within the July 3, 2012, Brief in Support, it is seen that that argument was
made from the perspective of counsel and failed to address or discuss argument
believed relevant from the perspective of the Commission in approving fees
pursuant to IDAPA 17.02.08.033.01.c., promulgated by the Commission as the
"Rule Governing Approval of Attorney Fees in Workers' Compensation Cases." As
noted by sub-paragraph 01. thereof, said Rule was promulgated by the Commission
" ... to govern the approval of attorney fees." (Emphasis added).
lt is respectfully suhmitted that from the perspective of the Idaho
State Industrial Commission, the "governing" consideration, pursuant to the Rule, is
whether the services of counsel, " ... operated primarily or substantially to secure the
fund out of which the attorney seeks to be paid." If so, the l.C. § 72-804 fee award
constitutes "available funds" to which counsel's "charging lien" may attach.

Addendum to Brief in Support of Motion to Reconsider
and/or Motion for Further Findings - 2

In the instant matter, the record is clear that but for the services of
counsel, Ms. Page would have received absolutely no Title 72 benefits by reason of
her claim. Thusly, by definition, the l.C. § 72-804 fee award constitutes "available
funds" secured primarily or substantially by the services of counsel out of which
counsel seeks to be paid, pursuant to the Contingent Fee Agreement between Ms.
Page and himself. As noted by and within the July 3, 2012, Motion to Reconsider
and/or Motion for Further Findings; and, Brief in Support, the services of counsel
which operated "primarily and substantially" to secure the l.C. § 72-804 fee award
were separate, distinct and identifiably different from counsel's services in securing
the remainder of the Title 72 benefits awarded by the September 8, 2009, Order.
IDAPA 17.02.08.033.01.c. does not limit or define "available funds" by
the nature or type of Title 72 benefits achieved by counsel's services with the
exception that "available funds" shall not include compensation paid or not disputed
to be owed prior to the Claimant's agreement to retain the attorney. Thusly, upon
consideration of the Commission's promulgation of IDAPA 17.02.08.033.01.c.,
constituting the Commission's "Rule Governing Approval of Attorney Fees in
Workers' Compensation Cases," the requested fees, if otherwise

reasonc:~b!e,

must

be approved and allowed as against the l.C. § i12-804 fee award.
CONCLUSION
In the instant matter, the Commission determined that counsel's
requested fees at the contingent rate of 40% were reasonable. The issue which the
instant Addendum addresses is whether an l.C. § 72-804 fee award is subject to
reasonable fees imposed by a claimant's counsel, where it is clear that counsel's
Addendum to Brief in Support of Motion to Reconsider
and/or Motion for Further Findings - 3

services operated primarily or substantially to secure the fee award, which
constitutes the fund out of which counsel seeks to be paid. The Commission's Rule
does not exclude an l.C. § 72-804 fee award from the "available funds" to which the
attorney's charging lien may attach. Idaho's Supreme Court, in Curr v. Curr, 124
Idaho 686, 864 P.2d 132 (1993), determined that, to modify attorney fee
agreements the Commission must have formally published clear guidelines upon
which it will base fee modifications. The Court held that,
"Without clear guidelines nestled in appropriately
promulgated regulations, attorney's actions are plagued
by doubt, which may have a chilling effect upon the
underlying purpose of the Workers' Compensation Act
that the Commission is constrained to promote under
l.C. § 72-508."
See 864 P.2d 132, at 137. As the guidelines promulgated by the Commission failed
to exclude an l.C. § 72-804 fee award from the "available

funds" to which an

attorney's charging lien may attach, it is respectfully submitted that counsel is
clearly entitled to fees against an l.C. § 72-804 award, where counsel's services
operated primarily or substantially to secure the same.
Counsel earlier argued that absent entitlement to fees upon an LC.

§ 72-804 fee sruard. c!a!mants' counsel could not invest, devote or risk their office's
resources required to develop and prosecute an l.C. § 72-804 claim. Were such to
be allowed to occur, claimants, across the board, would suffer. It must be recalled
that as fees are calculated upon a contingency basis, claimant receives the lion's
share of the award and thusly is greatly benefited thereby. Additionally, there is

Addendum to Brief in Support of Motion to Reconsider
and/or Motion for Further Findings - 4

another and potentially even greater negative effect to negating claimants'
counsels' motivation to prosecute an l.C. § 72-804 claim.
Claimants' counsel, motivated to prosecute an l.C. § 72-804 fee
award by the potential of fees, perform a public service to the workers of Idaho and
to the Idaho State Industrial Commission.

In effect, claimants' counsel act upon

behalf of Idaho's workers and the Industrial Commission by bringing wrongful
conduct and practices of employers and their sureties to the attention of the
Commission, which is then in a posture to determine whether such conduct comes
within l.C. § 72-804, and serves to both punish past and deters potential future
wrongful conduct of sureties.
RESPECTFULLY submitted this

day of August, 2012.

L. Clyel
rry
Attorney for Claimant
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
l hereby certify that I am a resident attorney of the State of Idaho ~nd
that on the 13th day of August, 2012, I served a copy of the foregoing document by
depc:sft~ng 2 true cr1py thc:reof in the LJnited States maiL ~)ostage prepaid;
addressed to the following:
VerDene Page
507 West 300 South
Heyburn, ID 83336
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J
..ii L CLYEL BERRY, .._HARTE RED
ATTORNEY AND COUNSELOR AT LAW

P.O. BOX302
Twin Falls, ID 83303-0302
Telephone: 2081734-9962
Fax Number: 2081734-9963
Idaho State Bar No. 1897

BEFORE THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO

)
)

VerDENE PAGE,
Claimant,

l.C. No. 02-007246

)
\

J

)

vs.

)

McCAIN FOODS, INC.,

)

MOTION TO
INTERVENE

)

Employer,
and
TRANSCONTINENTAL INSURANCE
COMPANY,

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

Surety,
Defendants.
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~)

COMES NOW Clyel Berry, individually, pursuant to Rule 24(a), Idaho
Rules of Civil Procedure, and hereby petitions the Idaho State Industrial
Commission tor its Order granting Clyel Berry permission to intervene in the instant
matter.
The basis of the instant Motion is that, in Kinghorn v. Clay, 12.17
ISCR 9, filed August 9, 2012, the Idaho State Supreme Court determined, in a civil
action, that although earlier decisions from the Court held that an attorney may
seek perfection of an attorney's lien within the same action as the one from which
the claim of lien arises, upon revisiting, " ... the plain language of IAR 4, an attorney
Motion to Intervene - 1

who seeks to participate in an appeal in order to advance his or her personal
interests with regard to a claimed charging lien ... must become a party in order to
have standing."
Upon said basis, to afford movant standing to potentially appeal from
any adverse Order or Decision of the Idaho State Industrial Commission entered
upon Claimant's currently pending Motion to Reconsider and/or Motion for Further
Findings, dated July 3, 2012, Clyel Berry respectfully requests the Idaho State
Industrial Commission for its Order granting movant permission to intervene herein.
Clyel Berry respectfully asserts that, pursuant to IRCP 24(a)(2), he
claims an interest relating to the subject of the instant action and that the disposition
thereof may, as a practical matter, impair or impede his ability to protect that
interest. Further, although Claimant herein, VerDene Page, supports Clyel Berry in
his request for fees, it may be found and/or determined that VerDene Page is not a
party "aggrieved" should the Commission deny, to any extent, the pending Motion
to Reconsider and/or Motion for Further Findings, such that she would lack standing
to appeal from the same.
RESPECTFULLY submitted this

2'1

day of August, 2012.

L. Clyel
rry
Attorney for Claim

Motion to Intervene - 2

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I hereby certify that I am a resident attorney of the State of Idaho and
that on the 2J1h day of August, 2012, I served a copy of the foregoing document
by depositing a true copy thereof in the United States mail, postage prepaid,
addressed to the following:
VerDene Page
507 West 300 South
Heyburn, ID 83336
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I
L. CLYEL BERRY, HARTERED
ATTORNEY AND COUNSELOR AT LAW
P.O. BOX302
Twin Falls, ID 83303-0302
Telephone: 2081734-9962
Fax Number: 2081734-9963
Idaho State Bar No. 1897

BEFORE THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO
)
)
)
Claimant,
)
)
vs.
)
)
McCAIN FOODS, INC.,
)
)
Employer,
)
)
and
)
)
TRANSCONTINENTAL INSURANCE
)
COMPANY,
)
)
Surety,
)
Defendants.
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~)
VerDENE PAGE,

l.C. No. 02-007246

CLAIMS FOR WHICH
INTERVENTION IS
SOUGHT

COMES NOW Clyel Berry, pursuant to IRCP 24(c) and hereby sets
forth tht: c!c:<ims for which inte1vention is sought as attorney's foes encompassed by

and within that December 17, 2009, Petition for Approval of Fees, together with
those Affidavits of Clyel Berry in Support of said Petition, dated December 17,
2009, December 28, 2009, and March 29, 2012; that Motion to Reconsider and/or
Motion for Further Findings, dated July 3, 2012, together with the Affidavit of Clyel
Berry in Support of Motion for Reconsideration, dated July 3, 2012; and, that

@j

Addendum to Brief in Support, dated August 13, 2012, together with all briefs,
Claims for Which Intervention is Sought - 1

memorandums and/or arguments of record in support thereof, to the extent that the
Idaho State Industrial Commission failed to approve/denied the same.
RESPECTFULLY submitted this

2 ry

day of August, 2012.

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that I am a resident attorney of the State of Idaho and
that on the 2J1h day of August, 2012, I served a copy of the foregoing document by
depositing a true copy thereof in the United States mail, postage prepaid,
addressed to the following:
VerDene Page
507 West 300 South
Heyburn, ID 83336
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BEFORE THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF THE STATE OF IDAHO

VERDENE PAGE,
Claimant,

IC 2002-007246
ORDER GRANTING
MOTION TO INTERVENE

v.

McCAIN FOODS, INC.,
Employer,
and
TRANSCONTINENTAL INSURANCE
COMPANY,
Surety,
Defendants.

This matter comes before the Idaho Industrial Commission on a Motion to Intervene filed
by Claimant's counsel, Clyel Berry individually. Mr. Berry requests the Commission grant him
permission to intervene in the instant matter so that he may have standing to potentially appeal
the Commission's decision regarding his attorney fees. Mr. Berry points out that it is he, not
Claimant, who is the aggrieved party.
The Commission has reviewed Mr. Berry's motion and hereby grants Mr. Berry
permission to intervene in this matter. Claimant's Motion to Intervene is GRANTED.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
DATED this£ day of

})o1iC41tJH <2012.
1

INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION

ORDER GRANTING MOTION TO INTERVENE - 1

Rec used

Thomas P. Baskin, Commissioner

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
2012 a true and correct copy of
I hereby certify that on the \ti\\,\ day
ORDER GRANTING MOTION TO INTERVENE was served by regular United States Mail
upon each of the following persons:
L CLYEL BERRY
PO BOX302
TWIN FALLS ID 83303-0302
MARK PETERSON
PO BOX 829
BOISE ID 83701-0829

ORDER GRANTING MOTION TO INTERVENE - 2
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BEFORE THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF THE STATE OF IDAHO

VERDENE PAGE,
Claimant,

IC 2002-007246

v.
McCAIN FOODS, INC.,

ORDER ON RECONSIDERATION
REGARDING ATTORNEY FEES

Employer,
and
TRANSCONTINENTAL INSURANCE
COMPANY,
Surety,
Defendants.

This matter comes before the Commission on Claimant's motion for reconsideration of

.
Commission's June 21, 2012 Order on Attorney Fees. The Order on Attorney Fees found that
Claimant's counsel (Counsel) was not entitled to additional attorney fees from Claimant after
Counsel entered into a stipulation with Defendants allowing 30% in attorney fees.

The

Commission further stated that attorney fees awarded pursuant to Idaho Code § 72-804 constitute
the fees that Counsel is to accept and are not to be added into the pot of all other benefits before
the contingent fee is taken.
Under Idaho Code § 72-718, a decision of the Commission, in the absence of fraud, shall
be final and conclusive as to all matters adjudicated; provided, within twenty (20) days from the
date of filing the decision any party may move for reconsideration or rehearing of the decision ..
ORDER ON RECONSIDERATION REGARDING ATTORNEY FEES -1

. and in any such event the decision shall be final upon denial of a motion for rehearing or
reconsideration or the filing of the decision on rehearing or reconsideration. J.R.P. 3(f) states
that a motion to reconsider "shall be supported by a brief filed with the motion."
On reconsideration, the Commission will examine the evidence in the case, and
determine whether the evidence presented supports the legal conclusions. The Commission is
not compelled to make findings on the facts of the case during a reconsideration. Davison v.
HH Keim Co., Ltd., 110 Idaho 758, 718 P.2d 1196. The Commission may reverse its decision
upon a motion for reconsideration, or rehearing of the decision in question, based on the
arguments presented, or upon its own motion, provided that it acts within the time frame
established in Idaho Code§ 72-718. See, Dennis v. School District No. 91, 135 Idaho 94, 15
P.3d 329 (2000) (citing Kindred v. Amalgamated Sugar Co., 114 Idaho 284, 756 P.2d 410
(1988)).
A motion for reconsideration must be properly supported by a recitation of the factual
findings and/or legal conclusions with which the moving party takes issue.

However, the

Commission is not inclined to re-weigh evidence and arguments during reconsideration simply
because the case was not resolved in a party's favor.
Counsel argues that he should be entitled to attorney fees from Defendants pursuant to
Idaho Code §72-804 (30% of benefits received per the stipulation executed by Counsel and
Defendants), as well as additional attorney fees from Claimant. Counsel states that it is obvious
that without the stipulation he would have been awarded 40% of fees. The Commission does not
agree that such a conclusion is obvious. The issue would have been addressed by both parties
and arguments would have been made before the Commission would have ruled on what was
appropriate for an award of attorney fees pursuant to Idaho Code §72-804. As stated before
ORDER ON RECONSIDERATION REGARDING ATTORNEY FEES - 2

@
.

/

Counsel had the opportunity to request 40% from Defendants and come to the Commission for a
ruling on that issue. The difference comes in how Counsel seeks his attorney fees and who will
bear the responsibility to pay those fees. The additional fees that Counsel is requesting will
come directly from Claimant, as opposed to Counsel making a case for 40% attorney fees to be
paid by Defendants pursuant to Idaho Code §72-804.
Counsel avers that because of the efforts in arguing for attorney fees under Idaho Code
§72-804, he is entitled to combine the amount of attorney fees awarded with the other
compensation and then take his percentage of the entire pot.

Counsel argues that the 804

attorney fee represents a benefit which should be treated like all other benefits and should be
included in the total amount of benefits from which contingent fees are due. Counsel contends
that it is unrealistic for the Commission to think that any attorney would pursue an award of
attorney fees pursuant to Idaho Code §72-804 if they will simply receive the same recovery as
they would receive.
The Commission acknowledges that Counsel will receive a larger fee if the percentage is
taken from the full pot, but it does not necessary follow that all claimant attorneys will walk
away from seeking 804 attorney fees if that calculation is not done. The Commission has great
faith that the majority of attorneys representing claimants seek to assist the claimant in keeping
the entirety of his or her benefits as well as to make defendants responsible for their
unreasonable delay or denial of benefits. Additionally, if Counsel's position is adopted how are
the responsibilities to be split? In this case Defendants paid 30% and Counsel is asking Claimant
to pay another 10%. But if Counsel had only asked Defendants for 20%, would Counsel ask
Claimant for another 20%. The Commission appreciates that Counsel is concerned with the
general process of compensating and incentivizing claimant attorneys, but the system must also
ORDER ON RECONSIDERATION REGARDING ATTORNEY FEES - 3

keep in mind the interests of claimants and the recovery of their benefits.
The Commission notes that IDAPA 17.02.08.033.01 does not apply to awards of attorney
fees pursuant to Idaho Code §72-804. IDAPA 17.02.08.033.01 governs lump sum settlements
but awards of attorney fees under Idaho Code §72-804 are guided by the analysis set forth in
Hogaboom v. Economy Mattress, 107 Idaho 13, 684 P.2d 990 (1984).

The Commission has reviewed the Order on Attorney Fees as well as the supporting
documents and we still find that the facts support the order.

Although Claimant disagrees with

the Commission's conclusions, the Commission finds the order is supported by substantial
evidence in the file and Claimant has presented no persuasive argument to disturb the order.
Claimant's Motion for Reconsideration is DENIED.
L

DATED this

~f\A
1

day

2012.
INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION

Rec used

Thomas P. Baskin, Commissioner
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
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I hereby certify that on the IL day
2012 a true and correct copy of
ORDER ON RECONSIDERATION REGARDING ATTORNEY FEES was served by
regular United States Mail upon each of the following persons:
L CLYEL BERRY
PO BOX 302
TWIN FALLS ID 83303-0302
MARK PETERSON
PO BOX 829
BOISE ID 83701-0829
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L.CLYELBERRY,CHARTERED
ATIORNEY AND COUNSELOR AT LAW
P.O.BOX302
Twin Falls, ID 83303-0302
Telephone: 208/734-9962
Fax Number: 208/734-9963
Idaho State Bar No. 1897

BEFORE THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO
VerDENE PAGE,
Claimant/Appellant,
vs.
McCAIN FOODS, INC.,
Employer,
and
TRANSCONTINENTAL INSURANCE
COMPANY,
Surety,
Defendants.
L.CLYELBERRY,CHARTERED,Real
Party in Interest/Intervenor -Appellant,
vs.
IDUSTRIAL COMMISSION, STATE OF
IDAHO, Real Party in Interest- Respondent

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

l.C. No. 02-007246
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TO:

THE ABOVE-NAMED RESPONDENTS, McCain Foods, Inc. and
Transcontinental Insurance Company, and their counsel, Mark C. Peterson,
of the firm, Moffatt, Thomas, Barrett, Rock & Fields, Chartered, P.O. Box

NOTICE OF APPEAL - 1

829, Boise, ID 83701-0829; and, the CLERK OF THE INDUSTRIAL
COMMISSION OF THE STATE OF IDAHO.
NOTICE IS HEREBY GIVEN THAT:

1.

The above-named Appellants appeal against the above-named
Respondent to the Supreme Court of the State of Idaho from
the following:
(a)

That Order Regarding Attorney Fees, dated and filed on
or about April 1, 2010, R.D. Maynard, Chairman,
presiding;

(b)

That Order on Attorney Fees, dated and filed on or about
June 21,

2012, Thomas

E.

Limbaugh, Chairman,

presiding;
(c)

That Order on Reconsideration Regarding Attorney
Fees, dated and filed on or about November 19, 2012,
Thomas E. Limbaugh, Chairman, presiding; and,

(d)

All other decisions and/or orders of record herein
denying L. Clyel Berry, Chartered, any claimed or
requested attorney fees.

2.

That Appellants have a right to appeal to the Idaho Supreme
Court and that the judgments or orders described in paragraph
1, above, are appealable under and pursuant to Rule 11 (d),
Idaho Appellate Rules.
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3.

Preliminary statement of issues on appeal:
(a)

Did the Idaho State Industrial Commission err by its
failure to discuss within its orders and/or decisions
appealed

from,

to

any extent,

whether the fees

requested were reasonable upon consideration of the
factors

set forth

within

Hogaboom

v.

Economy

Mattress, 107 Idaho 13, 684 P2d 990 (1994);

(b)

Did the Idaho State Industrial Commission err in
reviewing that Petition for Approval of Fees, dated
December 17, 2009, submitted pursuant to l.C. § 72803, upon the basis of l.C. § 72-804;

(c)

Did the Idaho State Industrial Commission err in limiting
fees approved pursuant to l.C. §72-803 to the Title 72
parties'

Stipulation

Regarding

Attorney

Fees,

as

approved by that Order Granting Stipulation, dated and
filed October 22, 2009, regarding benefits awarded by
the September 8, 2009, Order of the Idaho State
Industrial Commission;
(d)

Did the Idaho State Industrial Commission err in
approving fees upon the May 18, 2006, benefit payment
of thirty percent, rather than at the contingent fee rate of
forty percent, where fees were approved at the forty
percent rate on all other Title 72 benefits excepting those

NOTICE OF APPEAL - 3

encompassed within the September 8, 2009, Order of
the Idaho State Industrial Commission;
(e)

Did the Idaho State Industrial Commission err by
denying fees, to any extent, upon the value of the l.C. §
72-804 fee award within the September 8, 2009, Order
of the Idaho State Industrial Commission, with the effect
that claimants' attorneys will be denied any fees for the
successful prosecution of an l.C. § 72-804 claim;

(f)

Was the Idaho State Industrial Commission without
jurisdiction to modify and/or disregard the Contingent
Fee Agreement regarding a Fee Petition in which
Claimant specifically joined; there was no fee dispute by
and between counsel and Claimant; and, no guidelines
had been promulgated pertaining to fees considered
reasonable by the Idaho State Industrial Commission
upon re-hearing or following appeal;

(g)

Did

the

conduct

of

ii1e

Idaho

State

Industrial

Commission in sua esponte reducing an uncontested
Fee Agreement without properly enacted regulations or
guidelines constitute a deprivation of property rights
without due process of law, in violation of the Contract
and Due Process Clauses as well as the Fourteenth
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Amendment of the United States Constitution, and/or
Idaho Constitution Article 1 Section 16;
(h)

Does

the

of

refusal

the

Idaho

State

Industrial

Commission to approve a claimant's attorney's fees
upon the value of an l.C. § 72-804 fee award violate the
Equal

Protection

Clause

of

the

United

States

Constitution, where attorneys representing Title 72
defendants are at liberty to charge their clients for time
and services in defending that same l.C. § 72-804 claim;
(i)

Whether the services of L. Clyel Berry, Chartered,
" ... operated primarily or substantially to secure the (l.C.

§ 72-804 fee award pursuant to the September 8, 2009,
Industrial Commission Decision) out of which (it) seeks
to be paid," such that said l.C. § 72-804 fee award
constitutes "available funds" to which a "charging lien"
may attach.

If so, did the Idaho State Industrial

Commission err in failing to follow the guidelines
established by and within IDAPA 17.02.08.033.01.c,
promulgated by the Commission as the "Rule Governing
Approval of Attorney Fees in Workers' Compensation
Cases";
Whether the

Idaho

State

Industrial

Commission's

findings, rationale and/or determinations within the
NOTICE OF APPEAL - 5

above-described and identified Orders appealed from, to
the extent adverse to Appellants herein, are erroneous
as a matter of law; supported by substantial and
competent evidence of record; set forth specific findings
necessary and required for meaningful appellate review;
were arbitrary, capricious, and the product of an abuse
of discretion; and/or, whether relevant thereto, the
Commission failed to make proper application of law to
the evidence and/or facts of record herein, in reaching
the same;
(k)

Whether IDAPA 17.02.08.033 and/or, more specifically,
the interpretation and application thereof by the Idaho
State Industrial Commission contravene the underlying
purpose of the Workers' Compensation Act as codified in
l.C. § 72-201, that the Commission is constrained to
promote under l.C. § 72-508.

(I)

Whether the Notice of Hearing dated December 2, 2011,
and/or that Amended Notice of Hearing, dated January
12, 2012, were sufficient to comply with the mandate of
Idaho Code § 72-713, by failing to identify as an issue
whether Claimant's l.C. § 72-804 fee award was subject
to attorney fees, thereby denying appellants opportunity
to adequately prepare for the same.

(m)

Whether,

L.

Clyel Berry, Chartered,

is entitled to

reasonable attorney fees on appeal

herein, either

pursuant to the "Private Attorney General Theory" and/or
Idaho Code § 12-117, together with Rule 41, Idaho
Appellate Rules.
4.

Appellants request the preparation of the entire reporter's
standard transcript, specifically to include but not be limited to
the Transcript of the April 10, 2012, Hearing upon Appellants'
Petition for Approval of Fees.
preparation

Appellants do not request the

of the transcript in

compressed

format,

as

described in Rule 26, I.AR.
5.

Appellants request the following documents to be included in
the Clerk's record in addition to those automatically included
under Rule 28, I.AR.:
(a)

All Motions filed in said action from and following
January

31,

2008,

together

with

all

briefs,

memorandums, affidavits or other matters filed of record
in support thereof and/or in opposition thereto;

(b)

Those Findings, Conclusions, and/or Orders as identified
by and within paragraph 1, above;

(c)

Pursuant to Rule 28(c), I.AR., Appellants specifically
request that the following be included in the Clerk's
record:
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(1)

All

exhibits

submitted

from

and

following

January 31, 2008, whether admitted into the
record, or not;
(2)

All

instruments,

documents

and/or

writings

submitted to and/or filed with the Idaho State
Industrial Commission by the Title 72 parties
relating to the lump sum settlement of Claimant's
claim in chief against the Title 72 Defendants,
together with each and every Order of the Idaho
State

Industrial

Commission

relating

to the

approval thereof, in whole or in part, specifically to
include but not be limited to the following:
[a]

That Confidential Addendum to Lump Sum
Settlement Agreement Between Claimant
and Defendants Employer and Surety,
dated October 25, 2011, together with all
attachments thereto;

[b]

That Stipulation and Agreement of Partial
Lump

Sum

Discharge

and

Order

of

Approval and Discharge, dated on or about
October

25,

2011,

attachments thereto;
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together

with

ail

[c]

That Order Approving in Part Stipulation
and Agreement of Lump Sum Discharge,
dated November 9, 2011;

[d]

That Order Approving in Part Stipulation
and Agreement of Lump Sum Discharge,
dated December 9, 2011;

[e]

That Amended Order Approving in Part
Stipulation and Agreement of Lump Sum
Discharge, dated December 9, 2011; and,

[f]

That Stipulation and Agreement of Lump
Sum Discharge and Order of Approval and
Discharge Re: Future Medical Benefits,
approved by the Idaho State Industrial
Commission upon August 17, 2012;

(3)

That Request for Calendaring Re Claimant's
Counsel's Petition for Approval of Fees/Request
for IDAPA

17.02.08.033.03.b Hearing, dated

November 21, 2011;

(4)

The Industrial Commission's Notice of Hearing,
dated and filed December 2, 2011;

(5)

The Industrial Commission's Amended Notice of
Hearing, dated and filed January 12, 2012;
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(6)

That Post-Hearing Brief Upon Attorney Fee Issue,
dated May 1, 2012, with all exhibits and/or
attachments;

(7)

Matters of record upon appeal before the Idaho
Supreme Court in VerDene Page v. McCain
Foods, Inc., Supreme Court Docket No. 30391;

AND, matters of record upon appeal before the
Idaho Supreme Court in

VerDene Page v.

McCain Foods, Inc., Supreme Court Docket No.

33158.

Relevant thereto, Appellants hereby

advise they will file a Motion for Augmentation
and/or Consolidation of Record with respect to the
instant request.
6.

I certify:
(a)

That a copy of this Notice of Appeal has been served on
the Reporter.

(b)

That the estimated fee for preparation of the Reporter's
transcript has been paid to the Clerk of the Idaho State
Industrial Commission.

(c)

That the estimated fee for the preparation of the Clerk's
record has been paid.

(d)
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That the Appellant filing fee has been paid.

(e)

That service has been made upon all parties required to
be served pursuant to Rule 20.

DATED this

{p

day of December, 2012.

L. Clyel erry
Attorney for Appella s

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I hfreby certify that I am a resident attorney of the State of Idaho and
that on the _JJL_ day of December, 2012, I served a copy of the foregoing
document, by depositing a true copy thereof in the United States mail, postage
prepaid, upon the following:
Mark C. Peterson
MOFFATT, THOMAS, BARRETT,
ROCK & FIELDS, CHARTERED
P.O. Box 829
Boise, ID 83701-0829
VerDene Page
507 West 300 South
Heyburn, ID 83336
Clerk, Idaho Industrial Commission
P.O. Box 83720
Boise, ID 83720-0041

BEFORE THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO
VERDENE PAGE, Claimant, and
L. CL YEL BERRY, CHARTER,

056t

SUPREME COURT NO. '-/

Real Party in Interest/Intervenor/Appellants,
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MCCAIN FOODS, INC., Employer, and
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COMPANY, Surety, Defendants.
IDAHO INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION,
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Industrial Commission Chairman Thomas E. Limbaugh presiding.
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IC 2002-007246
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ORDER ON ATTORNEY FEES ENTERED JUNE 21, 2012; ORDER
ON RECONSIDERATION AND ORDER GRANTING MOTION TO
INTERVENE BOTH ENTERED NOVEMBER 19, 2012.
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L. CLYELBERRY
P.O. BOX302
TWIN FALLS, ID 83303-0302

Attorney for Respondent:

IDAHO INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION
BLAIR D. JAYNES, DEPUTY ATTORNEY GENERAL
P.O. BOX 83720
BOISE, ID 83720-0041
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L. CLYEL BERRY, Real Party in Interest/Intervenor
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IDAHO INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION, Real Party in Interest
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DECEMBER 7, 2012
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$94.00
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M. Dean Willis, CSR No. 95
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CERTIFICATION
I, DENA K. BURKE, the undersigned Assistant Secretary of the Industrial Commission
of the State of Idaho, hereby CERTIFY that the foregoing is a true and correct photocopy of the
NOTICE OF APPEAL FILED DECEMBER 7, 2012; ORDER ON ATTORNEY FEES
ENTERED JUNE 21, 2012; ORDER ON RECONSIDERATION AND ORDER
GRAl\'TING MOTION TO INTERVENE BOTH ENTERED NOVEMBER 19, 2012
herein, and the whole thereof, in IC case number 2002-007246 for Claimant Verdene Page.
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand and affixed the official seal
of said Commission this _l_O_th_ day of DECEMBER, 2012.

mi' :

Dena K. Burke, Assistant Coiunts
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VERDENE PAGE,
Claimant-Appellant,

v.
MC CAIN FOODS, INC., Employer, and
TRANSCONTINENTAL INSURANCE
COMPANY, Surety,
Defendants-Respondents,
and
IDAHO INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION,
Real Party in Interest-Respondent,
and
L. CLYEL BERRY, individually,

Intervenor-Appellant.

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

Supreme Court Docket No. 40568-2012
Industrial Commission No. 2002-7246

)
)
)

Dena,
Please make the following corrections and resend as an original not amended certificate.
If you have any questions, give me a call (208)334-2210.
1. Use the caption as shown above
2. Attorney for Respondent: Mark C. Peterson for McCain Foods & Transcontinental
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Insurance
PO Box 829
Boise ID 83701-0829
Blair D. Jaynes ....
3. Appealed against: McCain Foods, Transcontinental Insurance, Idaho Industrial Commission
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VERDENE PAGE,
Claimant-Appellant,

v.
MCCAIN FOODS, INC., Employer, and
TRANSCONTINENTAL INSURANCE COMPANY,
Surety,
Defendants-Respondents,
and

SUPREME COURT NO. 40568

CERTIFICATE OF APPEAL
OF VERDENE PAGE

IDAHO INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION,
Real Party in Interest-Respondent,

L. CLYEL BERRY, individually,
Intervenor-A

ellant.

Appeal From:

Industrial Commission Chairman. Thomas E. Limbaugh presiding.

Case Number:

IC 2002-007246

Order Appealed from:

ORDER ON ATTORNEY FEES ENTERED JUNE 21, 2012; ORDER
ON RECONSIDERATION AND ORDER GRANTING MOTION TO
INTERVENE BOTH ENTERED NOVEMBER 19, 2012.

Attorney for Appellants:

L. CLYEL BERRY
P.0.BOX302
TWIN FALLS, ID 83303-0302

Attorney for Respondents: EMPLOYER/SURETY:
MARK C. PETERSON
P.O. BOX 829
BOISE, ID 83701
IDAHO INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION:
BLAIR D. JAYNES, DEPUTY ATTORNEY GENERAL
P.O. BOX 83720
BOISE, ID 83 720-0041
Appealed By:

L. CLYEL BERRY, Intervenor-Appellant

Appealed Against:

MCCAIN FOODS, INC., Surety, and TRANSCONTINENTAL
INSURANCE COMPANY, Employer, and
ORIGINAL
IDAHO INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION

I ED.
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Notice of Appeal Filed:
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$94.00

Name of Reporter:

M. Dean Willis, CSR No. 95

Transcript Requested:
Dated:
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BEFORE THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO
VERDENE PAGE,
Claimant-Appellant,

SUPREME COURT NO. 40568

v.

MCCAIN FOODS, INC., Employer, and
TRANSCONTINENTAL INSURANCE COMPANY,
Surety,
Defendants-Respondents,
and

NOTICE OF COMPLETION

IDAHO INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION,
Real Party in Interest-Respondent,
L. CL YEL BERRY, individually,

Intervenor-Appellant.
TO:

STEPHEN W. KENYON, CLERK OF THE COURTS; AND
L. CL YEL BERRY, ESQ., FOR CLAIMANT AND INTERVENOR-APPELLANTS;
AND BLAIR D. JAYNES, ESQ., FOR THE IDAHO INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION,
REAL PARTY IN INTEREST-RESPONDENT

YOU ARE HEREBY NOTIFIED that the Agency's Record was completed on this date,
and, pursuant to Rule 24(a) and Rule 27(a), Idaho Appellate Rules, copies of the same have been
served by regular U.S. mail upon each of the following:
L. CLYEL BERRY
P.O. BOX 302
TWIN FALLS, ID 83303-0302

BLAIRD. JAYNES
DEPUTY ATTORNEY GENERAL
IDAHO INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION
P.O. BOX 83720
BOISE, ID 83720-0041

You are further notified that, pursuant to Rule 29(a), Idaho Appellate Rules, all
parties have twenty-eight days from this date in which to file objections to the Record,
including requests for corrections, additions or deletions. In the event no objections to the
Agency's Record are filed within the twenty-eight day period, the Transcript and Record
shall be deemed settled.
DATED at Boise, Idaho this 17TH day of January, 2013.

EA

i •:
Dena K. Burke
Assistant Commission~ec~tary
~ ~·.
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L CLYEL BERRY,

~

_ARTERED

ATTORNEY AND COUNSELOR AT LAW
P.O. BOX302
Twin Falls, ID 83303-0302
Telephone: 2081734-9962
Fax Number: 2081734-9963
Idaho State Bar No. 1897

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO
VerDENE PAGE,

)
)

Claimant-Appellant,

Supreme Court No. 40568

)
)
\

VS.

}

McCAIN FOODS, INC., Employer,
TRANSCONTINENTAL INSURANCE
COMPANY, Surety,
Defendants-Respondents,

)
)
)
)
)
)
)

STIPULATION FOR
CORRECTION AND ADDITIONS
TO/AUGMENTATION OF
AGENCY'S RECORD

)

And
IDAHO INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION
Real Party in Interest-Respondent,
L. CLYEL BERRY, individually,
Intervenor-Appellant.

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
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COME NOW the parties in the above-referenced and captioned
matter, each by and through respective counsel of record, pursuant to Rule 29(a),
Idaho Appellate Rules, and hereby stipulate, as follows:

I.

CORRECTION
That the Certificate of Appeal herein be corrected such that the November

19, 2012, Order Granting Motion to Intervene be deleted from the Orders Appealed
From.
STIPULATION FOR CORRECTION AND ADDITIONS TO/AUGMENTATION OF AGENCY'S
RECORD-1

II.

ADDITIONS TO/AUGMENTATION OF AGENCY'S RECORD:

It is hereby specifically stipulated that the following be added to the Agency's
Record:
1.

The Commission's Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and
Order, dated September 8, 2009;

2.

That Stipulation Regarding Attorney Fees, filed October 20,
2009;

3.

The Commission's Order Granting Stipulation, dated October
22, 2009;

4.

The Claimant's Petition for Approval of Fees, dated December
17, 2009;

5.

That Approval and Joinder in Petition for Approval of Fees,
dated December 29, 2009;

6.

Claimant's Motion to Reconsider and/or Motion for Further
Findings; and, Alternative Request for IDAPA 17.02.08.033.03.b
Hearing, dated April 9, 2010;

7.

The

Commission's

Amended

Order

Approving

in

Part

Stipulation and Agreement of Lump Sum Discharge, signed by
the Commission upon December 9, 2011; and,
8.

That Stipulation and Agreement of Lump Sum Discharge and
Order of Approval and Discharge re Future Medical Benefits, file
dated by the Commission August 17, 2012.

STIPULATION FOR CORRECTION AND ADDITIONS TO/AUGMENTATION OF AGENCY'S
RECORD-2

111.

RESERVATION OF RIGHT TO MAKE FURTHER REQUESTS FOR
AUGMENTATION OR DELETIONS:
It is further specifically understood and agreed that none of the parties hereto,

by entering into the instant Stipulation, waive their respective rights to move the
Supreme Court to further augment or delete from the settled Reporter's Transcript or
Agency's Record, pursuant to Rule 30 Idaho Appellate Rules.
DATED this

_j_ day of February, 2013.

L. Cly
erry, '
Attorney for Claimant-A pellant, VerDene
Page; and, Individually, as IntervenorAppellant

DATED this

LJ/

day of February, 2013.

David Ym/ng, Deputy/ Attorney General
Attorney for Idaho Industrial Commission,
Real Party in lnter~st-Resp6ndent

STIPULATION FOR CORRECTION AND ADDITIONS TO/AUGMENTATION OF AGENCY'S
RECORD-3

BEFORE THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF THE STATE OF IDAHO

VERDENE PAGE,
Claimant-Appellant,
V.

MCCAIN FOODS, INC., Employer, and
TRANSCONTINENTAL INSURANCE COMPANY,
Surety,
Defendants-Respondents,
and

IC 2002-007246
SUPREME COURT NO. 40568

ORDER AUGMENTING
RECORD

IDAHO INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION,
Real Party in Interest-Respondent,
L. CLYEL BERRY, individually,

Intervenor-Appellant.
On February 5, 2013, the parties filed a stipulation to augment the Clerk's Record on
appeal. The parties request that the following be made part of the record for this appeal.
Accordingly, the stipulation to augment is hereby GRANTED. The Commission will
included the following stipulated documents as Additional Documents under the Exhibits; all
parties shall be provided copies of the Exhibits:
ADDITIONAL EXHIBITS PER STIPULATION BY PARTIES
S-1.

Commission's Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and Order signed 9/8/09.

S-2.

Appellant's Stipulation Regarding Attorney Fees filed 10/20/09.

S-3.

Commission's Order Granting Stipulation signed 10/22/09.

S-4.

Appellant's Petition for Approval of Fees filed 12/30/09.

S-5.

Appellant's Approval and Joinder in Petition for Approval for Approval of
Fees with affidavit and second affidavit all filed 12/30/09.

S-6.

Commission's Order Regarding Attorney Fees signed 411110.

S-7.

Appellant's Motion to Reconsider and/or Motion for Further Findings; and,
Alternative Request for IDAPA 17.02.08.033.03.b Hearing filed 4112/10.

ORDER AUGMENTING RECORD (docket 40568-2012 RE: VERDENE PAGE)-1

S-8.

Commission's Amended Order Approving In Part Stipulation and Agreement
of Lump Sum Discharge signed 12/9/11.

S-9.

Stipulation and Agreement of Lump Sum Discharge and Order of Approval
and Discharge Re: Future Medical Benefits filed 8/8/12.

S-10. Commission's Order of Approval and of Discharge Upon Lump Sum Payment
signed 8/17/12 and Stipulation and Order of Dismissal with Prejudice Relating
to Medical Benefits and Commission's Order signed 8/17/12.

IT IS

so ORD·~~fP·

DATED this / 7 ....-day of February, 2013.

.

INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

{qtjs_

I hereby certify that on the
day of February, 2013 a true and correct copy of the
ORDER AUGMENTING RECORD was served by regular United States Mail upon each of
the following persons:
L. CL YEL BERRY, ESQ.
P.O. BOX302
TWIN FALLS, ID 83303-0302

BLAIRD. JAYNES
DEPUTY ATTORNEY GENERAL
P.O. BOX 83720
BOISE, ID 83720-0041

IDAHO SUPREME COURT
STEPHEN W KENYON
STATEHOUSE MAIL
PO BOX 83720
BOISE ID 83720-0101

dkb

ORDER AUGMENTING RECORD (docket 40568-2012 RE: VERDENE PAGE) - 2

